Air incursions, crossing the median line, risk of accidents: Beijing is wearing down Taiwan through daily, measured pressure.
In summary
China is pursuing a low-key strategy of attrition against Taiwan. The principle is simple: increase the number of sorties around the island, regularly cross the median line of the strait, and force Taiwan to react. This tempo wears down fleets, maintenance, stocks, and personnel. It also changes tactical reflexes: Taiwan has had to adapt its responses and no longer takes off systematically at every alert, as the cost and fatigue become untenable. The most serious risk is not only military. It is accidental and political. The more close interactions there are, the greater the likelihood of a collision or an “unprofessional” incident. In this type of crisis, a trivial event can become a trigger. Finally, this daily pressure has a psychological objective: to impose the idea of permanent Chinese superiority and inevitability.
The mechanics of calibrated pressure, typical of the gray zone
The Taiwan Strait is not large. At its narrowest point, it separates the coasts by a distance of 130 to 180 km (70 to 100 nm). This is significant because fighter jets based on the mainland can enter, exit, make another pass, and start again without mobilizing heavy projection logistics.
Beijing’s logic is to exploit this proximity without crossing the obvious threshold of open warfare. Aircraft sorties (J-16 fighters, H-6 bombers, support aircraft) send a daily political signal. They also test Taiwan’s chains of command: detection times, alert decisions, takeoffs, radar guidance, and ground-to-air defense posture.
What Taiwan measures and publishes day after day are trajectories and volumes. And the volumes are rising. In open sources, 2024 is presented as a record year for crossings of the median line since 2021, with annual totals that have jumped over several years. Beyond the symbolism, repetition creates normalization: what was once a crisis becomes routine. This is exactly the desired effect.
Sky saturation and statistics that change the balance of power
Two figures sum up the operational angle. First, the overall volume of activity. Second, the share of this activity that “crosses the threshold” and forces decisions to be made quickly, with incomplete information.
In 2024, analyses indicate that Taiwan tracked several thousand aircraft around the island over the course of the year, and that a significant portion entered the ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone). Similarly, research centers describe a sharp increase in sorties crossing the median line over the years, with a notable acceleration in 2024.
Why do these figures matter? Because air defense functions as a sorting system. When detections become daily and numerous, each alert must be classified: exercise, intimidation, cover for broader training, attempt to gather intelligence, or preparation for more aggressive action. When in doubt, we overreact. And if we overreact too often, we exhaust ourselves.
The trick is this: Beijing can “spend” sorties at a low political cost. Taiwan, on the other hand, “spends” availability, maintenance hours, alerts, and human vigilance. It’s not symmetrical.
Taiwan’s dilemma between visible reaction and sustainable management
Flying fighter jets every time an aircraft passes overhead is reassuring in the short term. It shows that we control the skies. But in the long term, it’s a drain.
Taiwan has adjusted its policy. Analyses report that, starting in 2021, the defense has stopped systematically scrambling fighters for every sortie, relying more on ground-based radars and surface-to-air missiles to track, deter, and reserve scrambles for cases deemed more serious. This is not a “comfortable” choice. It is a choice forced by sustainability.
The reason is simple: a fighter jet is not just fuel. It is a chain. Every hour of flight consumes potential engines, structural cycles, and technician time. With a heterogeneous fleet, including older aircraft, the pressure quickly mounts. Budgetary constraints follow.
The real cost of a scramble and the logic of mechanical wear
The term “scramble” refers to a rapid takeoff on alert. It’s spectacular. It’s also expensive and rarely “optimized”: rapid climb, dynamic flight profiles, constraints on airframes, and sometimes return without engagement.
Open source estimates have cited hourly interception takeoff costs in the millions of Taiwanese dollars per hour, including fuel, maintenance, and parts. Although the exact figure varies depending on the aircraft and the method of calculation, the order of magnitude is sufficient to understand the trap: repetition transforms a defensive posture into a structural expense.
A concrete example can be given on the fleet side: Taiwan’s Mirage 2000s are often described as expensive to maintain, with operating costs significantly higher than other types. Taiwan has announced investments of several hundred million dollars to maintain the availability of this fleet and its associated missiles. In an attrition strategy, these budget lines become points of tension.
Ultimately, saturation is not just about “scaring” people. It aims to drive up costs, force trade-offs, and reduce the number of aircraft actually available on the day when the activity turns into a major crisis.
The human dimension and crew fatigue as a safety factor
The most underestimated part is this: the human factor. Daily pressure destroys regularity. It multiplies shifts, on-call duties, nighttime wake-ups, and flights with high mental loads.
A pilot on constant alert is not only physically tired. He is also subject to cognitive debt. So is a technician. And so is a chain of command. Repetition mechanically increases the probability of error: misidentification, poor radio transmission, misunderstood trajectory, or delayed decision-making.
In aviation, accidents rarely result from a single factor. They result from an accumulation of factors: fatigue, routine, distraction, weather, hierarchical pressure, tactical ambiguity. The attrition strategy plays with these variables. It does not need to be successful every time. It needs the probability of an incident to increase.
The risk of close encounters and the risk of collision as an accelerator
The saturation around Taiwan is combined with a second phenomenon: the increase in interceptions deemed “dangerous” or “unprofessional” in the Indo-Pacific region. Western militaries have issued several alerts about aggressive maneuvers by Chinese fighter jets during interceptions, including J-16 aircraft involved in reported incidents.
These events are important because they provide insight into the style of flying and the level of risk accepted. Flying too close, a sudden maneuver, a wake, a rapid closure. At a distance of just a few meters, everything becomes binary: either nothing happens, or there is an immediate accident.
And in the event of an accident, the issue is not just aeronautical. It is political. Who is responsible? Who publishes the images? Who “responds”? In an already congested area, a collision can turn a routine situation into a major crisis in a matter of hours.
The operational consequences for Taiwan, beyond the numbers
The most direct operational effect is availability management. Taiwan must maintain armed aircraft, ready crews, and continuous radar surveillance. It must also maintain stocks: parts, tires, brakes, consumables, missiles, and maintenance hours.
The second effect is tactical. If it is not possible to take off every time there is an incursion, choices must be made. And choosing means accepting that some of China’s activity will take place without close interception. Beijing gains training and intelligence-gathering space.
The third effect is doctrinal: a more “networked” defense is being developed, with more sensors on the ground and graduated responses. But this graduated response has its limits. If activity suddenly intensifies, we have to step up a gear very quickly. And this is where the strategy of attrition attempts to create a delay: slowing down Taiwan’s ability to switch from “saturated routine” mode to “acute crisis” mode.
Historical precedents and the trap of the psychological effect
In military history, attrition through alertness is nothing new. The Cold War saw an increase in presence missions, interceptions, and demonstrations of force designed to wear down attention and elicit reactions. The difference here is the frequency and proximity, combined with a battle of real-time storytelling.
This strategy has already “worked” in a specific sense: it has often forced the adversary to change its procedures, accept more passages, or spend more on maintenance. But it carries a structural risk: the rise of accidental danger. The more you play on the edge, the more you expose yourself to unwanted events.
That’s why we have to be frank. The strategy of attrition is rational on paper. It is also unstable. It is based on the assumption that everyone will remain disciplined and that no incident will escape political control. However, aviation is a field where a second of error is enough.
The final question and the sticking point of unintended escalation
If the goal is to wear down Taiwan, the method is consistent: saturation, repetition, crossings, normalization, budgetary pressure, human pressure. Over the years, this erodes.
But if the goal is to keep the crisis “under control,” the method becomes dangerous. The volume of activity increases the opportunities for error, and incidents of aggressive interception observed elsewhere in the region show that the risk is not theoretical.
My opinion is clear: this strategy is effective for wearing down and testing. It is also an accident waiting to happen. Beijing wins as long as the incident does not occur. The day it does, controlling the escalation will depend less on plans than on politics, communication, and the ability of the actors involved not to overreact in the first few hours.
Sources
Jamestown Foundation, “Military Implications of PLA Aircraft Incursions in Taiwan’s Airspace, 2024” (flights crossing the median line, annual totals).
Janes, “China sets new records in air-sea operations around Taiwan” (volumes tracked, share of ADIZ incursions).
FPRI, “Breaking the Barrier: Four Years of PRC Military Activity Around Taiwan” (adjustment of Taiwan’s takeoff policy in 2021).
South China Morning Post, “Taiwan reveals high cost of PLA sorties…” (order of magnitude of takeoff/interception costs).
AeroTime, “Taiwan invests $339M in Mirage 2000-5 fleet combat readiness” (budgetary effort on Mirage 2000-5).
CSIS ChinaPower, “Tracking the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis” (examples of aircraft package compositions, J-16/H-6).
USINDOPACOM, press release dated May 30, 2023 (“aggressive” interception by a J-16, interception risk).
Associated Press, Australia–China incident on February 13, 2025 (J-16, flares at 30 m).
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.