Purchases of American weapons, trade concessions, technical dependencies: Europe clings to Washington despite Trump’s political and economic pressure.
In summary
In psychology, “trauma bonding” describes a paradoxical attachment to a figure who dominates, humiliates, or threatens. Transposed to the geopolitical arena, the concept sheds light on a troubling dynamic between Europe and Donald Trump: the tougher the relationship becomes, the more Europe consolidates its dependence. The mechanics are visible in the figures and decisions. Since 2022, arms contracts signed by Europeans have shifted heavily toward the United States, for understandable reasons of urgency, interoperability, and industrial availability. But under Trump, this dependence has also become a tool of power: threats of tariffs, pressure on NATO, implicit blackmail for protection. The trade agreement of summer 2025, with a 15% US tariff on most European goods, is accompanied by European promises of massive purchases of US energy and investments, while also formalizing defense purchases. The result is a more “secure” transatlantic relationship in the short term, but one that is potentially more costly, more asymmetrical, and more difficult to loosen in the medium term.
Trauma bonding as a political framework, without caricature
The term trauma bonding comes from the clinical field. It describes the emotional bond that forms when a victim alternates between fear, relief, and seeking approval from a dominant person. Applied to a relationship between states, it is obviously not a diagnosis. It is a metaphor.
It becomes useful when a relationship produces paradoxical behavior: the more the other side threatens, the more one “invests” in the bond. The harsher the rhetoric, the more compromises pile up. And above all, the more we buy in, the more expensive it becomes to walk away.
The relationship between Europe and the United States is not limited to Trump. It is based on 80 years of security architecture, industrial standards, and diplomatic habits. But Trump has a distinctive trait: he transforms this architecture into a permanent transaction. He puts a price on protection. He talks about sovereignty in terms of bills.
It is this combination of structural dependence and overt pressure that makes the analogy of “trauma bonding” illuminating, even if it remains provocative.
The Trump method as domination: threaten, obtain, repeat
Trump has always operated through verbal escalation and ultimatums. His goal is not just to win a negotiation. It is to create a balance of power where the other side accepts concessions to avoid the worst.
The summer of 2025 provides a clear illustration of this. The European Union accepted a trade framework that included a 15% US tariff on most European goods, after a threat to raise it to 30%. The agreement also includes European commitments on energy, investment, and defense purchases. Reuters reports that Europe has promised $600 billion in investments and $750 billion in energy purchases over three years, as well as a “defense” component.
This is not a technical detail. It is a political signal: the tariff threat is becoming a diplomatic weapon, and “de-escalation” comes at a price.
The same logic applies to security. Trump is pushing Europeans to spend more, which may seem legitimate. But he also insists that American protection cannot be taken for granted. It must be earned. It must be paid for. This constant posturing creates uncertainty that pushes European capitals to “lock in” Washington… often by ordering American.
European military purchases as proof of loyalty and panic
The wave of European purchases since 2022 has been massive. The IISS estimates that the total value of European defense contracts signed since 2022 exceeds $180 billion.
The United States captures a considerable share of this market, particularly in combat aviation, ground-to-air defense, and long-range artillery. The most visible symbol remains the F-35. It is not purchased “for love.” It is purchased for three simple reasons: industrial availability, NATO standards, and access to a global support ecosystem.
Added to this core are critical building blocks:
- air defense with the Patriot, which Europe has relaunched on a large scale, to the point that a group purchase via NATO has been announced for up to 1,000 missiles, for $5.5 billion (Defense News, January 3, 2024; Breaking Defense, January 5, 2024).
- precision artillery with HIMARS, which has become a political as well as a military benchmark, particularly on the eastern flank
- armored vehicles, helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft, and ammunition, often purchased as a “package” with training, parts, and support
Poland illustrates this trajectory. It has purchased Abrams, Patriot, HIMARS, and Apache, in addition to South Korean purchases, with a view to accelerated mass replenishment.
Even countries traditionally committed to European solutions are shifting their stance. The German example is telling: the potential sale of 60 CH-47F Chinooks has been announced for $8.5 billion.
In the short term, this is rational: Europe needs to rebuild its stocks, and European industry cannot supply everything quickly. In the long term, it is a trap of dependency.
The industrial dependency created by American systems
A military purchase is not just an object. It is a long-term relationship.
When a country buys American, it also buys software, doctrine, parts, updates, simulators, and conditional access. The hardest lock is not the airframe or the launcher. It is the digital and regulatory ecosystem.
Europe thus finds itself bound by NATO interoperability, which is an immediate operational asset, but which mechanically pushes toward standards dominated by Washington.
Two issues structure this dependence:
Regulatory restrictions on resale and modifications
American weapons are governed by rules on export, modification, and transfer, often summarized by one term: ITAR. In practical terms, this means that a purchased capability can become very difficult to modify without consent or to resell without approval.
This is a silent lever of power. It is not visible on the day of delivery. It becomes visible ten years later, when a country wants to integrate non-American ammunition, adapt a system to a national doctrine, or simply reduce its costs.
The software lock, stronger than metal
The current era is one of “distributed combat” and connected systems. The more an army depends on software updates and digitized maintenance chains, the more it depends on the supplier.
In this context, buying American often means accepting that the center of gravity of sovereignty is no longer in the factory, but in the code.
Economic and energy concessions as the price of protection
The energy issue is a stark revelation. Europe has replaced its dependence on Russian gas with a new dependence, partly on the US.
Eurostat shows that in 2025, the US became the European Union’s leading supplier of LNG, with a share of around 60% in certain quarters.
The European Commission also confirms the rise of LNG in gas imports and the fall in Russian volumes: Russian gas imports via pipeline fell to 31.6 billion m³ in 2024, a 77% drop compared to 2021, while LNG accounts for 37% of gas imports.
Under Trump, this energy dependence has become part of a trade agreement. Reuters reports that the EU-US framework provides for $750 billion in energy purchases over three years, plus investments and defense purchases.
This is not simply diversification. It is a strategic shift towards US LNG, which is often more exposed to market volatility and US domestic politics.
In other words, Europe is buying military security… and energy security… in the same negotiating corridor.
The hidden costs for Europe: money, industry, decision-making autonomy
Trauma bonding, in its metaphorical sense, is not measured in terms of sympathy. It is measured in terms of exit costs.
The more Europe buys American, the more it reduces its industrial margin. However, a defense industry cannot be improvised. Production lines, skills, and subcontractors are maintained by orders. When orders go elsewhere, the fabric weakens.
The issue is particularly visible in ground-to-air defense. A think tank such as Bruegel highlights the capacity constraints of the American industrial base, while pointing out that unit costs can reach up to $13 million per Patriot missile, depending on contracts and configurations.
Europe therefore sometimes finds itself in a paradoxical situation: dependent on a supplier that is not always able to deliver quickly, and paying a high price to compensate for the urgency.
Political image is also at stake. A Europe that buys heavily from the US while Washington imposes a 15% tax on a large part of its exports gives an impression of imbalance, even if the agreement can be presented as “the least bad scenario.”
The AP reports that the agreement has lowered the auto tariff from 27.5% to 15%, which could save European manufacturers €500 to €600 million per month.
This is a real gain. But it comes after a period in which the American threat set the terms.
The rational reasons why Europe is accepting asymmetry
Let’s be fair. If Europe is “hanging on,” it is not out of naivety. It is because it has good reasons, some of which are vital.
The time constraint
Faced with Russia, Europe must rebuild its stocks and capabilities within a few years. European industry lacks volume in certain key areas, particularly air defense, missiles, and certain types of ammunition.
Buying American means buying quickly, with structured support.
The logic of political lock-in
Some European elites see American purchases as an “insurance premium”: the more Europe buys, the more Washington is encouraged to remain committed.
This logic is explicitly mentioned in analyses of post-2022 purchases: buying American can be seen as a way of “locking in” the United States in the defense of Europe. (IISS, 2024).
European fragmentation
Europe does not buy as a bloc. It buys as 27 priorities, 27 timetables, 27 doctrines. In this context, the American offer acts as a “default standard.” It simplifies cooperation, so it wins.
Possible ways out of the cycle without a sudden break
If we accept the idea that dependence has increased, the question becomes: how can we get out of it without putting ourselves at risk?
The answer is not to “stop buying from the US.” That would be unrealistic and potentially dangerous. The answer is to gradually reduce the cost of exit.
Rebuilding a credible European industrial base
Not with statements. With production rates. With stocks. With long-term contracts. Europe can decide to invest heavily in critical chains: ammunition, missiles, ground-to-air defense, drones, electronic warfare, heavy maintenance.
Clarifying a doctrine of sovereignty
Europe must say what it wants to control: the code, updates, critical parts, the decision-making chain. Otherwise, it will always buy “turnkey” solutions.
Transatlantic negotiation in a mature manner
A healthy relationship is not a conflict-free relationship. It is a relationship where conflict is not a tool for public humiliation.
The goal for Europe is to move away from a position of permanent supplication. It must shift to a position of strategic co-investor, capable of saying yes, no, and above all, “not at that price.”
This is where the final word comes in: European strategic autonomy. Not as a slogan against Washington, but as life insurance against American political cycles.
Sources
Reuters — “Key elements of EU-U.S. trade deal agreed on Sunday,” July 27, 2025
Reuters — “US and EU avert trade war with 15% tariff deal,” July 28, 2025
European Commission — Q&A EU–US trade deal, July 28, 2025
Eurostat — EU imports of energy products, parts LNG partners, 2025
European Commission — Liquefied natural gas (LNG), key figures 2024
IISS — “Europe’s defense procurement since 2022: a reassessment,” October 23, 2024
Defense News — “European nations team up to buy Patriot missiles…,” January 3, 2024
Bruegel — “US defense industrial base can no longer reliably supply Europe,” December 18, 2024
DSCA (United States) — “Germany – CH-47F Chinook Helicopters,” May 11, 2023
Associated Press — EU–US trade deal impact (auto tariffs), 2025
Euronews — Polish defense purchases, August 2, 2025
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.