Once focused on territorial defense, the PLAAF now claims to have regional projection capabilities. Does its doctrine really match its resources?
Summary
Since the 1990s, the PLAAF‘s doctrine has undergone profound changes. From a logic of territorial defense, focused on protecting national airspace and supporting ground forces, the Chinese air force now claims to be a tool for power projection capable of operating beyond the first archipelago, within the framework of Joint Operations and Information Warfare. The strategic guidelines published in 1993 and 2004 successively introduced the concepts of “local wars under high-tech conditions” and then “computerized wars,” while the concept of Active Defense became the doctrinal pivot of an officially defensive but operationally offensive posture. In terms of capabilities, the modernization has been spectacular: J-20 fighters, H-6K bombers, YY-20 tanker aircraft, and Y-20 transport aircraft have significantly increased the PLAAF’s range of action. However, there remains a real gap between the stated combat doctrine and the ability to conduct complex joint air campaigns over the long term, especially outside China’s immediate vicinity.
Doctrinal transformation since the 1990s
The PLAAF’s doctrinal shift is part of the overall evolution of Chinese military strategy. In the early 1990s, after the Gulf War, Beijing recognized the overwhelming superiority of US air power. In 1993, military guidelines were revised: the priority became preparing to win “local wars under high-tech conditions.”
In 2004, a new shift enshrined the concept of computerized local wars: the emphasis was placed on networks, sensor fusion, precision strikes, and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) integration. The PLAAF gradually ceased to be a simple “umbrella” over the territory and became a decisive player in Chinese combat doctrine.
This evolution remains framed by Active Defense. Beijing insists on a strategically defensive posture: armed force would only be used to protect sovereignty and essential interests. But at the operational level, doctrinal texts assume offensive campaigns, including preventive ones, in airspace and beyond borders, in order to neutralize enemy assets early on.
For the PLAAF, this means striking enemy air bases, command systems, naval platforms, and logistics centers, rather than simply repelling intrusions over its territory. Since the 2000s, Chinese white papers have explicitly referred to the transition from a “territorial air defense” mission to a combined “defensive and offensive” function.
A combat doctrine geared toward regional projection
The current doctrine emphasizes a full spectrum of air campaigns: air offensives, air defense, air blockade, support for naval and ground forces, protection of sea lanes, and coverage of amphibious operations. Since the early 2000s, RAND’s work on PLAAF employment concepts has described a rise in offensive air campaigns aimed at disrupting the enemy’s system in the early hours of a conflict.
The idea of air-space power is also emerging: the PLAAF is no longer limited to the third dimension. It sees itself as a player in the struggle for information superiority, using satellites, electronic warfare, and anti-satellite capabilities to blind the adversary and protect its own networks.
In this vision, the Combat Doctrine is based on several pillars:
- surprising and saturating enemy defenses with coordinated air-sea-cyber strikes;
- quickly neutralizing enemy command and intelligence capabilities;
- protecting vital economic areas, particularly maritime approaches and large coastal cities;
- extending combat beyond the “first island chain” to keep American and allied forces at bay.
However, this ambition remains primarily regional: the priority is still to control the immediate surroundings—Taiwan, the China Seas, the western Pacific—rather than to develop a global projection capability comparable to that of the United States.
The central role of information warfare and joint operations
Information warfare at the heart of doctrine
Since the early 2000s, information warfare has been at the center of Chinese theoretical writings. Beijing believes that the side that gains information superiority—i.e., the ability to collect, process, and exploit reliable data faster than the enemy—gains a decisive advantage. Doctrinal documents emphasize the need to strike enemy communication networks, navigation systems, sensors, and decision-making centers, while protecting one’s own communications.
For the PLAAF, this translates into the development of long-range radars, early warning platforms (KJ-2000, KJ-500), embedded electronic warfare capabilities, and offensive cyber capabilities. The goal is to operate in a “computerized” environment, or even in the future an “intelligent” environment (warfare supported by artificial intelligence), where the time between detection and strike is reduced to a few tens of seconds.
Joint Operations still maturing
The 2015-2016 reforms restructured the chain of command around five theater commands, each responsible for an operational area and with a joint staff. The PLAAF’s tactical forces now report to these theater commands, while the Air Force headquarters retains control of strategic assets (bombers, heavy transport, airborne troops).
On paper, Joint Operations are becoming the norm: campaigns combining air strikes, ballistic and cruise missile strikes, naval and cyber operations, all integrated into a single campaign plan. The PLAAF is expected to play a leading role in this, both as a strike vector and as a provider of intelligence and air cover.
In practice, progress remains difficult to measure. Numerous joint exercises show a real step up in scale, with complex scenarios simulating operations around Taiwan or in the South China Sea. But the joint culture is recent, service reflexes remain, and the PLAAF has not yet been tested in a high-intensity war where real-time coordination would be put to the test.
The PLAAF’s real capabilities: rapid modernization, controlled power
In terms of equipment, the transformation has been spectacular. In 2007, the PLAAF still fielded a majority of aircraft derived from Soviet models from the 1950s and 1960s (J-6, J-7, Q-5). Less than twenty years later, it relies mainly on 4th and 5th generation fighters (J-10C, J-11B, J-16, J-20), while older aircraft have been withdrawn or relegated to secondary roles.
The overall size of the fleet has remained relatively stable, at around 2,200 to 2,300 aircraft, but the proportion of modern aircraft has exploded. At the same time, the support fleet—refueling tankers, transport aircraft, radar aircraft, drones—has been significantly strengthened. By 2024, China is expected to have around 16 Y-20U/YY-20 tankers and more than 50 Y-20A heavy transport aircraft, not counting the modernized Y-8 and Y-9.
H-6K/H-6N bombers, capable of carrying up to six long-range cruise missiles (over 1,500 km), now conduct regular patrols around Taiwan, as far as the western Pacific. These platforms, supported by refueling aircraft, give the PLAAF a real deep strike capability against naval or land targets located beyond the first island chain.
The transport and airborne dimension has also been strengthened: around 50 Y-20s and several airborne brigades theoretically enable rapid deployment of troops and equipment over long distances, even though China currently has only one permanent overseas base, in Djibouti.
A projection tool that remains essentially regional
Despite this progress, the PLAAF’s power projection remains largely regional. The majority of bomber and fighter sorties are carried out in or around the first and second island chains: the Taiwan and Miyako Straits, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea.
China still lacks several critical elements for global projection:
- a network of overseas air bases;
- a fleet of refueling and transport aircraft comparable in size to that of the United States;
- operational experience in prolonged campaigns far from national territory.
The PLAAF is now capable of flying long distances on an ad hoc basis, but it would find it very difficult to sustain intense air operations week after week in a distant theater while maintaining regional pressure.
The doctrinal-capability gap: ambitions and realities
The doctrinal ambition—to conduct coordinated, integrated air campaigns in a contested environment—still outstrips the means in several areas. This doctrinal-capability gap is visible on three levels.
First, Joint Operations remain imperfect. Reforms have created structures, but culture, cross-training, and truly unified information systems take time to spread. The key issue is the PLAAF’s ability to cooperate in real time with naval and missile forces in an environment where communications will be jammed, targeted, or even partially destroyed.
Second, information warfare is a double-edged sword. The PLAAF relies on dense networks of sensors, data links, and satellites to conduct its operations. But this dependence creates a symmetrical vulnerability: if the adversary succeeds in striking satellites, disrupting networks, or infiltrating systems, command and coordination capabilities could be seriously affected.
Finally, conducting deeply offensive air campaigns with a strong Active Defense component requires a large number of modern platforms, precision-guided munitions, and support assets. The PLAAF is progressing rapidly, but its stocks of cruise missiles, long-range air-to-ground munitions, and guided bombs remain much less well documented than its fleet of aircraft. The endurance of such a campaign over time is therefore uncertain.
An ambitious doctrine facing the test of modern warfare
The trajectory is clear: the Chinese air force has moved from being a second-tier defensive force to becoming a central player in Beijing’s military strategy. On paper, the PLAAF’s Combat Doctrine now aligns with the standards of the major powers: offensive Active Defense, structured Information Warfare, Joint Operations, air-space power logic, and the rise of regional power projection.
But military history shows that there can be a considerable gap between a written doctrine and its execution in the fog of war. The PLAAF has not yet faced an adversary of the same technological level in a high-intensity conflict. It is only in such an environment—highly contested, saturated with jamming, precision strikes, and cyber attacks—that we will be able to measure whether the concepts developed over the past 30 years truly correspond to the operational capabilities built up over the past decade.
Sources
– Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, Washington D.C., 2024.
– DIA, China Military Power, 2019 (chapter on the PLAAF and the transition from territorial defense to an offensive-defensive posture).
– Roger Cliff et al., Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth: Chinese Air Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century, RAND Corporation, 2011.
– China Aerospace Studies Institute, PLA Aerospace Power Primer, 3rd edition, Maxwell AFB, 2022.
– Congressional Research Service, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), R46808, 2021.
– M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949, Princeton University Press, 2019.
– Articles and analyses 2023-2025 on PLAAF modernization (Defense Blog, Economic Times, think tank reports, and RAND/CSIS studies).
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