A containerized system launches swarms of drones in a matter of minutes. Useful for shows, it foreshadows large-scale offensive uses.
In summary
A Chinese company, DAMODA, has unveiled an automated container capable of deploying and recovering hundreds of quadcopters in a matter of minutes, with automatic synchronization of takeoff and landing. Officially dedicated to light shows, this concept is part of a major trend: the industrialization of drone swarms and their logistics. An operational example already exists: Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb used launchers concealed in mobile shelters to strike air bases at long range. Tomorrow, a single 6.1-meter (20-foot) truck could release several hundred aircraft for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, or coordinated attack missions. Conventional defenses struggle against saturation. Emerging responses—jamming, interceptor drones, power microwave systems—are advancing, but their range and coverage remain limited. In short, a “show in a box” that has become a “swarm in a box” changes the cost/effect equation in favor of the attacker, both on land and at sea.
DAMODA’s containerized system: a turnkey deployment chain
The Automated Drone Swarm Container System presented by DAMODA combines several technical components that have already been proven in the entertainment industry: preloaded racks, integrated recharging, and mass control via a single console. The version demonstrated shows at least 12 racks of 54 quadcopters, or 648 drones, pre-positioned on telescopic rails. When opened, the racks align in a staircase formation, freeing up clear takeoff trajectories. Landing is achieved by automatic return to the nest, with docking and recharging. Operation requires one operator and one portable controller; a laptop computer manages the mission. Installation takes only a few minutes.
The industrial appeal is obvious: “launch density” in a small footprint. In a 6.1 m (20 ft) or 12.2 m (40 ft) ISO container, useful capacity is maximized through vertical stacking. Scalability is native: several containers can be clustered together to deploy 1,000 to 2,000 drones from a logistics parking lot. Recent show records (more than 10,000 coordinated devices) illustrate the maturity of synchronization algorithms and links.
From a cost perspective, a quadcopter for shows costs a few hundred euros per unit in large volumes. A batch of 648 units represents an investment of around €0.2 to €0.6 million. The container, its motorized racks, power supply, and control system add a few tens of thousands of euros. This cost structure, which is much lower than that of a piloted military aircraft, explains the strategic shift: for the same budget, the attacker can multiply the number of vectors and impose an operational pace that is difficult for the defense to withstand.
However, it is important to remember the product’s stated limitations: pre-scripted routines, reduced range, and lack of military payloads. But the technological approach—centralized preparation, mass launch, automated recovery—is directly transferable to more robust models equipped with sensors or payloads and piloted by more advanced onboard autonomy.
Proof in the field: what Operation Spiderweb has already validated
In June 2025, Operation Spiderweb demonstrated the operational effectiveness of “discreet” launches from unmarked mobile units. Swarms of FPV and multirotor drones, concealed in shelter-type structures or “tiny houses” and transported on trucks, struck distant bases. Ukrainian authorities claimed dozens of aircraft were hit. Independent analyses and satellite images confirmed significant destruction, including strategic bombers.
This experience provides three lessons. First, logistics: a civilian vehicle can approach a sensitive area up to a few kilometers away, or even inside the perimeter, and then serve as a deployment platform. Second, the saturation effect: dozens or even hundreds of vectors strike in successive or simultaneous salvos, dividing the attention of radars and operators. Finally, granularity: FPV trajectories make it possible to reach critical points (tank connections, avionics bays, air intakes) with payloads of 0.5 to 2 kg, sufficient to neutralize a stationary aircraft.
Transposed to the containerized concept, the method is simplified: no time-consuming setup, no scattered wiring, less personnel exposed. A single standard container can store, load, and control an entire swarm, ready for use. A coordinated deployment of 3 to 5 containers on different axes can cover areas of several square kilometers, strike missile ramps, early warning radars, fuel depots, or saturate the close defense of an airfield. As an order of magnitude, if 200 drones at €1,000 each neutralize two aircraft at €25 million each and damage infrastructure worth several million euros, the cost/effect ratio weighs heavily in favor of the attacker.
The tactical threat: distributed missions and economy of effects
A containerized swarm becomes a tactical “Swiss Army knife.” Three families of payloads cover most needs. The first is ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance): day/night cameras, compact thermal modules, radio triangulation. Typical effective range of 5 to 15 km for multirotors weighing 1 to 3 kg, and more if flying wings are used. The second is electronic warfare: local jamming, GNSS deception, spectrum sensors for mapping emissions. The third is kinetic: light directional charges, modified grenades, miniature shaped charges.
The operational potential lies in the distribution of roles within the drone swarm. An ISR “vanguard” leads the way and designates targets in real time. A “main body” carries out the attack, flying low to reduce detection. A “reserve” remains at medium altitude for damage assessment and defense harassment. With the addition of more advanced onboard autonomy (shape detection, obstacle avoidance, simple pursuit), the swarm can continue its mission despite link losses.
An attack on an airfield illustrates the economy of effects: 500 vectors spread over 5 to 10 entry points, arriving in 3 waves at 60–120-second intervals, saturate the targeting capabilities of the guns and the availability of short-range missiles. An EW “cloud” jams interception frequencies or forces the defense to change its network, which consumes precious time. Even a simpler scenario—pre-programmed strikes on coordinates—inflicts rapid damage on fixed targets: radars, depots, aircraft in the open.
In urban areas, swarms of drones can also combine reconnaissance and kinetic effects at very short range, with an increased risk to civilians if target discrimination is not strictly controlled. This is where the framework for use and doctrine are as important as the technology.
Anti-swarm defense: strengths and limitations of current countermeasures
Modern defense consists of three layers: detection, disruption, and interception. On the sensor side, low-power pulse radars and passive radio frequency networks detect the various signatures of multirotors. But the attacker relies on saturation: multiple axes, very low altitudes, and composite signatures. The disruption layer relies on electronic warfare: GNSS and link jamming, spoofing, decoys. This remains effective against drones that depend on their control links, but less so against semi-autonomous platforms.
Power microwaves are gaining credibility. Demonstrators have neutralized dozens of drones at short range with a single transmission, with a useful cone effect. The advantage is “infinite ammunition” as long as the power supply holds out, but the difficulty lies in the practical range (a few hundred meters at very short range for compact versions), directivity, and electromagnetic cohabitation on site. Lasers offer high precision but remain limited by the atmosphere, rain, and thermal management, especially against bursts of targets.
That leaves “like-on-like” interception: drones built to hunt other drones, either with nets, controlled collisions, or directional charges. This layer is flexible and deployable, but it requires reaction time and numbers. Finally, short- and very short-range surface-to-air missiles, which are accurate but expensive, cannot be the main response to targets costing €1,000: the economic exchange is unfavorable.
Faced with an automated container multiplying the number of vectors, defense must evolve: hardened shelters in aircraft parking areas, real dispersion of aircraft and radars, physical anti-approach barriers around perimeters, redundant sensors, and training in handling mass alerts. Otherwise, a single “swarm container” will be enough to neutralize an entire area in a matter of minutes.
The market and distribution: from spectacle to containerized weaponry
Civilian manufacturers already have mass logistics in place: production of lightweight drones, aerial swarm control systems, automated trajectory planning, energy management. Recent records—more than ten thousand drones flying simultaneously—attest to sufficient reliability to remotely control thousands of units. The transition to military use requires a few adaptations: more robust chassis, redundant links, electromagnetic hardening, modular payloads, and C2 integration.
On the supply side, defense groups are promoting containerized launchers for loitering munitions. Brochures describe ISO modules capable of aligning more than a hundred ready-to-fire munitions, with replenishment by pallets. At sea, the idea of “container swarms” to be placed on the decks of logistics vessels or patrol boats is a recurring theme: it is a quick way to add distributed ISR/attack capability without redesigning the platform. On land, 8×8 trucks can carry one or two containers and operate from semi-urban areas, with reloading at rear-area depots.
In terms of budgets, the orders of magnitude speak for themselves. A module of 100 to 150 loitering munitions at €20,000–40,000 per unit represents a payload of €2 to €6 million, but offers a strike depth of tens of kilometers with loitering munitions and optronic sensors. A “low-cost quad” container of 500 to 1,000 units, even at €1,000 each, costs less than a short-range missile battery and can generate, through saturation, a temporary defensive “breach” opening the way for heavier effects.
From a strictly military point of view, it would be naive to refuse to consider the swarm container as a serious threat. It defeats static protection routines and forces the defense to mobilize in real time, with costly and scarce human resources.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.