Turkey is moving forward with KAAN, its stealth fighter jet designed to replace F-16s and reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers.
Summary
The KAAN program, led by TUSAŞ, embodies Ankara’s ambition to acquire a fifth-generation fighter jet capable of replacing its aging F-16s. After two successful flights of the P0 prototype in 2024, two new aircraft are entering the system integration phase, a crucial step in validating sensors, flight controls, and software architecture. The first flight of these prototypes is scheduled for 2026, with initial service entry of Block 10 planned for 2029. The Ankara factory has a capacity of eight aircraft per year, with the prospect of acceleration. Turkey’s requirements are estimated at 148 aircraft, to which is added an order for 48 aircraft by Indonesia. Designed to be stealthy, interoperable and armed with Turkish missiles, the KAAN still relies on American F110 engines, pending the development of a national engine. Beyond the technology, the project reflects a strategy: to reduce external dependence and become an exporter.
The program and its technical schedule
The focus of the news is on two milestones: the entry into system integration of prototypes P1 and P2, and the goal of first flights in spring 2026. The significance of this sequence is not cosmetic. System integration means that the aircraft is no longer just a “airframe demonstrator,” but a test vehicle incorporating a mission computer, sensors, flight controls, and data links. The campaign logic provides for an increase in complexity: validation of the dual F110 flight chain, verification of flight control laws, thermal performance tests, then initial high-angle-of-attack profiles and controlled stalls. The two 2024 flights of the P0 mainly “opened the door”: low altitude (≈ 2,400 to 3,000 m), modest speed, stability points. P1 and P2, on the other hand, feature system and shape developments (air intakes, thermal management, signature).
On the roadmap, Block 10 corresponds to initial commissioning in 2029 with a limited scope. In concrete terms, this means a limited number of active sensor modes, a flight envelope limited in terms of load factor and supersonic range, and software functions that have not yet been “unlocked” (long-range air-to-air modes in dense environments, extended multi-platform fusion). This phasing is typical for a fifth-generation fighter: maturity comes in software packages, not all at once. Turkey’s gamble is clear and deliberate: maintain a sufficient testing pace in 2026-2028 to deliver around 20 pre-production aircraft around 2029, while keeping margins for readjustment if the indigenous engine or certain sensors slip to the right. In the meantime, the avionics architecture must remain “open” to accommodate rapid iterations without heavy re-qualification.
The industrial chain and production rate
The credibility of a mass production program is measured in square meters of workshop space and the repeatability of operations, not in models. The dedicated facility in Ankara vertically assembles the major parts: 14-meter wings, a central section weighing approximately 3.3 tons, and the nose and rear fuselage. This architecture reduces jigging time, optimizes access for wiring and fluids, and allows for faster “pull flow.” The nominal capacity announced today is eight aircraft per year. This is consistent with a gradual ramp-up: instrumented pre-production, then a “stepping stone” rate around 2028-2029, before aiming for two aircraft per month once bottlenecks have been removed (sheet metal work, surface treatments, non-destructive testing).
On the cost side, several benchmarks are circulating. The target unit price is often mentioned as around $100 million per aircraft, or approximately €93 million at the current exchange rate. This is not a “full” price: the first ten aircraft involve more non-recurring costs (tooling, industrialization, defect corrections). The financial reality will be reflected in the operating bill: hours of work per airframe, scrap rates, supplier availability. Industrial governance has a strict challenge: securing the long chain (structural composites, avionics computers, actuators) in an environment of ITAR controls and shifting embargoes. It is precisely to limit these risks that the program internalizes as many components as possible (structure, avionics, electronic warfare), while assuming critical temporary dependencies such as motorization. In the short term, the factory will have to “amortize” the learning curve: more rework at the beginning, quality that improves with production runs, and a shift to a true production line when test validations reduce configuration discrepancies.
Expected operational capabilities and technical choices
On paper, the KAAN is positioned as a fifth-generation fighter: reduced radar cross-section, sustained supersonic cruise speed, multi-sensor data fusion, and swarm operation with drones (MUM-T concept). Initially, the aircraft will fly with twin F110 engines, a robust and available solution that has already been proven on modern F-16 and F-15 aircraft. In terms of sensors, the goal is to use an electronically scanned AESA radar, an IRST for passive detection, and an integrated electronic warfare suite. The weapon platform aims to integrate national air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions (e.g., Gökdoğan/Bozdoğan for air-to-air, SOM for cruise), with gradual integration on subsequent blocks.
The indigenous engine, a strategic pivot, is following a realistic trajectory: TF6000/TF10000 demonstrators to “learn,” then TF35000 as the target. The stated ambition is for initial ground tests around 2026 and operational integration by 2032. This is ambitious but not unreasonable if high-temperature materials, surface treatments, and vibration control converge. The risk is twofold: if the F110 chain is strained for political reasons, engine dependency could become the program’s sticking point. The other challenge lies in the software. Maintaining high-quality data fusion requires years of sensor-to-sensor testing, Kalman filter tuning, and network latency management. Here, Turkey’s advantage is the proximity between the aircraft manufacturer and the equipment manufacturer, which allows for a “short loop” between ground test benches and test aircraft. One simple truth remains: stealth cannot be decreed. It must be measured in an anechoic chamber and across a range of frequencies, then protected during maintenance through an RCS culture that few armies can master at low cost.
Export dynamics and the case of Indonesia
Indonesia’s signing for 48 aircraft changes the equation: the program is no longer just a national effort to replace the F-16s, it is an export product with obligations in terms of deadlines, configuration, and support. The figures put forward suggest a contract worth around $10 billion, or nearly €9.2 billion. The structure of the deal is as important as the total amount: distribution between airframes and initial support, training, spare parts, local content, and possible industrial offsets. For Jakarta, the logic is twofold. On the one hand, to diversify suppliers beyond existing partnerships, while aiming for a transfer of know-how. On the other hand, it is about committing to a fighter that could, in the long term, provide a basis for regional superiority if it reaches maturity.
For TUSAŞ, this is a full-scale test. Export customers do not tolerate chronic delays and unstable configurations. The public schedule mentions first deliveries as early as 2028-2029, while Block 10 remains an initial capability. It will therefore be necessary to precisely “frame” the definition: which radar modes, which data links, which certified munitions, which refueling probes, which interoperability with the archipelago’s C2 systems. Financing is likely to be spread out; the robustness of payment guarantees will determine the smoothness of production. On the maintenance side, the hourly cost equation will depend on engine availability, cannibalization rates, and the organization of spare parts pools. Ultimately, this sale consolidates Turkey’s export ambitions, but challenges the program to deliver, document, and support outside its national “cocoon.” Interested Gulf countries are watching this closely: actual production rate, fleet availability, and cost transparency. ([Reuters][4])
Risks, costs, and the path to sovereignty
A modern fighter program rarely fails on a single parameter; it gets bogged down when risks accumulate. The first is temporal: the temptation to promise as early as possible. The “2029” landing for Block 10 only makes sense if the engine chain, priority sensors, and critical software converge on time. The second is financial: the €93 million “advertised” says nothing about ownership costs. What matters to an air force is the euro per flight hour and fleet availability. Until aircraft maintenance has industrialized its ranges, the hour remains expensive and the parts supply tight. The third risk is maintainable stealth. A reduced signature at the end of the production line is only useful if field repairs do not degrade it. This is as much a matter of doctrine as it is of materials.
The most obvious and political strategic issue remains: decision-making autonomy. The choice of a domestic engine, the densification of the equipment network, and control over assembly put Turkey within reach of credible operational independence by the 2030s. But independence comes at a price: accepting more iterations at the beginning, “restricted” performance on Block 10, and then a patient ramp-up. To say otherwise would be misleading. Honesty requires us to remember that, for a country that has never certified a fighter in this category, every successful milestone is a real step forward, and every setback is a cost. The right question is not “Is the KAAN already on par with the most mature aircraft?”, but “Is the program on track in terms of its learning curve, budgetary sustainability, and customer buy-in?” That is what ultimately separates an ambitious prototype from an operational fleet.
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