France is militarizing space and modernizing its air assets to deal with high-intensity conflicts and growing anti-satellite threats.
The militarization of space and the return of high-intensity conflicts are forcing the French air force to transform rapidly. General Jérôme Bellanger, Chief of Staff of the Air and Space Force, has announced a series of major technical initiatives: the development of combat drones, the restoration of electronic warfare capabilities, and the adaptation of the fleet for complex missions such as suppressing enemy air defenses. At the same time, France is affirming its ambition in space with the deployment of anti-satellite capabilities, high-altitude maneuverable balloons, and geostationary patrol satellites. The strengthening of the ACE (Agile Combat Employment) doctrine and the increase in the number of Rafale aircraft are aimed at ensuring greater strategic flexibility in an environment marked by airspace saturation and the emergence of hybrid threats.
The doctrinal evolution of the Air and Space Force
The change of course initiated by the Air and Space Force (AAE) is the result of an unambiguous strategic analysis: the assumption of limited conflicts is no longer sufficient to guide the preparation of forces. The return of symmetrical conflicts – such as in Ukraine – means that France must re-evaluate the capabilities it reduced in the 1990s, particularly in the areas of offensive electronic warfare and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).
The Operation Poker exercises, held four times a year, mobilize up to 50 aircraft, including Rafale, A330 MRTT, and A400M aircraft, in simulated nuclear raid scenarios. This exercise is used to test France’s ability to penetrate heavily defended airspace at night, with in-flight refueling and electromagnetic jamming, under real-life conditions. This type of exercise requires at least 180 hours of flight time and 60 hours of simulator time per Rafale pilot each year to achieve the required level of performance.
The AAE also maintains a rapid projection capability, as demonstrated by the Pégase Grand Nord exercise in 2024: six Rafale and three Mirage 2000D aircraft conducted a multinational operation in Sweden, Poland, and Croatia with reduced logistical support, demonstrating the feasibility of the ACE concept. The French Army anticipates a war of movement involving light forward bases, with squadrons capable of being deployed in less than 48 hours with limited resources.
This doctrinal redeployment is based on a modernized fleet: the Rafale’s ramp-up should reach a total fleet of 225 aircraft by 2035, completely replacing the Mirage. The move towards the F5 standard, currently being developed with Dassault Aviation, aims to integrate a new-generation SEAD missile (RJ10), an enhanced electronic warfare system and full compatibility with autonomous combat drones. This transformation also anticipates the gradual transition to the Air Combat System of the Future (SCAF), some components of which will be tested on the F5.
Restoration of SEAD and electronic warfare capabilities
For nearly two decades, France has reduced its investment in enemy air defense suppression (SEAD) and offensive electronic warfare, considering these threats to be marginal in asymmetric theaters of operation (Sahel, Levant). The return of conflicts between states with modern surface-to-air systems (S-300, S-400, HQ-9, etc.) now makes it necessary to correct this shortcoming. General Bellanger is clear: these capabilities will be reinstated as operational priorities in the next military programming law.
The Rafale F5 program, expected around 2030, is the cornerstone of this reconstruction. This standard will incorporate the RJ10 missile, currently being developed by MBDA, designed to neutralize medium- and long-range ground-to-air systems. This missile should be based on robust inertial guidance and GPS jamming-resistant targeting capabilities, with a multispectral seeker capable of identifying active radar despite countermeasures. In the short term, temporary solutions are being studied to counter short-range threats, notably through the modernization of the A2SM missile with anti-radar capabilities.
At the same time, the AAE is investing again in offensive electronic warfare. The SPECTRA system, which already equips the Rafale, will be enhanced to include active directional jamming and radar decoy capabilities. The Army has also launched the Black Crow exercise, dedicated to training against complex enemy electromagnetic defenses. In addition, a dedicated EW command structure is being set up, with a general responsible for integrating electronic capabilities at all levels of planning.
These developments are accompanied by cross-cutting industrial programs: Thales, Safran, Dassault, and MBDA are collaborating on the development of onboard equipment and active decoys. This synergy aims to achieve complete technological autonomy in the critical areas of jamming, electronic stealth, and electromagnetic spectrum exploitation.
The operational consequences are significant. By reestablishing SEAD capability, France is giving itself the means to break through an A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) bubble in the event of a major conflict, while reducing the risks to its pilots. Similarly, an offensive electronic warfare capability would make it possible to degrade the entire enemy C4ISR system (command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance), which is an essential prerequisite for any air intervention in a contested space.
Development of combat drones and UCAVs linked to the Rafale F5
The French Air and Space Force (AAE) has now made the development of combat drones (UCAVs) a tactical and industrial priority, directly linked to the evolution of the Rafale towards the F5 standard. This approach responds to several challenges: the saturation of enemy defenses, the protection of manned aircraft, and the rise of collaborative combat.
General Bellanger refers to a “multi-level swarm” architecture. It combines:
- heavy UCAVs that are stealthy, armed, capable of penetration and have a long range (10 to 15 hours of flight time, 1,500 km range),
- low-cost saturation drones (less than €3 million each), capable of simulating radar signatures, jamming or launching swarm attacks,
- remote carrier-type vehicles, interconnected, deployable by Rafale, and designed to strike, disrupt or disorganize deep defenses.
The Rafale F5 will incorporate a secure data link enabling the in-flight control of several UCAVs and dynamic role distribution. The aim is to make the pilot a digital formation leader, shifting risk-taking to drones while retaining human decision-making. The development of these capabilities anticipates the building blocks of the SCAF (Future Air Combat System), which is expected to enter service around 2040.
On the industrial front, Airbus Defence and Space, Dassault Aviation and MBDA are collaborating on demonstrators such as Remote Carrier X and nEUROn, while the DGA is investing in exploratory programs for expendable drones. The Rafale F5 UCAV platform could be derived from a stealthy, subsonic aircraft such as the nEUROn, equipped with an internal cargo bay and operating in coordination via on-board artificial intelligence.
The operational consequences are significant. A Rafale + UCAV group would enable:
- deep penetration into A2/AD zones with reduced human risk,
- dispersion of enemy fire via electromagnetic or physical saturation,
- first strike capability, preceding conventional strikes,
- prolonged surveillance, or even communication relay missions in degraded environments.
This model is in line with American (NGAD/CCAs), British (GCAP), and Israeli (Harop, Harpy NG) doctrines. It marks a paradigm shift: the added value of humans is no longer their presence in the combat zone, but the dynamic management of a network of distributed sensors and effectors that can be adapted in real time. This is a capability breakthrough that the F5 standard aims to bring about by 2030.
Spatialization of operations and militarization of space
The interview with General Jérôme Bellanger confirms a major strategic shift: the growing integration of space as a fully-fledged theater of military operations. France, through the AAE, is now structuring its doctrine around a continuum ranging from the upper atmosphere to geostationary orbit, with dedicated capabilities to act from space, in space and against space.
Militarization dictated by threats
The United States, Russia, and China have already integrated anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities into their arsenals. Beijing, for example, tested an SC-19 anti-satellite missile in 2007, capable of striking a satellite at an altitude of more than 860 km. Moscow has co-orbital satellites suspected of having offensive capabilities, such as Kosmos-2542. Faced with this reality, France officially recognized space in 2019 as a confrontation environment, and no longer just a support environment.
French and European structural programs
The French doctrine is based on several projects:
- The Yoda program, a demonstrator for geostationary orbit (GEO) patrol satellites, led by CNES and Thales Alenia Space, which has prepared the architecture for Egide, the future active satellite inspection and protection capability. It is expected to enter service in the second half of the 2020s.
- The Toutatis demonstrator, developed for close-range maneuvers in low Earth orbit (LEO), complements efforts to test approach, interception, and jamming strategies.
- Participation in the IRIS² initiative, a European secure communications constellation that will introduce dual civil and military capabilities by 2027-2030.
These capabilities are intended for both surveillance of orbital objects and active response to intrusion attempts, through electromagnetic jamming or limited kinetic action. Ultimately, France is seeking to acquire reversible deactivation capabilities, based on directed energy weapons.
Sovereignty to protect: the upper atmosphere as a gray zone
General Bellanger mentions a new ambition: controlling the upper atmosphere up to approximately FL3300 (about 100 km altitude), the so-called “sub-orbital” zone, which is still largely unregulated. This is the space where future programs will be developed, such as:
- Balman, a balloon maneuvering at very high altitudes (up to 25 km), capable of persistent surveillance missions and ISR tests,
- fixed-wing platforms (Zephyr-type pseudo-satellites) that can remain in flight for several weeks.
France is giving itself the means to act autonomously, from its own territory or from distant theaters, to observe, prevent, or respond. This approach also includes the concept of “responsive space”, with micro-launchers capable of putting tactical satellites into orbit in less than 48 hours. Initiatives such as HyPrSpace, Latitude, and ArianeWorks are now part of the national strategy, with support from the CNES and the Defense Innovation Agency.
This rise in military power in space also involves major industrial and doctrinal choices. France will have to manage the increasing saturation of low Earth orbit, the rules of engagement in an environment without clear borders, and interoperability with allied forces, particularly through NATO and bilateral initiatives (with Germany and the United Kingdom).
Modernization of electronic warfare and SEAD capabilities
The return of attrition warfare in Eastern Europe, marked by environments saturated with ground-to-air defenses, has profoundly changed French priorities in terms of access denial (A2/AD). General Bellanger confirms a major doctrinal shift: the rebuilding of enemy air defense suppression (SEAD) capabilities and offensive electronic warfare (EW). These skills, which were put on hold in the 1990s after the disappearance of the Soviet threat, are once again becoming critical.
SEAD: a priority for ensuring first strike capability
The SEAD mission consists of neutralizing or degrading enemy ground-to-air defenses (radars, SAM batteries) in order to open a breach for offensive raids. France is currently relying on the development of a specialized air-to-ground missile, the RJ10, entrusted to MBDA. This will be a system capable of:
- target medium- and long-range ground-to-air systems (such as the Russian S-300/400 or Chinese HQ-9),
- operate with inertial, electro-optical, and passive radar guidance modes,
- resist GPS jamming and electronic countermeasures.
The RJ10 missile is designed to equip the future Rafale F5 standard, with the long-range version scheduled to enter service after 2030. An intermediate-range version is expected as early as 2030 for the most urgent theaters.
Rafale F5 and electronic warfare: towards an integrated offensive capability
Offensive electronic warfare is also back among the doctrinal priorities. The Air and Space Force is now reintegrating this function into its operational structure. Efforts are focused on three areas:
- Spectra, the Rafale’s self-protection system, will be upgraded to the F5 standard to offer active decoy, directional jamming, and radar deception functions.
- Dedicated training: electronic warfare officers are now assigned to each squadron, supervised by a central doctrine unit within the Air Warfare Center (CReA).
- Specialized exercises, such as Black Crow, put crews in large-scale electronic warfare situations.
Ultimately, the goal is to integrate these skills into a collaborative tactical framework, where sensors and jammers from different aircraft (manned and unmanned) operate in a network.
Operational consequences: flexibility and mass effect
The combination of SEAD and offensive EW aims to deliver effects at a distance, defend key areas (such as allied airspace), or open an access corridor for conventional or nuclear strikes. This tandem strengthens France’s ability to carry out missions:
- in high-density radar denial of access contexts,
- against technologically advanced state operators (Russia, China),
- in coalition, with enhanced NATO interoperability (multinational SEAD coordination).
This also requires sustained technological investment. Ongoing developments will need to be accompanied by an upgrade of simulators, automated generation of SEAD mission plans, and adaptation of C2 (Command & Control) networks to integrate dynamic electronic strikes.
Deployment of combat drones and remote-controlled carriers for the Rafale F5
The French doctrine of collaborative combat aviation is now organized around the concept of remotely operated combat drones (UCAVs) and remote carriers. These capabilities are intended to support manned aircraft, such as the future Rafale F5, to saturate airspace, jam defenses, or carry out targeted strikes. This approach responds to a clear tactical requirement: reduce human risk while maximizing the payload, endurance, and resilience of the overall system.
An integrated system of systems centered on the Rafale F5
The Rafale F5, expected to enter service in 2030, will be at the heart of this collaborative system. It will be designed to:
- remotely pilot one or more UCAV or carrier drones,
- exchange real-time data via a secure link with its auxiliaries,
- delegate critical functions: opening strike, reconnaissance, deception, radar suppression.
The associated drone will be able to carry an internal weapons bay, a reduced radar signature, and infrared optronic, ESM or compact AESA radar sensors. It will be able to carry out the first strike, followed by the Rafale with its own weapons, in a first strike scenario. This concept is designed for highly defended theaters, particularly against Russian or Chinese defenses.
Carrier types: saturation and economic efficiency
The concept of “remote carrier” covers several categories of vehicles:
- Low-cost tactical UAVs, to saturate enemy defenses (e.g., decoy carriers or jamming drones).
- Reusable MALE UAVs, for surveillance, electronic warfare or limited strikes.
- Heavy stealth UCAVs, operating in direct coordination with the Rafale, for penetration missions.
The proposed architecture allows for a gradual escalation of engagement, starting with swarms of disposable drones, followed by more complex vehicles, and finally the Rafale, which retains decision-making superiority.
Operational objectives and tactical advantages
This system offers several benefits:
- Mass effect without cost inflation: a Rafale can direct several drones at a lower cost.
- Increased resilience: the loss of an unmanned vehicle does not result in human casualties.
- Tactical flexibility: drones and Rafales can adopt separate trajectories, sow confusion in defenses, jam radars, or feign attacks.
In budgetary terms, the development of French UCAVs is still partially integrated into research budgets. Industrial studies are being conducted by Dassault Aviation, MBDA, Safran, Thales and their European partners as part of joint work related to the SCAF (Future Air Combat System) program.
Integration into the SCAF: anticipated compatibility
The Rafale F5 is explicitly designed as a bridge solution for the SCAF. The logic is to enable a smooth transition, without any loss of capability, with:
- the integration of fused sensor technologies,
- an upgrade of the M88 engine,
- and a digitalized cockpit, adapted to the management of a distributed tactical network.
These developments anticipate the standards of the SCAF’s sixth-generation aircraft and will enable France to remain competitive while ensuring the sovereignty of its chains of command and engagement.
Militarization of space: a strategic priority
The militarization of space is now at the heart of the operational priorities of the French Air and Space Force. This transformation stems from two pressures: the rise of Russian and Chinese offensive capabilities in space, and the need to protect orbital assets essential to the conduct of modern military operations.
A continuous view of space: from high altitude to orbit
General Jérôme Bellanger advocates a broader approach to the field of operations: from the upper atmosphere (up to 25 km altitude) to geostationary orbit (35,786 km). This “upper” zone includes stratospheric balloons as well as communication and reconnaissance satellites. It constitutes what the French Army refers to as the air-space continuum.
Air operations therefore no longer stop at the traditional flight ceiling of a fighter jet (FL500 or ~15,000 m), but extend to FL3300 (approximately 100 km), thus crossing the Kármán threshold.
Space capability: observation, jamming, deterrence
Several programs are under development or being demonstrated:
- Egide: future geostationary orbit patrol satellite. Objective: to monitor, track, and even neutralize third-party satellites deemed hostile. It will succeed the Yoda demonstrators, which have been successfully tested since 2022.
- Toutatis: a low-orbit demonstrator designed to test close maneuvers, soft interception, and jamming capabilities.
- IRIS²: the EU’s sovereign secure communications constellation. France is actively involved in this project to guarantee strategic autonomy.
- Jamming from space: the ability to disrupt or blind an enemy satellite through electronic warfare or directed energy weapons. These capabilities are identified as already operational in Russia and China, according to assessments by NATO and CNES.
Industrial and technological ramp-up
The challenge is twofold: accelerate the launch schedule while ensuring complete sovereignty over national space infrastructure. Several initiatives are underway:
- Development of agile small launchers (e.g., startup projects such as Latitude and Sirius Space).
- Involvement of ArianeGroup in launchers that meet military needs.
- Critical need for responsive launches capable of putting a tactical satellite into orbit in less than 48 hours. This requires mobile launch sites, optimized logistics, and simplified protocols.
In 2024, France had a space budget of €2.3 billion, which is growing. The Space Command, created in 2019, is now fully integrated into the Air and Space Force, with dedicated personnel and an operational center in Toulouse.
Operational consequences and doctrinal challenges
This overt militarization is transforming space into a potential conflict zone. There are several direct consequences:
- Preemption and denial of access: preventing an adversary from using its space capabilities in the event of conflict.
- Increased vulnerability: civilian and military satellites are exposed to jamming, laser, and cyber attacks. Resilience must therefore be strengthened (multiplication of platforms, modularity, distributed architectures).
- Tactical integration: space is becoming a direct lever for conducting operations: targeting, communications, detection, positioning.
Finally, this approach requires enhanced cooperation with European and NATO allies. France participates in the European Defense Agency’s space exercises and is engaged in dialogue with the United States as part of the Combined Space Operations Initiative.
Maneuverable balloons: a strategic comeback in the upper atmosphere
The BALMAN (Ballon Manœuvrant) program embodies a discreet but strategic approach to the militarization of the upper atmosphere. This type of vehicle, long considered obsolete, is now back on the agenda of the Air and Space Force in response to the increasing complexity of the air and space theater.
A complementary capability between drones, satellites and missiles
Stratospheric balloons operate at altitudes between 18,000 and 25,000 meters, evading most conventional ground-to-air radars and medium-range anti-aircraft systems. They offer several operational advantages:
- Endurance: they can remain in the air for several weeks or even several months, unlike drones or satellites, which are only in transit.
- Low unit cost: a balloon costs up to 50 times less than an optical or radar satellite.
- Modular payload: ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) sensors, relay communication systems, or electromagnetic jammers.
Used for long-term aerial surveillance, they complement existing systems, particularly in contested access areas, without requiring direct overflight of hostile territory.
Technical challenges: piloting, control, recovery
The BALMAN program, which is in an advanced demonstration phase, faces several constraints:
- Trajectory control: unlike drifting balloons, BALMAN must follow a defined route, taking advantage of atmospheric layers at different altitudes. This requires automated piloting and detailed knowledge of high-altitude weather conditions.
- Recovery: after the mission, the balloon and its payload must be recovered, which requires complex logistical coordination, particularly in extraterritorial areas.
- Climate resistance: at 25,000 meters, the temperature can drop to −50°C with strong winds. The envelope, propulsion system, and onboard equipment must be tested for these extreme environments.
The next test flight is scheduled for late 2025, with a mission duration of more than 10 days, according to official statements from the Ministry of the Armed Forces.
Practical applications and role in French doctrine
The use of stratospheric balloons is part of a strategy of persistent sensors for monitoring sensitive sites and air or maritime movements. In contexts such as the Arctic or the Sahel, they would enable continuous surveillance without direct exposure of pilots or drones.
They can also play a role in detecting ballistic missiles during their ascent phase, or in relaying communications in degraded areas (following jamming or satellite saturation). Some foreign models are even being considered for use as onboard electronic warfare platforms.
Finally, their low radar signature makes them difficult to detect. It was a similar technology that an American F-22 shot down in 2023 over US territory after detecting a Chinese balloon. France is therefore seeking to integrate these tools into a complete air-space command chain, in line with its multi-environment maneuver doctrine.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.