Site flyovers, regulatory tension, ramp-up of Thales Belgium’s 70 mm rockets for anti-drone defense in Europe and Ukraine.
Summary
The proliferation of unmanned aircraft over sensitive infrastructure in Europe poses an immediate industrial and security risk. Thales Belgium reports suspicious flyovers and invests in detection while highlighting the legal impasse: in Belgium, radio jamming remains prohibited except by designated authorities. At the same time, the company is ramping up production of 70 mm rockets with the FZ123 (airburst) and FZ275 LGR (laser-guided), which are compatible with NATO launchers. Announced effectiveness against Shahed-type targets up to 3 km away, steel cloud approximately 25 m in diameter; costs well below those of conventional surface-to-air missiles, which addresses the issue of economic asymmetry between drones and effectors. The geopolitical context (incursions in Poland, Denmark, Romania) has triggered Eastern Sentry on the NATO side and national measures, such as the temporary ban on drone flights in Denmark. At the European level, the SAFE (€150 billion) instrument targets bulk purchases and sustained production rates, which are useful for mass-producing C-UAS solutions. Recent data confirms deliveries and ramp-up (3,500 guided rockets planned for 2025, target of 10,000/year in 2026, up to 30,000/year in unguided version). Critical point: quickly clarify who has the right to intervene against a hostile drone over an industrial site, and with what means, to avoid a blind spot between the police, regulators, and private operators.
The industrial risk of overflights and the operational response
Overflights of sensitive sites by drones have increased in Europe since September. Airports have been disrupted, as in Munich, and several countries have reported incursions over bases or critical facilities. In Copenhagen, the authorities temporarily suspended all remotely piloted aircraft flights during a week-long European summit, a strong signal of a threat seen as probable and opportunistic. This operational pressure is compounded by an industrial challenge: a light drone flying over a pyrotechnic site is enough to interrupt a workshop, immobilize stocks of explosives, or even force evacuations and security audits. Simply triggering an emergency plan costs tens of thousands of euros in lost hours and NV-HSE checks.
In this context, Thales Belgium has equipped its sites (Herstal, Fort d’Évegnée for propellant storage and testing) with detection capabilities. This is in line with the European trend: passive RF sensors, short-range radars, optical cameras coupled with AI for slow object discrimination, and correlation with ADS-B/RID when available. But detection does not mean prohibition: active neutralization (C2 or GNSS jamming, takeover, kinetic firing) remains legally restricted. As a result, manufacturers can see the drones, but cannot always act without the support of law enforcement. However, the response time for specialized units is measured in minutes, while a drone “visit” sometimes lasts less than a minute.
The pressure is not theoretical. Group flights have been reported in Belgium over a military camp in Elsenborn; Danish and Norwegian airports have experienced suspensions; Germany has strengthened its procedures after alerts. For its part, NATO has launched Eastern Sentry, a vigilance and enhanced posture activity on the eastern flank, to respond to Russian incursions into allied airspace. The implicit message is that air defense must incorporate “low and slow” layers, with proportionate responses available 24/7.
The 70 mm rocket as a C-UAS effector: technical data and costs
When faced with “disposable drones” (unit price ranging from a few thousand to tens of thousands of euros), firing a $1 million missile makes no economic sense. Hence the interest in FZ275 LGR rockets (semi-active laser guidance) and FZ123 warheads (airburst). Technically speaking, we are talking about a 70 mm caliber, typically around 1.8 m long, weighing around a dozen kilograms, with a solid propellant rocket motor. The FZ275 is equipped with folding fins and STANAG-compatible FCS electronics, for metric precision at 6 km in air-to-ground firing. Against drones, the challenge is not penetration, but volume lethality: the FZ123 disperses thousands of steel balls, creating a lethal volume of approximately 25 m in diameter. The target anti-UAV engagement distance is announced as “up to 3,000 m,” which is consistent with realistic tracking and laser designation times from adapted Mi-8 helicopters or Vampire-type ground platforms.
Recent industry figures give an order of magnitude: approximately 3,500 guided rockets in 2025, with a target of 10,000 rockets/year in 2026. At the same time, the current capacity for unguided rockets is 30,000/year, expandable to 60,000/year with double shifts if the supply chain can keep up. These volumes are part of a market where C-UAS needs are exploding. On the cost side, Thales does not publish unit prices, but provides a useful benchmark: a 70 mm guided rocket costs about one-fifth of an “affordable” surface-to-air missile such as an AIM-7 (approximately $125,000, or ~€118,000). The exchange ratio becomes sustainable for point defense: a ground battery with four or five tubes can deal with waves of small UAVs without depleting critical stocks of high-value missiles. In short air-to-air firing, a helicopter can intercept drones traveling at 200–300 km/h on converging trajectories, with compatible illumination windows.
A tricky but decisive point: reliable laser acquisition and tracking are required. In poor weather conditions, performance deteriorates; this is a compromise that must be accepted in view of the cost and weight. Hence the interest in a multi-sensor architecture: short-range radar, IR optronics, passive RF, then airburst rockets as a last line of defense before the site.
The right to jamming and site protection: clarification needed quickly
The legal position is clear: in Belgium, the IBPT prohibits the import, possession, and use of radio jammers; only certain authorities (police, prisons, defense) may use them under strict conditions. In most Member States, the logic is similar: active neutralization is the monopoly of law enforcement. For an industrialist, this means “detect and alert,” not “prohibit.” This results in a blind spot: if a hostile drone flies over a propellant depot, the company must wait for the competent team, without being able to interrupt the C2 link or the GNSS, even though the effective time is short.
At the European level, U-space standardization organizes the integration of civil drones, but does not regulate counter-UAS. The ENLETS and JAPCC projects converge: authorize private detection, but reserve effectors for the state. Technically, the caution is understandable: poorly controlled jamming can disrupt GSM, LTE, TETRA, and GNSS and create a risk to aviation safety. Legally, the civil and criminal liability for unauthorized kinetic firing is heavy. Operationally, however, the status quo is fragile for pyrotechnic sites or high-speed factories: a drone that falls “anywhere” after losing control can cause collateral damage.
The realistic approach? Codified intervention protocols around Seveso/pyrotechnic sites, with short loops between industrial control centers, police, and C-UAS units, dynamic temporary no-fly zones, and limited delegation of non-disruptive means (net capture, localized GNSS decoys, short-range directed effectors), under the control of an authority. We can also imagine temporary RF bubbles authorized by prefectural/ministerial decree around highly critical sites, with mandatory recording and logging. This is not “comfortable” from a regulatory standpoint, but continuing to “see without being able to act” is not serious. Site managers need a clear, written, enforceable framework.
European funding and sustainability: volumes, not one-offs
The budgetary issue is everything. Repeated air-to-air engagements using AIM-120 or AIM-9X missiles against drones costing $10,000–50,000 is a financial dead end. NATO has admitted this, and public criticism has grown after incursions in Poland and Romania: we cannot waste rare multi-role missiles on disposable threats. This is where C-UAS rockets fit into the “low-cost/high-cadence” echelon. But to deliver thousands of strikes per year, multi-year contracts, advance payments, and supplier risk sharing are required.
On the EU side, SAFE (€150 billion) provides leverage: long-term loans to buy European, 65% preference of origin, and a disbursement horizon starting in 2026. In practical terms, this is the only way to absorb plans for 10,000 guided rockets and 30,000 unguided rockets per year, while securing powder, proximity fuses, and electronic cards. This mechanism can also finance integration on land vehicles (Vampire), the adaptation of helicopters (Mi-8 reconfigured for NATO), and parts stocks.
Economic realism: even if a guided rocket costs, say, a few tens of thousands of euros, it is still ten to twenty times cheaper than a “conventional” surface-to-air missile. In site defense, a fleet of 200 to 400 rockets per year per major critical operator is not excessive, especially when you factor in testing, pyrotechnic expiration, and training. The production rates announced by Thales (3,500 in 2025, 10,000/year targeted in 2026 for guided rockets; 30,000/year for unguided rockets, 60,000/year for double teams) indicate a credible trajectory, provided that demand is smoothed out through pooled purchases.
One requirement remains: an honest assessment of effectiveness. Initial use in Ukraine confirms its effectiveness against Shahed drones at varying altitudes. But it is necessary to measure hit rates by context (weather, sky background, enemy jamming) and decide where to place the rocket in the C-UAS “stack” alongside 30/35/50 mm programmable artillery, interceptor drones, and 20–50 kW lasers still in development.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.