From hypersonic gliders to space sensors, Prompt Global Strike promises a strike in less than an hour. Who can afford it, and who can defend themselves?
In summary
Prompt Global Strike refers to a conventional strike capability that can reach a target almost anywhere on the planet in less than an hour. The idea originated in the US, but the momentum is now global, as China and Russia are also deploying hypersonic systems. Three approaches dominate: ballistic missiles with conventional warheads, boost-glide hypersonic gliders, and scramjet hypersonic cruise missiles. The offensive promise is clear: reduce warning time, deal with fleeting targets, and complicate interception. The downside is also clear: nuclear ambiguity, risks of escalation, and very high costs. The orders of magnitude speak for themselves: munitions costing tens of millions of dollars per unit and space sensors costing billions. Ultimately, only a few states with massive budgets, a solid industrial base, and access to space can aim for credible capability. The others can purchase technological building blocks or rely on alliances.
The concept of a strike in less than an hour and its misunderstandings
Prompt Global Strike is often summarized with a catchy phrase: strike anywhere on Earth in less than an hour. This formula is useful for understanding the intention, but it hides the essentials.
First, “global” does not mean “magical.” To achieve an hour, you need either a quasi-ballistic trajectory with a very long range, an atmospheric trajectory at very high speed, or a combination of the two. In both cases, we are talking about heavy, costly architectures that are difficult to make reliable.
Second, “prompt” does not mean “permanent.” A rapid strike capability is not a delivery service. It requires intelligence, a short decision chain, political authorization, mission planning, and guidance capabilities. If you do not know precisely where the target is, speed does not compensate for the lack of information.
Finally, “strike” does not mean “war won.” The concept is primarily aimed at so-called “high-value” and “time-sensitive” targets: command posts, mobile batteries, anti-satellite systems, launchers about to fire, terrorists on the move, or hardened infrastructure. This is therefore a niche capability, not a tool for mass strikes.
The American origin and strategic logic behind the idea
The concept took shape in the United States in the 2000s, in the wake of a simple question: how can we strike quickly, from far away, without resorting to nuclear weapons?
The logic is twofold. On the one hand, it provides a rapid conventional strike to deal with a target that will not remain available. On the other hand, it avoids the binary choice of “either we do nothing, or we cross the nuclear threshold.” On paper, this capability gives decision-makers an additional option.
But this logic also creates tension. A weapon launched like a strategic missile, even with a conventional payload, can be interpreted as nuclear by the adversary, especially at the beginning of its trajectory. The concept therefore carries a structural political fragility: it accelerates decision-making for everyone, including the target of the attack.
Countries pursuing comparable capabilities, and those that are unable to do so
Let’s be frank: few states can aim for a truly “global” capability in less than an hour. Many can develop hypersonic systems, but that is not enough.
The United States, the historical architect of the model
The United States remains the country that formulated the concept, organized dedicated programs, and invested most heavily in the entire chain: delivery systems, guidance, intelligence, sensors, and associated defense. The terminology has evolved to Conventional Prompt Strike, but the idea remains the same: a very fast conventional option at long range.
China, a regional strategy that could become global
China has developed and deployed hypersonic glider systems and associated missiles, with a logic often described as anti-access and area denial: complicating US intervention in a given region. Some of these systems have a rather regional range, but technological advances and investment in space leave the door open to more distant options in the medium term.
Russia: a strategy of circumvention and nuclear signaling
Russia is promoting hypersonic systems, some of which are explicitly linked to nuclear deterrence. Its rhetoric emphasizes the ability to penetrate missile defenses. Here again, there is a gap between announcements, actual available capacity, and “global conventional” capacity that can be used without risk of escalation.
Other countries: technological building blocks rather than a global concept
The United Kingdom, France, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea are funding hypersonic technologies or long-range weapons, but targeting “any point on the globe in less than an hour” requires budgets, an industrial base, and a space ecosystem that only a few states possess. Others can aim for rapid strikes on a theater scale, which is already very ambitious in military-industrial terms.
Technologies that enable a “prompt” strike on a global scale
The technology family is divided into three main categories. They do not respond to the same constraints or the same costs.
The ballistic route with conventional payloads: the most direct solution
Ballistic firing is the “simplest” way to go fast and far, in the physical sense. A rocket can project a payload over several thousand kilometers with a very short flight time. The problem is not energy, but political credibility and nuclear/conventional discrimination. If the launcher resembles an ICBM, the adversary does not have the luxury of waiting to find out what is coming.
This approach also requires very high precision if a conventional effect is desired on a hardened target, and a guidance system that is robust against jamming and interference.
The hypersonic glider approach: the speed-maneuverability compromise
The glider, or hypersonic gliding vehicle, is launched by a rocket and then “glides” through the atmosphere at very high speed, with the possibility of maneuvering. This is the boost-glide family.
Its advantage is clear: it stays lower than a pure ballistic trajectory, can maneuver, and therefore makes trajectory prediction more difficult. Its cost and difficulty are just as clear: thermal protection, stability, control, navigation, and maintaining accuracy until the terminal phase.
At very high speeds, the vehicle heats up significantly. The structure, materials, and control software become an inseparable whole. A small surface degradation can alter the aerodynamics, and therefore the heating and stability. It is a technology where the margin for error is slim.
The path of the hypersonic cruise missile, the most demanding industrial ambition
The hypersonic cruise missile seeks to remain in the atmosphere with continuous propulsion, often via a scramjet. The advantage is a sustained trajectory, profile flexibility, and potentially better “energy management” than an unpowered glider.
But it is also one of the most difficult paths to pursue: supersonic combustion, materials, thermal management, air intake, stability, and sustained propulsion over time. Testing and development are very expensive, and development cycles are long.
The companies behind these programs and the industrial fabric behind them
A rapid global strike capability is not a “weapon.” It is an industry.
In the United States, the major contractors and equipment manufacturers for missiles, aerostructures, and space are consistently involved in hypersonic programs: Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and their ecosystems of propulsion, electronics, materials, and software. Alongside this, the “sensors and network” dimension is boosting the growth of satellite and infrared payload manufacturers.
The important point is this: this market is dominated by those who can do three things at once:
- produce high-energy propellants and structures,
- produce high-temperature materials on a large scale,
- produce space and network infrastructure.
Without this triptych, it is possible to build a demonstrator. It is more difficult to build a deployed, maintained, and renewed capability.
Real offensive effects, beyond the slogan
Compression of warning time and pressure on decision-making
The most obvious advantage is the reduction in warning time. Even a few minutes gained change the nature of defense, as they reduce the window for detection, classification, firing authorization, and engagement.
This also favors “decapitation” or early neutralization strategies, especially against command systems or mobile launchers. This is precisely what makes the tool attractive… and politically anxiety-inducing.
The effect on hardened and fleeing targets
Speed alone does not destroy a bunker. However, speed can make it possible to strike a critical point before the target moves, disperses, or fires. For hardened targets, the effect depends on the payload and the concept of use: penetration, accuracy, and synchronization with other means.
Prompt Global Strike is therefore less a “weapon of destruction” than a “weapon of tempo”: it imposes a rhythm on the adversary.
The gray area of conventional attack and the risk of error
This is where the concept reaches its political limits. A very rapid strike launched by a seemingly strategic system can trigger a crisis response even before the intention is understood. This nuclear ambiguity is not theoretical. It is part of the recurring criticism of the concept, including in American analyses.
Defensive impacts, or the birth of a new generation of missile defense
If the offensive is faster, the defense must see earlier and track better. Defense against hypersonic vectors is based on a so-called “layered” architecture, which resembles a firewall: sensors, data fusion, command, and effectors.
Detection, the real weak point when faced with atmospheric trajectories
A hypersonic glider flies lower than a conventional ballistic missile and can maneuver. Ground-based radars see it later because of the curvature of the Earth. This requires more persistent sensors, particularly in space, capable of detecting and tracking a hot signature on a complex trajectory.
This is where space-based infrared sensors become central. They are not a “bonus.” They are essential for interception.
Trajectory tracking and multi-sensor fusion
Seeing a trace is not enough. A high-quality firing track is needed, and therefore real-time fusion between space sensors, radars, and command systems.
This requires resilient networks, data links, and robust software architecture.
Countries that do not have these networks can purchase interceptors, but they will not be able to use them effectively against maneuvering threats.
Interception: a problem of geometry and time
Intercepting a hypersonic glider is primarily a question of time and position. Interception in the terminal phase is still possible, but the window is short. Hence the growing interest in interception in the gliding phase, before the terminal phase.
Specialized interceptor programs are being developed, but they are long, risky, and expensive. And even with an interceptor, the success rate will depend on the quality of the tracking, and therefore on the sensor segment.
This defensive race is often summarized under the label missile defense, but in the case of hypersonic weapons, it involves a partial reinvention: new sensors, new algorithms, and new effectors.
How much it costs, and why the cost is structural
The cost of a Prompt Global Strike capability can be broken down into four blocks: R&D, munitions, delivery/launch platforms, and sensor-command network.
The cost of munitions: tens of millions per unit
Publicly available figures, derived from budget analyses and costing studies, give a clear order of magnitude: a boost-glide type hypersonic munition is significantly more expensive than a “comparable” ballistic missile. A frequently cited estimate puts the unit cost at around $41 million (2023 value) for missiles of this type in a large-scale purchase scenario. The figure is not surprising when you consider what it costs to produce: high-temperature materials, hardened electronics, integration, testing, and low production volume.
The cost of research: billions of dollars per year
US funding for hypersonic research amounts to billions of dollars per year. This expenditure does not buy ammunition. It buys risk, testing, failures, and iterations.
The key point to remember is stark: hypersonic technology is a field where you pay mainly to learn. And each lesson learned costs a test campaign, sometimes a lost vehicle, and years of engineering.
The often underestimated cost of defensive firewalls
Building offensive capabilities is expensive. Building defensive capabilities is also expensive, often more so, because it requires covering areas, maintaining a permanent presence, and renewing constellations.
The costs add up:
- detection and tracking satellites,
- radars and ground stations,
- command networks,
- interceptors, testing, and stocks.
As a benchmark, the total cost of strategic anti-missile architectures can exceed tens of billions of dollars over time. Against hypersonic weapons, we add a technological layer, and therefore a layer of costs.
Countries with the budgets and ecosystem to aim for “global”
A high defense budget is not enough. You also need an industrial base, material supply chains, software expertise, and ideally autonomous access to space.
The United States: unmatched budgetary and industrial capacity
With military spending close to $1 trillion per year and a comprehensive space and missile ecosystem, the United States can finance both offensive and defensive capabilities, even if this remains a political and industrial trade-off.
China: a massive budget and continued acceleration in space
China combines very high military spending with a long-term industrial strategy. Its ability to deploy constellations and invest in research gives it the means to support a hypersonic race, even if the “global in an hour” architecture remains, at this stage, more of a possible direction than a proven capability.
Russia: a strategic priority but an economic constraint
Russia is promoting hypersonic systems, but the cost of development, volume production, and maintenance of a complete industrial chain is constrained by a more limited economy. Russia can push systems with high strategic value, but a comprehensive conventional capability, deployed in quantity and coupled with a sensor network equivalent to that of the United States, is a much more difficult goal.
Other major powers: varying ambitions
Countries such as India, Japan, the United Kingdom, and France have significant budgets and serious technological programs. But targeting “any point on the globe” requires a range, a sensor-command network, and a testing infrastructure that only a few states possess. Their most credible trajectory is often that of a rapid strike on a theater or coalition scale, rather than an autonomous and global Prompt Global Strike.
The most sensitive area: strategic stability in the hypersonic era
We must conclude with a straightforward idea: Prompt Global Strike is as much a political problem as it is an engineering problem.
Speed reduces verification time. It encourages delegation and automation. It increases the risk of misinterpretation. And it can push to strike earlier “out of caution,” which is exactly the opposite of stability.
The other effect is budgetary. Hypersonic technology triggers an offensive race, then a defensive race, then a sensor race, then a software race. It is not a one-time purchase. It is a long-term commitment.
The most lucid point is therefore this: the “strike within an hour” capability is only of interest if it is politically controllable and militarily integrated. Otherwise, it becomes a costly, spectacular, and dangerous crisis accelerator.
Sources
- Congressional Research Service, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress (R45811, August 27, 2025).
- Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) (IF11991, June 12, 2025).
- Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives (January 31, 2023).
- SIPRI, Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024 (fact sheet, April 2025).
- U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center, Experiments in hyperspeed (August 16, 2018) .
- Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), prototype contracts (2020–2021).
- Space Development Agency, Tracking Layer Tranche 0, Wide Field of View contract (October 5, 2020).
- Aviation Week, SDA Tranche 1 Tracking Layer, infrared tracking contracts (July 25, 2022).
- Arms Control Association, Current U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance (updated 2024).
- CSIS Missile Threat, Avangard system fact sheets (updated 2024) and DF-17 (technical data and orders of magnitude).
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