The Mozyr system was designed to protect Soviet ICBM silos by firing metal projectiles — technical and strategic analysis.
Summary
During the Cold War, the USSR developed the ‘Mozyr’ system, an active protection device for ICBM silos, which was designed to destroy incoming warheads using clouds of metal rods launched in terminal flight. The programme, which began around 1975, was tested at the Kura missile test range in eastern Siberia (Kamchatka) during the second half of the 1980s. It was never deployed operationally, but it represents a unique approach to defending fixed silos against nuclear strikes. From a strategic point of view, the project illustrates Soviet efforts to maintain credible deterrence while attempting to reduce the vulnerability of its ICBM silos to a mass attack.
The system: concept, mechanics and technical characteristics
The Mozyr system was created in response to a structural vulnerability: missile silos remain fixed and known targets, even when well concealed. To this end, the device was designed to intercept enemy ballistic warheads in their terminal phase, shortly before impact or nuclear detonation. In concrete terms:
- The system used a multi-barrel launcher, sometimes described as ‘several hundred tubes’ or ‘80 tubes’.
- Each of these tubes was loaded with a propellant charge and a steel-tungsten alloy projectile.
- The firing created a dense cloud of metal rods or darts, deliberately projected onto the trajectory of the descending warhead at a relative speed of around 6 km/s (approximately 21,600 km/h).
- A phased array radar, notably the 5N65 ‘Flat Twin’ model, was deployed to track and detect incoming objects at low altitude.
- The planned test site was located approximately 19 km from the Shiveluch volcano on the Kamchatka Peninsula, near Kura. The logistical deployment required nearly 250 air transport flights.
From a functional point of view, this process was similar to a hard-kill self-protection system (APS) adapted to silos. Usually, an APS protects a vehicle in close combat; here, the idea was to apply this concept to a fixed strategic infrastructure. The technical interest lay in the relative simplicity of the principle (kinetic darts rather than expensive guided missiles) and the need for speed in the terminal phase of a warhead. According to some sources, the device could have operated at an altitude of up to approximately 6 km.
In terms of figures: the programme involved 250 companies spread across 22 Soviet ministries. The missile that this system was designed to protect, the R-36M2 Voevoda (NATO: SS-18 Mod 5/6 ‘Satan’), could carry up to 10 MIRVs of 500–750 kT or a single 8 Mt warhead, depending on the version.
In this respect, the technical approach is remarkable: it rejects the use of heavy interceptor missiles in favour of short-range kinetic firing. However, it imposes extreme constraints: ultra-fast detection, highly accurate automatic sights, very high firing density, and no margin for error. Any delay or dispersion of the projectile cloud drastically reduces the probability of interception.
The context and strategic market for ballistic weapons
During the Cold War, the race for ballistic missiles and missile defence had a profound impact on nuclear strategy. The development of MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) increased the complexity of defence: a single launch could deliver multiple warheads to different targets, making existing defence systems vulnerable. Thus, the R-36M2 was designed to counter American deterrence.
Contemporary Russia is investing alongside China in the modernisation of strategic forces, including missile defence shields. A report by a strategic institution indicates that projects such as Mozyr were part of a broader Soviet missile defence research programme.
Even today, Russia maintains silos and missiles inherited from the USSR, such as the UR-100N (SS-19). The global missile defence market is estimated to be worth tens of billions of euros per year. Although Mozyr was not adopted, its principle remains an example of a potentially lower-cost solution than a standard ABM system. The major problem remains the probability of destroying an RV MIRV by kinetic interception, which drops sharply if decoys and penetration aids are used.
If a warhead enters the atmosphere at 7,000 m/s (25,200 km/h) and the density of darts must reach several thousand per square metre at a distance of 2 km to guarantee impact, the technical requirements are considerable. This reality explains why, despite its strategic interest, Mozyr was abandoned in 1991 due to a lack of favourable conditions and resources after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The strategic and operational consequences of the system
The existence of such a system would have several major consequences.
For the vulnerability of silos
The nuclear posture is based on second-strike capability: a country must retain enough weapons to retaliate after an enemy strike. If a silo is perceived as vulnerable, the logic of deterrence can be undermined. The deployment of a system such as Mozyr would have reduced this vulnerability, improving strategic stability by diminishing the value of a first strike.
For the race for penetrator systems and countermeasures
The rise of MIRVs and decoys made interception increasingly difficult. The development of defence therefore led to an escalation: each defensive improvement prompted the adversary to improve their offensive capabilities (decoys, manoeuvres, hypersonic weapons). Mozyr was fully in line with this dynamic.
For the economics of deterrence
One of the advantages of the Mozyr principle was its comparatively low cost compared to a complete network of anti-ballistic interceptors. It offered a potential alternative to strengthening silos without multiplying costly interceptor missiles. However, the required firing density and accuracy limited the actual economic gains.
For the evolution of threats
Since the 1980s, ballistic warheads have gained speed, agility and manoeuvrability. Systems such as Mozyr would need to be completely redesigned to counter these developments. Effectively protecting a silo against a hypersonic vehicle would be nearly impossible with this approach.
Mozyr could have made a silo attack less lucrative, but it required advanced technologies and remained subject to offensive and defensive escalation.
Why was the programme not deployed?
There are several reasons why Mozyr was never deployed operationally:
- The collapse of the Soviet Union: funding was cut off after the 1991 coup attempt.
- Technological complexity: although tested, installation required heavy logistics and extreme reliability.
- The changing strategic context: after the 1972 ABM Treaty and its demise in 2002, priority shifted to mobile systems and hypersonic weapons.
- Cost-effectiveness: actual performance remained uncertain, especially in the face of American offensive advances.
Some analyses point out that the density of projectiles and the control of fire at several kilometres per second made any error fatal. A deviation of a few milliseconds was enough to compromise the interception.
Current scope and prospects
Even today, the idea of a silo shield is not obsolete. In 2012, Russian sources mentioned the possibility of a return to this concept. The United States had considered a similar programme, Swarmjet, which never made it past the design stage. China, for its part, is rapidly expanding its land and sea capabilities, making localised protection of silos by kinetic means conceivable.
The question remains: in a world where manoeuvrable warheads and decoys are proliferating, can a system like Mozyr still be viable? Technically, it could serve as a complementary terminal defence, but it cannot replace the mobility and redundancy of launch systems.
The Mozyr project strikingly illustrates the search for active defence of Soviet ICBM silos during the Cold War. This ambitious concept, which involved neutralising incoming warheads with clouds of metal projectiles, remains one of the most original episodes in nuclear deterrence.
Although it was never put into service, it highlights:
- the persistent vulnerability of fixed silos and efforts to remedy it;
- the ongoing race between ballistic attack and defence;
- the importance of economic logic in deterrence: the search for effective solutions without breaking the bank.
Today, as ballistic threats multiply and nuclear powers modernise their arsenals, the Mozyr concept is once again relevant. It reminds us that silo protection can involve radical and technical approaches, but that reliability, accuracy and the evolution of countermeasures remain major challenges. This project demonstrates the strategic and technical complexity of nuclear deterrence: a fragile balance between innovation, pragmatism and survival.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.