In Ukraine, drones are disrupting the use of fighter jets and bombers. Costs, production, efficiency, and moral impact: doctrine is changing on the ground.
In summary
The war in Ukraine has shattered a comfortable notion: aviation no longer automatically “dominates” a theater of operations. Fighter jets and bombers remain decisive, but their value now depends on a brutal factor: survivability in the face of dense anti-aircraft defenses and aggressive electronic warfare. At the same time, drone warfare has transformed the balance of power. Drones are fast, easily replaceable, and can be deployed by the thousands, becoming an everyday tool for attrition, intelligence gathering, and strikes. Ukraine and Russia have adapted their methods. They protect their aircraft, favor long-range strikes, and entrust the bulk of tactical actions to drones. This shift also has a psychological effect. Drones create a permanent, visible, close-range threat that weighs heavily on infantry, cities, and supply chains. This war does not render aviation obsolete. It ruthlessly redefines what really “counts” in the sky.
The end of a doctrinal reflex inherited from the last century
For decades, Western air forces built their doctrines on a simple promise: gain air superiority, then exploit freedom of action. This logic worked in conflicts where the adversary did not have a dense, modern, and well-coordinated surface-to-air network.
Ukraine breaks this pattern. The skies there are constantly contested. Both sides operate under the threat of a multi-level ground-to-air layer, ranging from MANPADS near the front line to medium- and long-range systems. As a result, an aircraft that “enters” too far takes a disproportionate risk, even if it is high-performance.
This is the most important point. The value of an aircraft is no longer measured solely by its speed or radar. It is measured by its ability to survive, strike from a distance, and be available the next day. In this context, the central role is no longer played by the individual aircraft. It is played by the strike and intelligence architecture, both above and on the ground.
The rise of drones as a weapon of mass and routine
The most visible disruption is the rise of drones at all levels. Drones are no longer a technological “plus.” They are the standard tool. Reconnaissance, artillery fire correction, targeted strikes, mining, jamming, interception of other drones: everything goes through them.
The figures are staggering. By 2024, Ukraine is expected to have produced around 2.2 million drones of various types. In 2025, production is expected to exceed 4.5 million, including more than 2 million FPV drones, according to structured estimates. For its part, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has reported that order volumes and budgets dedicated to drones are reaching industrial levels, with more than 110 billion hryvnias announced for drone purchases in 2025.
This reality is creating a new norm: mass production. Aircraft are manufactured slowly, in small batches, with long cycles. Drones are manufactured quickly, in a continuous flow, with weekly adaptability. This is a doctrinal shock. Power no longer comes solely from quality. It comes from speed and the ability to accept losses.
Cost-effectiveness that is shaking up conventional aviation
In the field, the debate is not philosophical. It is economic and operational. An aircraft sortie is expensive, requiring fuel, infrastructure, a maintenance chain, and a pilot who is difficult to replace. A drone, on the other hand, is expendable. It costs little, is quick to train, and can be sacrificed to reveal a position or force a reaction.
This is where the concept of cost-effectiveness becomes central. Destroying a drone with a sophisticated surface-to-air missile raises an immediate question: how much does the interception cost, and how much does the intercepted object cost? This asymmetry is pushing armies to seek “low-cost” solutions: cannons, jammers, lasers in the long term, and now interceptor drones.
In a war of attrition, aircraft once again become a rare asset. They are not unusable. They become precious. And what is precious is protected, and therefore less exposed. This automatically reduces the volume of “contact” missions that aviation can undertake.
The transformation of combat aviation missions
Aviation has not disappeared. It has changed its posture.
On the Russian side, the use of fighter jets and bombers has largely shifted to remote strikes. The idea is simple: stay out of areas with the densest ground-to-air defenses and strike with missiles or guided gliding bombs. This limits losses, but changes the nature of air support. Areas are no longer “cleaned up” at close range. Instead, strikes are carried out on zones, infrastructure, logistics points, and identified positions.
On the Ukrainian side, aviation has been forced to be ingenious. Missions still exist, but they are often designed as controlled-risk operations, with very low flight profiles, short windows, and long-range firing. Electronic warfare plays a critical role here: it can save an aircraft by disrupting enemy engagement, but it can also make ammunition less accurate if signals are degraded.
This reality is transforming the profession. Pilots are no longer just fighter pilots. They are becoming threat managers, sensor operators, and “deliverers” of stand-off munitions in a saturated environment.
Direct competition between drones and aircraft on the front lines
The Ukrainian front line resembles a continuous line of approximately 965 km (600 miles), with a density of sensors and observers that reduces surprises. In this space, drones are the kings of tactics. They spot, correct, strike. They maintain constant pressure. They make every move count.
Aircraft, on the other hand, excel in other areas: speed of intervention over long distances, heavy payloads, the ability to deliver complex effects, and above all, striking deep. Long-range drones exist, but they carry little, are slower, and are more susceptible to jamming. They are excellent for harassing, saturating, and wearing down the enemy. They are less suited to delivering a single massive effect.
This is the new division of labor. Drones wage everyday warfare. Aircraft wage decisive warfare, when they can.
Industrial resilience as a factor of superiority
Industry has become a battlefield. Ukraine has structured a large-scale production and procurement ecosystem. So has Russia, with an increase in the production of attack drones and decoys.
Credible estimates suggest that Russia is producing thousands of Shahed/Geran-type drones per month, with monthly volumes reported at around 2,700 units for certain types, alongside an effort to produce decoys. This level of production changes everything: defense no longer has to stop “a few” drones. It has to stop hundreds in a short window of time.
In this context, aircraft and bombers face a harsh reality: mass. They can destroy, but they cannot be everywhere. Drones fill this void, not by replacing aircraft, but by multiplying points of friction.
Nuisance and attrition as new military currencies
Modern warfare in Ukraine is not just about breakthroughs. It seeks exhaustion. Drones are perfect for this. They impose constant tension, day and night. They force camouflage, dispersion, and slowing down. They degrade logistics. They cost time and nerves.
This logic creates low-noise attrition. It is less spectacular than a major air battle, but more constant. It affects equipment, but also habits and morale.
Loitering munitions illustrate this phenomenon. They combine reconnaissance and strike capabilities. They allow you to wait, choose, and strike at the right moment. They punish error and immobility. They reduce the value of isolated armored vehicles, poorly protected command posts, and overly visible depots.
In response to this, the role of the aircraft has been redefined: it is no longer the sole tool for rapid punishment. It has become part of a system, sometimes the weapon of strategic “last mile” strikes, but rarely a tool for daily harassment.
Air superiority, now fragmented and local
Another major doctrinal change is that air superiority is no longer a stable state. It is local, temporary, contested, and sometimes invisible.
Both sides can create windows of opportunity. But these windows are short. They rely on surprise, jamming, saturation, and rapid exploitation of a breach. In this model, drones play the role of scout, decoy, and saturator.
Aircraft intervene when conditions are right. They strike quickly, then withdraw. This approach limits losses but reduces air “presence.” And less air power leaves more room for drones and artillery.
The psychological impact on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides
Let’s be blunt. Drones weigh on morale because they make the threat feel intimate. An aircraft flies by, strikes, and disappears. A drone can stay, observe, return, and strike a soldier a few meters away. It is an oppressive presence.
On the Ukrainian side, drones are also a compensatory tool. They offer a capacity for action despite numerical inferiority in certain segments. They give the impression of being able to strike back blow for blow. They create a sense of local control, even when strategic pressure is high.
On the Russian side, the effect is more ambiguous. Russia has also massively increased its use of drones. But the exposure of units, visible losses, and the constant threat of contact are wearing down morale. Here again, the key is not just destruction. It is fatigue, constant vigilance, and the feeling of being watched all the time.
This moral impact is an operational fact. An exhausted soldier makes mistakes. A slowed-down convoy becomes a target. A unit that is no longer moving becomes detectable.
The new balance emerging for the post-Ukraine era
The lesson is not “drones replace aircraft.” The lesson is harder: in a high-intensity war, the sky belongs to those who combine sensors, jamming, mass, and industrial cadence.
Combat aircraft retain major value, but they must evolve. More connectivity. More stand-off munitions. More human-machine cooperation. And above all, complete integration with drones, from the smallest FPV to the largest reconnaissance drone.
The decisive point is this: aviation is no longer a separate weapon. It is a function of the overall combat system. Ukraine has demonstrated this at a very high price. Armies that ignore this reality will discover, too late, that modernity does not forgive rigid doctrines.
Sources
- OSW (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich) — Game of drones: the production and use of Ukrainian …
- Ministry of Defense of Ukraine — In 2025, the Ministry of Defense plans to procure 4.5 million FPV drones
- Reuters — Ukraine to produce thousands of long-range drones in 2024, minister says
- CSIS — Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign
- ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment (production of Shahed-type drones)
- Business Insider — Ukraine’s ground robots are surging in popularity… (data on drone missions and share of strikes)
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.