In light of the SCAF and GCAP programs, the idea of a single European production of a sixth-generation fighter jet poses significant budgetary, industrial, and strategic challenges for the air forces and NATO.
Summary
The idea of a single European production of a sixth-generation fighter is coming back with a vengeance as the SCAF program stalls and the British GCAP program progresses. On paper, a single 6th generation “Eurofighter 2.0” would offer economies of scale, industrial rationalization, and greater strategic autonomy for Europe. In reality, the divergent positions of France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy, French nuclear and naval requirements, and the place of the F-35 in NATO make this scenario complex. The SCAF, estimated to cost around €100 billion, is currently undermined by industrial tensions between Dassault and Airbus and by the prospect of two competing sixth-generation programs in Europe. A single production line would not automatically resolve these obstacles. It would require significant political compromises, clear industrial governance, and a shared vision of air superiority for 2040–2050. The question is therefore not simply “should we build the SCAF?”, but “what kind of SCAF and with whom?”.
The question of a single sixth-generation European fighter
Europe is currently facing a paradox. On the one hand, defense budgets are increasing, the war in Ukraine has reignited rearmament and the desire for European strategic autonomy. On the other hand, the aeronautical landscape is fragmented: the French Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, Gripen, and F-35, purchased in large numbers by NATO allies.
In the sixth generation, two main approaches coexist:
- the Franco-German-Spanish SCAF program (Future Combat Air System) based on a New Generation Fighter (NGF), remote carriers, and a combat cloud, with an operational target around 2040;
- the GCAP program (Global Combat Air Program) led by the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan, with a target entry into service in 2035.
The hypothesis of a single European production of a sixth-generation fighter would, in fact, require merging these trajectories or abandoning one of the two axes. This is where the stakes become budgetary, industrial, but also highly political.
The SCAF program and the temptation of a “single champion”
SCAF was launched in 2017 as a flagship project for European military integration: a sixth-generation European fighter jet, swarms of drones, and a combat cloud, costing around €100 billion over several decades.
Officially, it is a “system of systems” in which:
- Dassault Aviation is leading the NGF;
- Airbus plays a key role in remote carriers and overall architecture;
- Indra plays a leading role for Spain.
In practice, the program is mired in:
- tensions over the sharing of work and intellectual property;
- disagreements over leadership of the fighter jet;
- unstable political calendars in France and Germany.
Several analyses now suggest the possibility of “splitting up” the SCAF: maintaining cooperation on the combat cloud and drones, but giving each country more freedom on the fighter itself.
In this context, presenting the SCAF as the sole vehicle for “single European production” is already debatable: some European countries (the United Kingdom, Italy, potentially Sweden, and the F-35 states) are already committed elsewhere on a long-term basis.
The budgetary consequences of a single production
Financially, a single 6th generation fighter offers theoretical advantages:
- pooling of R&D costs (several tens of billions of euros);
- economies of scale in production (several hundred potential aircraft);
- rationalization of MCO (maintenance in operational condition).
The SCAF is often estimated at around €100 billion in total cost over the life of the program. The GCAP is in a similar order of magnitude, although the public figures are less clear.
Two parallel sixth-generation programs therefore represent a potential €200 billion long-term commitment for a continent where defense budgets, even though they are increasing, remain constrained. This is precisely what is fueling the debate: can Europe sustainably finance two competing architectures, in addition to the F-35s already ordered by many allies?
A single production line would reduce the risk of duplication and consolidate funding around a single standard. But the SCAF experience shows that the “number of participants” does not guarantee budgetary efficiency: industrial differences can cause costs to skyrocket, even with a single program.
Industrial challenges, skills, and knowledge transfer
From an industrial perspective, a single European 6th generation fighter would be a powerful tool for sovereignty. It would make it possible to:
- maintain fighter design capabilities in Western Europe;
- consolidate key skills in aerodynamics, stealth, engines, AESA radars, electronic warfare, and combat software;
- structure a base of subcontractors across several countries.
Today, two clusters are emerging:
- SCAF cluster: Dassault, Airbus, Indra, Safran, MTU, etc.;
- GCAP cluster: BAE Systems, Leonardo, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and a galaxy of 1,000+ subcontractors.
A single production line would involve either merging these clusters or sacrificing part of one of them. In both cases, there would be serious consequences:
- for France: giving up complete leadership on the fighter would be difficult to reconcile with Dassault’s strategic and industrial culture;
- for Germany: accepting a secondary role in fighter aircraft after the Eurofighter would be politically sensitive;
- for the United Kingdom and Italy: abandoning a well-advanced GCAP in favor of a reconfigured SCAF would be costly and politically risky.
Current tensions over task sharing and access to sensitive technologies—including within the GCAP, where Italy criticizes the United Kingdom for not sharing certain expertise sufficiently—show that pooling expertise is anything but trivial.
The effects on air forces, training, and transition
A single 6th generation fighter would also pose operational challenges. European air forces are currently structured around different fleets:
- Rafale for France and other current or potential European customers;
- Eurofighter Typhoon for Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (in part);
- F-35 for most NATO countries;
- Gripen for a few users.
The transition to a single European sixth-generation fighter would involve:
- synchronizing the retirement schedules of current fleets (Rafale, Typhoon, F-18, etc.) around 2040–2050;
- the establishment of common training courses for pilots and mechanics;
- a major reorganization of air bases, simulators, and parts stocks.
For the armed forces, the advantages would be clear:
- increased standardization;
- logistical simplification;
- potential for exchanges of pilots and units on the same type.
But the reality of needs is not uniform:
- France requires an aircraft capable of carrying airborne nuclear weapons and being deployed on a CATOBAR aircraft carrier;
- Germany and Italy are already relying on the F-35 for NATO nuclear missions;
- some countries prioritize cost per flight hour over high intensity.
A single fighter would therefore have to cover a very wide range of needs—at the risk of becoming a costly and complex compromise that is difficult to certify everywhere.
The NATO dimension and integration with the F-35
Within NATO, the future air architecture is already dominated by the F-35, purchased by the majority of allies. The arrival of a single European sixth-generation fighter would raise two questions:
- How can it be integrated into a system of systems dominated by American standards?
- How can we avoid the European aircraft being perceived as a direct competitor to US solutions, to the detriment of interoperability?
Technically speaking, a successful SCAF—with combat cloud, remote carriers, and multi-domain capabilities—could fit perfectly into NATO, provided it complies with Alliance standards. Politically, it is more delicate: a highly autonomous system, focused on European sovereignty, could be seen as an instrument of rebalancing vis-à-vis the United States.
The reality is undoubtedly hybrid:
- the European system will have to interact with F-35s, AWACS, and American drones;
- Europeans will have to demonstrate that the SCAF is not an “industrial whim,” but a real contribution to NATO’s credibility, particularly vis-à-vis Russia.
National positions and room for compromise
The French position: leadership, nuclear weapons, and aircraft carriers
For Paris, the SCAF is the logical continuation of the Rafale. France is aiming for an aircraft capable of:
- carrying airborne nuclear weapons;
- being adapted to a future conventional aircraft carrier with catapults;
- guaranteeing complete independence on critical chains (software, jamming, weapons integration).
A single European production is acceptable to France if it retains a structuring role on the fighter itself. This is one of the points of friction with Germany.
The German position: balanced sharing and alternative options
Berlin wants a more balanced sharing of leadership, particularly via Airbus. Germany, already committed to the F-35 for NATO’s nuclear mission, could be tempted to scale back its involvement in a SCAF that is too focused on French needs.
At the same time, there are signs that Germany is keeping the door open to the GCAP, or even to its own solution if the SCAF fails.
Spain’s position: alignment with SCAF and the Eurofighter
Madrid has clearly stated its priority: to modernize the Eurofighter and remain aligned with SCAF, while ruling out the F-35 option for the time being.
A single European production via SCAF is therefore the natural option for Spain—provided that it retains a significant industrial role.
The British and Italian positions: preference for GCAP
The United Kingdom and Italy have chosen GCAP with Japan, with a more aggressive timetable (targeted entry into service in 2035) and an industrial setup that is already well advanced (Edgewing joint venture, G2E electronics consortium, etc.).
For these countries, returning to a reconfigured SCAF would be a major strategic reversal, difficult to justify after having invested politically and industrially in GCAP.
The key question: should the SCAF really be built?
The answer is not black and white. Several levels can be distinguished.
- A complete SCAF as the sole European fighter aircraft
- Advantage: a powerful symbol of unity, a single standard, economies of scale.
- Limitations: politically unrealistic (GCAP already well underway), possible opposition from London and Rome, difficulty of merging two industrial cultures.
- A SCAF refocused on the “system of systems”
- The SCAF could become the European framework for cloud combat, drones, and command architectures, leaving states more freedom on the fighter (SCAF NGF, GCAP, or F-35).
- Advantage: pooling of key components (data fusion, AI, electronic warfare) while respecting national choices.
- Limitation: partial loss of the ambition for a “single aircraft,” but a gain in realism.
- A gradual abandonment of the SCAF fighter in favor of a patchwork
- Some scenarios suggest a reduced SCAF where the NGF would be delayed or even abandoned in favor of modernized Rafale and Eurofighter aircraft, supplemented by F-35s and, for some countries, by the GCAP.
- Advantage: fewer immediate financial risks, extended use of proven platforms.
- Limitation: loss of expertise in the design of a purely continental European 6th generation fighter.
To the question “should we build the SCAF?”, the most solid answer is perhaps: it is useful to preserve a SCAF foundation—standards, cloud, drones, critical technologies—but the ambition of a single fighter for all of Europe, similar to what the Eurofighter project had been, seems much less realistic in an environment where GCAP and F-35 have already established themselves.
In reality, the real strategic question goes beyond SCAF itself. It concerns Europe’s choice between two models: multiplying national or small club programs at the risk of dispersion, or accepting profound industrial and political compromises in order to converge towards a few truly shared architectures. A single sixth-generation European fighter would be a formidable accelerator of sovereignty, but it would require strategic clarity and collective discipline that are still lacking. Until this coherence is achieved, the idea will remain more of a desirable horizon than a feasible program.
Sources
– Article “Future Combat Air System,” encyclopedic summary of the SCAF (FCAS), 2024.
– Defense News and DGA analyses on the evolution of the SCAF and the transition to the demonstrator, 2024–2025.
– Reuters articles on Franco-German tensions surrounding the FCAS and the political roadmap for the end of 2025.
– Studies and analyses (National Interest, Parliament Magazine, European think tanks) on the estimated cost of the SCAF (≈€100 billion) and the risks of duplication with the GCAP.
– Official and industrial files on the Global Combat Air Program (BAE Systems, Leonardo, Mitsubishi, JV Edgewing, G2E), 2023–2025.
– Breaking Defense article on Spain’s preference for Eurofighter and FCAS, 2025.
– Analysis articles on the rise of the Rafale in Europe and the growing role of the F-35 in NATO, 2024–2025.
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