The Russian situation with regard to SU-57 and SU-75 development

The Russian situation with regard to SU-57 and SU-75 development

Analysis of the economic, industrial and military impact of the war in Ukraine on the development of Russia’s SU-57 and SU-75 fighters.

Background

For several years now, Russia has been asserting its desire to modernize its fighter fleet. The SU-57, officially considered a fifth-generation aircraft, already occupies a central place in military discussions. The SU-75 project, also nicknamed “Checkmate”, represents a more recent ambition: to create a single-engine aircraft affordable for export. However, the Russian economic situation and international sanctions, reinforced by the war in Ukraine, raise questions about the country’s real ability to continue these developments.

The state of the Russian aerospace industry

The Russian aerospace industry depends on a network of local and foreign suppliers. Before the sanctions, it relied on imported electronic components and several international partnerships. Since 2022, access to certain critical technologies has been restricted. As a result, Russian companies have had to reorganize their supply chains, which can slow down production.

According to various estimates, the Russian defense budget for 2023 will be around €66 billion. A substantial part of this budget is to cover operational costs related to the war in Ukraine. Financial resources allocated to air programs are therefore subject to internal trade-offs, as other priorities (tanks, artillery, munitions) also mobilize funds.

Financial challenges

Russia’s banking restrictions make it difficult to finance large-scale projects. Major armaments companies, such as Rostec and United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), face difficulties in securing international loans. Interest rates in Russia can rise, increasing the cost of capital. In addition, the fall in the ruble is increasing pressure on imports of components paid for in foreign currency. For the time being, these companies are maintaining their development announcements, but their timetable remains uncertain.

Technological constraints

Limited access to high-performance semiconductors and certain machine tools is holding back the development of projects such as the SU-57. For example, the AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar requires sensitive electronic components, often produced outside Russia. What’s more, the SU-57’s motorization, including the Izdeliye 30 engine, requires special materials. Without a stable supply, the production rate is compromised. The SU-75 project, praised for its competitiveness on the international market, also requires a reliable supply chain to deliver on its promise of economy and performance.

The Russian situation with regard to SU-57 and SU-75 development

The impact of the war in Ukraine

Military operations in Ukraine are absorbing a significant proportion of human and financial resources. The defense industry is called upon to produce missiles, drones and spare parts for existing aircraft. Factories that could be devoted to building or assembling fighter jets are sometimes redirected to maintaining equipment already in service.

Impact on production

The SU-57 program is already behind schedule. Initially, the Russian Air Force hoped to integrate 76 aircraft by 2028. Some sources estimate that fewer than ten units were actually flying by the end of 2022. Delays are due to difficulties in developing the final engine and a lack of electronic components. The war in Ukraine is not making things any easier, as the most qualified engineers and technicians are sometimes mobilized or assigned to other priority jobs.

Impact on exports

Russia relies on fighter aircraft exports to make its investments profitable. India, Algeria and other Asian and African countries have expressed an interest in advanced aircraft. However, banking sanctions make it more difficult to settle contracts in euros or dollars. What’s more, the reputation of Russian equipment may have been affected by its performance in the Ukraine, even if the latest-generation fighters are not deployed en masse. The SU-75, presented as a reasonably priced fighter, struggles to win over customers without tangible proof of its performance.

The SU-57 program

The SU-57 is designed to rival aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35. Equipped with partial stealth and advanced radar, it aims to combine versatility and firepower. However, several signals indicate that Russia has not yet reached the desired technological maturity.

  • Engine**: The Izdeliye 30 engine is supposed to improve thrust and reliability. However, its development is several years behind schedule, forcing the first SU-57s to fly with a modified AL-41F engine.
  • Avionics**: The fire-control system required top-quality microprocessors. Most of these components were supplied by foreign companies, which are no longer available.
  • Production**: The precise number of SU-57s produced remains uncertain. Estimates vary between 16 and 20 built, but only a handful are believed to be in active service.

Despite this, Russia is seeking to promote the SU-57 as a flagship of its industry, and hopes to convince foreign partners. The country is banking on cost-effectiveness to distinguish itself from Western competitors. But the economics of the project depend on costly technological developments and complicated supply chains.

The SU-75 project

The SU-75 “Checkmate” is aimed at a less expensive segment than the SU-57. It is a lighter, single-engine fighter with a planned range of around 3,000 km and a payload of 7 tons. Its announced unit price would be in the region of 25 to 30 million euros, which would represent an advantage for countries with limited budgets.

The model presented in 2021 was attracting interest, particularly from countries in the Middle East and Africa. UAC mentioned production from 2026, but no firm orders have been confirmed to date. International sanctions and volatile demand make this a risky bet. Without external development partners, the project could remain at the prototype stage for a long time.

Future prospects

Russia can still benefit from certain industrial specializations. Russian engineers have accumulated experience in motorization, aerodynamics and air-to-air missiles. However, the question of financing remains central. Moreover, international competition is strong: China is making rapid progress in the field of fifth-generation fighters, and Western models retain a solid reputation.

Opportunities for collaboration

Russia could seek alliances with countries wishing to circumvent Western sanctions. Iran, for example, needs modern fighter jets. Turkey, although a NATO ally, has already shown signs of independence by acquiring Russian equipment in the past. Nevertheless, a large-scale partnership would require a secure financial framework, which remains complex in view of international restrictions.

Budgetary adjustments

To carry out these programs, Moscow needs to review the distribution of its resources. Additional funds are needed to finance R&D and mass production. Some Russian analysts suggest postponing other military projects to secure aircraft modernization. But the situation in Ukraine is creating constant pressure to sustain the effort on the ground.

The Russian situation with regard to SU-57 and SU-75 development

Reality for the SU-57 and SU-75

As things stand, the viability of these two programs depends on the state’s ability to maintain a stable flow of funding and replace foreign technology components. Production of the SU-57 could remain limited if Russia fails to resolve the problems associated with its engines and on-board electronics. As for the SU-75, it is even more vulnerable to changes in budget priorities, in the absence of confirmed international customers.

The war in Ukraine is putting further pressure on the Russian military-industrial complex. Leaders are giving priority to the urgent needs of the frontline rather than to high-tech programs. As a result, Russia will certainly have to give up mass production of its new fighters for the time being, or accept a slower pace of production and a postponement of its export ambitions.

The obvious conclusion is that Russia does not necessarily have the financial and technological resources to pursue its SU-57 and SU-75 projects rapidly. These difficulties do not mean a total halt, but they do extend the lead times and reduce the confidence of potential partners. The programs continue to exist on paper, but their realization will depend on difficult economic compromises and alternative sources of supply.

War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.