Africa’s main arms suppliers (2020-2025)

Russia, China, and the US supply most of the arms purchased by Africa in 2020-2025. Analysis of the main sellers and imported arms.

Africa relies heavily on foreign suppliers to equip its armed forces. In the recent period 2020-2025, the continent accounted for only a modest share of global arms trade (around 4 to 5% of global imports). However, the question *”Where does Africa buy its arms? ” is of major geopolitical importance, as it highlights the influence of major powers and the evolution of alliances on the continent. This period has been marked by an overall decline in arms purchases in Africa compared to the previous decade, particularly in North Africa, but also by a sharp increase in imports in West Africa due to regional conflicts.

In this context, some traditional suppliers are consolidating their position while new players are emerging. Russia has established itself as Africa’s leading arms supplier, closely followed by China and the United States. France and other European countries continue to play a significant role in certain regions, but less dominant than in the past. At the same time, countries such as Turkey and India are beginning to carve out a place for themselves in this market. Finally, the informal sector should not be overlooked: a significant proportion of the arms circulating in African conflict zones come from illicit trafficking and illegal transfers.

This article provides a detailed overview, country by country and by category of weapons, of Africa’s arms suppliers between 2020 and 2025. The aim is to identify who is arming African nations, what types of equipment are being delivered, and how these arms flows reflect the continent’s contemporary strategic challenges.

Key figures for the African arms market

In terms of volume, Africa is a minority importer of arms on a global scale. According to available data, Africa’s share of global imports of major arms fell to around 4.5% over the period 2020-2024, a sharp decline compared to the 2010s. This decline is largely due to slower purchases by some of the continent’s major importing countries. For example, Algeria and Morocco, historically among the largest arms buyers in Africa, significantly reduced their acquisitions after 2019. Algeria has reduced its military imports by more than 70% in just a few years, and Morocco by around 25-30%. This contraction was enough to drag down the African total, given the heavy weight of these two Maghreb states in the continent’s arms spending.

At the same time, other African regions have experienced the opposite trend. Sub-Saharan Africa, although still spending less in absolute terms than North Africa, has slightly increased its arms imports compared to the end of the 2010s. Above all, West Africa has seen its purchases explode: West African arms imports doubled between 2015-2019 and 2020-2024. This surge can be explained by the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea: the fight against jihadist insurgencies and internal conflicts has prompted many states in the region to urgently modernize and strengthen their arsenals.

In West Africa, Nigeria has emerged as the largest buyer, accounting for around one-third of the subregion’s arms imports. As Africa’s largest economy, plagued by multiple insurgencies (Boko Haram in the northeast, communal conflicts elsewhere), Nigeria has invested heavily in equipping its army in recent years. Behind Nigeria, Sahelian countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso—faced with armed rebellions and the terrorist threat—have accelerated their arms purchases since 2020. Even countries that had previously been more modest in this area, such as Senegal, have significantly increased their military spending. These trends reflect a regional arms race driven by the need to respond to immediate security crises.

Despite these contrasting dynamics across regions, it should be noted that the African market remains limited compared to other regions of the world. In 2024, African countries as a whole spent around $50 billion on military expenditure (barely 2% of the global total). Moreover, most of this spending is used to run the armed forces (salaries, maintenance) rather than to purchase new equipment. However, in the medium and long term, Africa’s projected population and economic growth could significantly increase the budget allocated to armaments. International suppliers are aware of this and are already seeking to gain market share on the continent, often taking advantage of the weakness of local industry.

Russia: the continent’s leading arms supplier

Russia has established itself as the leading arms seller to African states in recent years. According to available estimates, Moscow accounted for around 20-25% of conventional arms deliveries to Africa between 2020 and 2024, making it the leading supplier to the continent. Russia’s leadership in the African arms market has been consolidated by historical ties and deliberate political strategies.

Russian influence was initially built on long-standing relations with North Africa. Two countries in particular—Algeria and Egypt—have long been major customers of the Russian arms industry. Both countries’ armies, which are legacies of the Cold War, have large stocks of Soviet- and Russian-made equipment. During the 2000s, Algiers and Cairo signed major contracts with Moscow for Sukhoi fighter jets, tanks and armored vehicles, air defense systems, and more. Although Algeria significantly reduced its orders after 2019, it is still estimated that at least two-thirds of Russian arms exports to Africa are destined for Algeria and Egypt. For example, more than 70% of Algeria’s arsenal and about one-third of Egypt’s arsenal comes from Russia, including Su-30 fighter jets, S-300 missile systems, and attack helicopters.

Beyond the Maghreb, Russia has also strengthened its presence in sub-Saharan Africa. In recent years, Moscow has signed military cooperation agreements with a growing number of African governments (more than 40 African countries have reportedly concluded such agreements, according to official Russian statements in 2023).. In concrete terms, Russia supplies weapons to a core group of strategic partners in sub-Saharan Africa. These include:

Mali: since 2021, Bamako has turned to Moscow to equip its army after breaking with Western countries. Russia has delivered combat helicopters (e.g., Mi-24/Mi-35), light attack aircraft, radars, and various armored vehicles to Mali. These transfers have often been accompanied by the presence of Russian “advisors” or mercenaries from the Wagner company to train Malian military personnel.
The Central African Republic (CAR): in the midst of civil war, the CAR received Russian small arms and armored vehicles in 2018-2019, officially under exemptions to the UN embargo. Since 2020, Russian support (via Wagner) has intensified, with additional deliveries of small arms to the Central African army and support for the restructuring of its forces.
Sudan: Russia has long-standing military ties with Khartoum, to which it has sold MiG and Sukhoi fighter jets in the past. In 2020-2021, despite political instability, negotiations took place for the establishment of a Russian naval base in Sudan and the continuation of arms sales (including anti-aircraft systems and artillery pieces). Sudan is one of Russia’s regular customers for military equipment in Africa.
Angola: Although more stable, Angola is another major buyer of Russian weapons in sub-Saharan Africa. Luanda, for example, acquired a dozen Su-30MK2 fighter jets in the second half of the 2010s, strengthening an air force historically equipped by the USSR. Negotiations are ongoing for the modernization of its arsenal through Russian suppliers.
Nigeria: Traditionally Western-oriented, Nigeria has nevertheless purchased some Russian equipment recently. Between 2016 and 2018, Abuja ordered and received 12 Russian-made Mi-35M attack helicopters to fight Boko Haram. These aircraft were delivered by 2020, marking Moscow’s largest direct sale to Abuja. This remains modest compared to Nigeria’s overall purchases, but highlights Russia’s ability to penetrate even traditionally pro-Western markets.

Other African countries have also benefited from smaller-scale Russian deliveries, including Cameroon (which received a Pantsir S1 air defense system), Uganda, and Burkina Faso (which acquired used Mi-17 helicopters). The diversity of these customers demonstrates Russia’s desire to expand into all sub-regions of Africa.

Several factors explain the appeal of Russian weapons. On the one hand, Russian equipment is generally less expensive than its Western counterparts and relatively robust, making it suitable for armies with limited budgets. On the other hand, many African countries already have Soviet equipment inherited from past decades, which facilitates training and logistics when they buy Russian again (compatibility of ammunition, spare parts, etc.). Above all, Russia does not make its arms sales conditional on political or human rights criteria. Unlike the US or European countries, Moscow does not shy away from supplying weapons to contested governments or those engaged in civil wars. For example, in the midst of the war in Libya (2020), Russia secretly supported Marshal Haftar’s forces—in violation of an international embargo—by supplying them with fighter jets, surface-to-air missile systems, and various armored vehicles via intermediaries. This cynical pragmatism allows Russia to win contracts where Western countries refrain from doing so.

Finally, beyond commercial sales, Russia is pursuing a veritable arms diplomacy in Africa. Free or heavily discounted deliveries are sometimes made as military aid, particularly to curry favor with certain regimes. Moscow also strives to organize annual Russia-Africa forums where military cooperation is highlighted. Rosoboronexport, the Russian arms export agency, has announced that by 2023 more than 30% of its global deliveries will be destined for Africa, a sharp increase. Everything therefore indicates that Russia’s presence will continue to grow in the African arms market, especially as Moscow’s geopolitical difficulties elsewhere (Western sanctions and the war in Ukraine limiting certain outlets) are pushing it to turn to alternative partners, particularly in Africa, for its arms exports.

China: a rising power in African arms

China has established itself in recent years as a key arms supplier to Africa, ranking second or even first among exporters to the continent, depending on the period. Between 2020 and 2025, Beijing accounted for around 15 to 20% of African arms imports, almost reaching Russia’s market share. This spectacular growth is part of China’s broader strategy in Africa, which aims to combine economic partnership and defense cooperation.

More than half of African countries now have Chinese military equipment in their inventories. It is estimated that between 2019 and 2023, at least 21 countries in sub-Saharan Africa received significant deliveries of Chinese arms. China’s presence is particularly strong in certain categories of weapons and among nations previously neglected by major Western suppliers. Here are the main features of China’s footprint:

Armored vehicles everywhere in Africa: China has flooded the continent with military vehicles of all kinds. According to estimates, about 7 out of 10 African armies now use Chinese-designed armored vehicles. For example, the state-owned NORINCO company has sold troop carriers and infantry fighting vehicles to countries as diverse as Nigeria, Zambia, Ghana, and Mozambique. Recently, Ghana acquired around 20 Chinese VN2A armored vehicles for its ground forces. Mali and Senegal have also purchased Norinco light armored vehicles to modernize their armies. These vehicles, which are less expensive than their Western counterparts, are proving very popular with African defense budgets, which are under pressure.
Drones and unmanned aerial vehicles: China has become a major player in the sale of military drones to Africa. Since the 2010s, models such as the CH-3 and CH-4 (MALE-type armed drones – medium altitude, long endurance) have been supplied to Nigeria, Egypt and Zambia. More recently, Chinese-designed Wing Loong drones have found their way to Ethiopia via transfers from the United Arab Emirates, contributing to the war in Tigray. China offers high-performance combat drones at lower costs than Western or Israeli drones. This allows African countries to acquire drone strike capabilities by purchasing Chinese equipment without having to rely on often complex Western licenses.
Artillery and heavy weapons: Beijing has also supplied artillery systems (multiple rocket launchers, howitzers) and missiles to various African states. For example, 302 mm WS-1 rocket launchers were delivered to the Sudanese army, providing long-range strike capability. South Sudan is reported to have received Red Arrow-73D guided anti-tank missiles, also manufactured in China, despite the partial embargo on such weapons. Tanzania and Cameroon are also among the customers for Chinese artillery and rockets.
Military aviation: Although China has not yet sold any front-line fighter jets to Africa (with the notable exception of the JF-17 Thunder to Nigeria, which are actually co-developed with Pakistan), it does export advanced training aircraft and helicopters. For example, Harbin Z-9 helicopters (the Chinese version of the French Dauphin) have been supplied to Zambia and Kenya.Harbin Z-9** helicopters (the Chinese version of the French Dauphin) have been supplied to Zambia and Kenya, for example. K-8 Karakorum jet trainers (designed with Pakistan) are used by Egypt, Sudan and Namibia to train their pilots. China is thus targeting light aviation, a less competitive segment than fighter jets, which are dominated by Russia, the US and Europe.
Small arms and ammunition: An often underestimated aspect is the mass of small arms, ammunition, and personal equipment supplied by China. Many African armed forces and police forces are equipped with assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, etc. from Norinco or Poly Technologies. For example, the famous Type-56 rifles (derived from the AK-47) manufactured in China are widely available on the continent, both through official sales and trafficking. These small arms are not always included in international databases, as China does not fully adhere to transparency mechanisms such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms. As a result, the actual volume of Chinese exports to Africa is undoubtedly higher than the official figures, with a significant proportion escaping the statistics due to these often poorly documented sales of small arms.

In terms of partners, China has successfully conquered a variety of markets. Algeria is considered the leading African customer of the Chinese defense industry – Algiers has purchased Chinese combat drones, anti-tank missiles, and even Chinese-made naval corvettes. Behind Algeria are countries such as Tanzania (Chinese land and naval equipment), Sudan (long supported militarily by Beijing), and Morocco, which has begun to turn to Chinese technology (such as Wing Loong drones acquired via the UAE to monitor Western Sahara). Large English-speaking economies such as Nigeria and Kenya are also customers, albeit to a lesser extent, for specific equipment. Overall, China is willing to sell to both authoritarian states under sanctions (Zimbabwe, Sudan) and Western partners (Kenya, Ghana), which opens up a wide field of opportunity.

China’s rise is accompanied by a global security offering. Beijing is not content with exporting equipment: it also offers training, infrastructure construction (maintenance factories, bases) and even the presence of Chinese security companies on the ground. For example, in the Central African Republic and Ethiopia, China has invested in private companies responsible for protecting its investments and training local forces, thereby creating a parallel security ecosystem. In Djibouti, Beijing has established its first overseas military base, officially for anti-piracy operations, but this also allows it to demonstrate its commitment to security in Africa. This integrated approach aims to build loyalty among African customers by combining arms, training, and long-term logistical support.

Ultimately, China now appears to be a very attractive supplier for many African countries. Its advantages include competitive prices, fast delivery (often superior to Western administrative procedures), and the absence of political conditions (Beijing does not interfere in the internal governance of its clients). In return, it gains diplomatic influence and access to strategic resources. However, this Chinese “arms diplomacy” is controversial: some African analysts are concerned about the sometimes uneven quality of Chinese equipment and the dependence that this policy creates. But in the short term, the trend is clearly toward growth in Chinese arms sales in Africa, positioning Beijing as a serious rival to traditional suppliers.

The United States: a present but regulated supplier

The United States is one of the main arms exporters to Africa, generally ranking third behind Russia and China for the period 2020-2025. Washington is estimated to account for around 15% of arms imported by Africa in recent years. However, the nature of the US commitment differs significantly from that of Moscow or Beijing. The US presence as an arms supplier in Africa is both discreet in terms of figures and strategic on the ground, framed by strict political considerations.

Traditionally, US arms sales have focused on a limited number of partners in Africa, including:

Egypt: Egypt is by far the largest recipient of US military assistance and arms sales in Africa, thanks to the Camp David Accords. Each year, Cairo receives approximately $1.3 billion in US military aid, which is used to purchase US-made equipment. The Egyptian army thus operates a wide range of US equipment, including M1 Abrams tanks (co-produced locally under license), F-16 fighter jets, AH-64 Apache helicopters, TOW anti-tank missiles, etc. In 2022, the Biden administration approved a significant sale to Egypt comprising 12 C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft and radar systems, worth around $2.5 billion. However, Washington remains attentive to the human rights situation in Egypt and has already frozen or delayed certain deliveries as a sign of disapproval.
Morocco: A non-NATO ally of the United States, Morocco has acquired significant US equipment in recent years. In 2019-2020, Rabat ordered a batch of 25 latest-generation F-16V aircraft and 24 Apache helicopters to modernize its forces. Precision missiles, air defense systems, and US armored vehicles are also part of Morocco’s arsenal. These contracts, worth several billion dollars, make Morocco the United States’ second-largest customer in Africa after Egypt.
Tunisia: Although more modest, Tunisia has nevertheless benefited from increased support from Washington in the fight against terrorism since 2015. It has received modernized Black Hawk helicopters, radars, and night vision equipment, all financed in part by US aid programs. Tunisia is considered by the US to be a stable partner in North Africa, although sales remain limited.
Nigeria: After a long period of difficult military relations (Washington had blocked certain sales due to human rights concerns), Nigeria has recently been able to purchase equipment from the US. In 2020-2021, Abuja took delivery of 12 A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft supplied by the US (co-manufactured with Brazil) for operations against Boko Haram. This delivery, worth around $500 million, marked an improvement in security cooperation. Nigeria is also interested in US helicopters and technology, but faces competition from Russian, Chinese and now Turkish offers.
Other African countries: US exports also reach a few other nations, particularly in East Africa. Ethiopia and Kenya have received US transport aircraft and helicopters in the past. Uganda and Ghana are on the list of customers, mainly through military aid rather than direct purchases. In French-speaking Africa, Senegal, Niger and Mali (before the recent diplomatic break) have benefited from donations of US equipment as part of anti-terrorist programs-terrorist programs—for example, light armored vehicles, patrol boats, and unarmed surveillance drones. However, commercial sales to these French-speaking countries remained very low, a situation that the US has recently sought to change in the face of China and Russia’s offensive in these same countries.

It is important to note that the US defense industry does not operate through centralized state sales as in Russia or China. In the US, private companies (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, etc.) export under the supervision of the government, which must authorize contracts. Washington can therefore influence who buys, but it is the manufacturers who solicit the markets. Furthermore, the majority of US arms transfers to Africa are made through aid or financing programs (Foreign Military Financing, Excess Defense Articles, etc.) rather than through simple purchases financed entirely by Africans. This gives the US leverage: they often choose not to sell or deliver certain weapons if the purchasing country does not meet certain criteria (democracy, human rights, strategic alignment).

This approach was seen, for example, in the case of Nigeria: for years, the US authorities refused to sell attack helicopters to Nigeria, citing abuses committed by the Nigerian army. It was only when the terrorist threat became critical and China or Russia threatened to take the market that Washington softened its position. Similarly, US military aid to Burkina Faso and Mali was suspended after the coups of 2020-2022, leading to the halt of equipment deliveries that had been planned. These examples show that US aid, although technologically advanced, often comes with political conditions that make it less attractive to certain regimes.

Despite this, the US remains a major player for several African armies, particularly those seeking high-tech equipment that is not available elsewhere. For example, US surveillance and intelligence systems (unarmed drones, ISR aircraft, etc.) are highly prized by Sahel countries engaged in counterterrorism. Washington provided this type of equipment to Niger and Chad before 2023, significantly improving these countries’ capabilities. US expertise in training (Flintlock exercises, etc.) adds to its arsenal of influence.

In conclusion on the US role, it can be said that the United States largely dominates the global arms market but considers Africa only as a secondary theater. It prioritizes stability and counterterrorism over commercial profitability. Nevertheless, faced with Russian and Chinese pressure, Washington has recently stepped up its efforts in Africa, including in French-speaking West African countries where it had little commercial presence. The future will tell whether the United States will be able to maintain its position or whether the restrictions it imposes will cause it to be overtaken by less scrupulous competitors.

France and European countries: a historic role in question

Due to its colonial past and post-independence partnerships, France has long been seen as a major arms supplier in Africa, particularly in its former colonies. However, figures from recent years reveal a relative decline in France’s position in this market. Between 2020 and 2025, French arms are estimated to account for only 8 to 10% of African imports, placing France behind Russia, China, and sometimes even the United States. How can this gap between image and reality be explained?

On the one hand, the French defense industry has seen its main markets shift to other regions of the world (the Middle East, Asia, Europe). Africa now accounts for only a very small fraction of French arms exports—about 1.5% of sales according to official data. French companies such as Dassault, Thales, and Nexter sell very little in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing their efforts on large contracts elsewhere. For example, in the recent period, 76% of French arms exports went to Europe (thanks to massive purchases by neighboring countries since 2022), while sub-Saharan Africa accounted for less than 2%.

On the other hand, a few African countries continue to buy French arms, but they are few and far between. Historically, France’s three main African customers were:

Egypt: The Egyptian army signed major contracts with France in the 2010s (delivery of 24 Rafale fighter jets, two Mistral helicopter carriers, multi-mission frigates, etc.). A second contract for 30 additional Rafales was signed in 2021, further strengthening the partnership. In terms of value, Cairo purchased more than €3.5 billion worth of French arms between 2014 and 2020. Egypt remains by far France’s largest customer in Africa in recent years, thanks to these strategic purchases, which have enabled it to diversify its sources (given its dependence on the US and Russia).
Morocco: Rabat, a traditional ally of Paris, has acquired French equipment but to a lesser extent than Egypt. Morocco has notably purchased French-designed frigates (the Floréal class, followed by the FREMM Mohammed VI delivered in 2014), CAESAR artillery batteries, and modernized its Mirage F1 aircraft in the past. In 2019-2020, Morocco imported around €650 million worth of French military equipment. However, it has since favored US (F-16, Apache) and Turkish (Bayraktar drones) suppliers, causing France’s share of its spending to fall in 2021-2022.
Algeria: Paradoxically, Algeria has also made occasional purchases of French equipment despite its dominant Russian presence. In the 2010s, Algiers acquired French patrol boats, electronic systems, and a few vehicles. The total remained modest (a few hundred million euros in 2012-2016).. In 2019, there was a surge in French arms purchases by Algeria, totaling €117 million, but this figure fell back to just €41 million in 2020. Algeria therefore appears to be maintaining limited cooperation with France, which is nowhere near the level of its Russian purchases.

In French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa, where France is often perceived as omnipresent, actual arms sales have been relatively low. Over the decade 2010, the best customers were:

Senegal: Dakar has strengthened its army, in particular to secure its new offshore oil resources. In 2020, Senegal made a massive purchase of French equipment worth around $240 million. This contract probably included ocean patrol vessels built by Piriou/OCEA, armored vehicles, and radar or information systems supplied by French manufacturers. He explains that Senegal alone accounted for the majority of French exports to West Africa in 2020.
Gabon and Burkina Faso: These countries have been customers for French equipment worth tens of millions of euros (approximately €40 million and €33 million respectively over several years). These were mainly light armored vehicles, small arms, and law enforcement equipment for these states with historical ties to Paris.
South Africa: Although not a French-speaking country, Pretoria acquired certain specialized equipment (Airbus systems, Thales radars) for around €30 million in the 2010s. However, South Africa also manufactures its own weapons and is not a major net importer.
Elsewhere in East Africa, France’s presence has remained marginal: a few million euros in sales to Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya (often internal security equipment or small radars), but nothing substantial.

These figures, although old, remain indicative of current trends. France retains a historical advantage in certain countries through the training of military elites (many French-speaking African officers are trained in France) and through bilateral defense agreements. However, commercially, it faces increased competition from new entrants (China, Turkey), including in its traditional sphere of influence. For example, countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso, which were once equipped almost exclusively by the West, are now turning to Russia and China after breaking diplomatic ties with Paris.

Beyond France, other European countries supply Africa, often in specific segments:

Italy: It has sold military vessels to Algeria (patrol boats, corvettes) and Egypt (two FREMM frigates resold in 2020). Italy has also supplied air transport (C-27J Spartan aircraft to Kenya and Zaire in the past).
Germany: Berlin has authorized the sale of Type-209 submarines to Egypt (four units delivered in the 2010s) and delivered armored vehicles to Kenya and Nigeria. However, Germany applies strong political restrictions and has blocked certain exports to Africa for ethical reasons.
The United Kingdom: Less present than in colonial times, the United Kingdom has exported Hawk training aircraft to southern Africa and a few armored vehicles to Nigeria. London focuses more on training (British programs in Kenya and Nigeria) than on sales of heavy equipment, where it is no longer very competitive with American or Asian rivals.

All EU countries, including France, account for around 10-15% of arms sold to Africa in 2020-2025, according to available data. This is not insignificant, but it is far from domination: the days when African arsenals were mainly French or British-made are over. However, there are still some niches: for example, France remains the leading supplier to the Senegalese and Ivorian armies, Italy plays a key role in the Algerian navy, Belgium sells small arms to certain countries, etc.

Finally, European countries, like the United States, often make their exports conditional on good conduct criteria. This has led to the refusal of sales to certain African states involved in internal conflicts (such as Sudan and South Sudan, which are under embargo, Libya, etc.). This policy, while laudable from an ethical standpoint, has sometimes had the collateral effect of shifting demand to Russia, China, or other less scrupulous players. As a result, France and its neighbors find themselves competing in a market where their political influence is no longer sufficient to secure contracts.

New players: Turkey, India, and other emerging suppliers

While Russia, China, the United States, and to a lesser extent France share most of the market, other countries have recently emerged as alternative arms suppliers in Africa. Among them, Turkey is undoubtedly the most notable case, followed by India and a few other niche players (Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Brazil, etc.)..

Turkey has launched a diplomatic and commercial offensive in Africa in the 2020s, as part of its desire to diversify its partnerships and increase its global influence. In the field of armaments, Ankara has highlighted several advantages: effective products at competitive prices, no colonial legacy (and therefore a positive image in many African countries) and the possibility for buyers to avoid taking sides in the rivalry between the US, Russia and China. In concrete terms, Turkish arms exports to Africa have risen sharply: between 2020 and 2021, they increased fivefold, from around $80 million to nearly $400-500 million. This growth has continued since then, driven by a few iconic successes:

Bayraktar TB2 drones: These Turkish-made combat drones have gained international renown (particularly after their role in the conflicts in Libya, Syria, and especially Ukraine). Several African countries have been won over. In 2021, Morocco purchased a dozen TB2 drones to monitor and deter the Polisario Front in the Sahara. In the same year, Ethiopia acquired them to strengthen its military effort during the Tigray war, which helped to reverse the balance of power on the ground. In 2022-2023, Tunisia and Nigeria* in turn received Bayraktar TB2s, making these drones one of Turkey’s most popular export products in Africa. They are appreciated because they are less expensive and easier to use than American or Israeli drones, while offering formidable performance against ground targets.
Turkish armored vehicles: Turkey manufactures various light armored vehicles (such as the Kirpi, a mine-resistant vehicle from BMC). These vehicles have found buyers in Tunisia, Somalia (where Turkey has a military training base), and other countries seeking to quickly equip themselves for law enforcement or counterinsurgency operations. The reliability of these vehicles is considered satisfactory for a price lower than Western equivalents.
Artillery and small arms: Turkish-designed assault rifles (MPT-76), mortar guns, and other weapons have been supplied to some armies in West and North Africa. For example, Libya (Tripoli government) received shipments of Turkish weapons during its conflict despite the embargo, strengthening its forces against Haftar. Niger also expressed interest in Turkish equipment before the 2023 coup that shook things up.

Behind these sales, the Turkish strategy also has a more unofficial component: the use of Turkish private military companies such as SADAT to train African troops and facilitate contracts. SADAT, founded by former officers close to the Turkish government, presents itself as a Turkish version of Wagner, offering advice and training while paving the way for equipment exports. This approach has been reported in Somalia and Libya, where Turkish instructors (official or private) accompany arms deliveries. By positioning itself in this way, Turkey offers African countries an alternative source of arms, neither Western nor Russian/Chinese, preventing these countries from becoming too dependent on one bloc.

The second new entrant worth mentioning is India. As an emerging power, India sees Africa as a place to compete with China, including in defense. In March 2023, New Delhi organized an unprecedented India-Africa forum focused on military cooperation. No fewer than 31 African delegations were invited to Pune (the center of the Indian defense industry), where weapons demonstrations and joint exercises were held. India highlighted its willingness to transfer technology and help develop local capabilities (such as building arms factories in Africa).

For the time being, India’s actual sales remain modest: it has offered all-terrain vehicles, radars, and naval patrol boats to various countries. It has made a few breakthroughs, such as supplying fast patrol boats to Mozambique and the Seychelles for maritime surveillance, and the sale of radar systems to Mauritius. India has also sold equipment to UN forces deployed in Africa. But overall, it is still in the prospecting phase. Its advantage is that it can offer weapons at competitive prices (thanks to a growing military industry) and promise a South-South partnership without a colonial past. Its stated goal is to counter Chinese influence by positioning itself as a reliable supplier for African countries that do not want to put all their eggs in Beijing’s basket. The challenge for India will be to convince buyers of the quality of its products (which are less tried and tested than those of the major manufacturers) and its ability to provide remote logistical support.

In addition to Turkey and India, other emerging suppliers include:

Israel: Although discreet, Israel sells advanced military technology to certain African states, often through confidential channels. For example, Israeli surveillance drones have been supplied to Kenya and Botswana. In 2021, Morocco acquired Israeli Harop drones (loitering munitions) following diplomatic normalization with Tel Aviv. Israel also offers cybersecurity and intelligence systems to African governments, strengthening their non-lethal arsenal. However, these exchanges remain modest in volume and are often not publicly disclosed.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Although the UAE does not mass-produce complex weapons, it has played a role in transiting and financing arms to Africa. It has supplied weapons (purchased from others) to its allies in Libya (Haftar forces) and Egypt. It has also deployed Chinese Wing Loong drones from its base in Eritrea to provide military support to the Ethiopian government. The UAE is thus asserting itself as an indirect player in the African market, using its wealth to arm partners aligned with its interests (against Turkish-Qatari influence in particular).
Iran: Tehran, subject to an embargo, has sought alliances in Africa to break its isolation. Iran has in the past supplied weapons to Sudan (an ideological ally), including missiles and drones, and is also believed to have armed militant groups such as Hezbollah in West Africa. More recently, Iran has sold surveillance drones to Ethiopia and offered military assistance to Mali and Guinea after their international isolation. Nevertheless, its overall impact remains limited compared to the heavyweights.
South Korea and Brazil: These two emerging countries have also attempted to sell a few products. South Korea has sold KT-1 training aircraft to Senegal and Botswana, as well as K2 assault rifles to a few African units. Brazil, through Embraer, has sold its Super Tucano aircraft to Nigeria (under US license) and is offering light armored vehicles (Guarani) in partnership with the South African company Paramount. However, their role remains marginal.

In short, the landscape of arms suppliers in Africa has diversified during 2020-2025. While four powers (Russia, China, the US, and France) still cover the majority of the formal market, new sellers are filling the gaps left by these major players. Turkey has paved the way in North and East Africa with its drones and armored vehicles, India is positioning itself by offering training and local production, while regional players (Israel, UAE, Iran) are arming allies according to their own agendas. This increased fragmentation of the market gives African countries more choice, allowing them to play off competitors to obtain better terms or circumvent certain sanctions. However, it could also complicate maintenance and standardization for African armies, which are equipped with a motley mix of weapons from multiple sources.

Types of weapons imported: from tanks to drones

Beyond the suppliers, it is instructive to examine what types of weapons African countries are mainly buying and from whom. Over the period 2020-2025, African armies have sought to acquire a full range of capabilities, from heavy conventional weapons (tanks, combat aircraft) to more modern equipment (drones, communication systems). Here is an overview by category:

Combat aircraft: Fighter aircraft remain a symbol of power for several African states. In recent years, we have seen the delivery of fighter jets such as Russian Su-30s to Algeria (the last of a previous order, although new contracts are under discussion for more recent Sukhoi models) and Russian MiG-29M/M2s to Egypt (delivered until 2020), and above all French Rafales to Egypt (first tranche).MiG-29M/M2** to Egypt (delivered until 2020), and above all French Rafale jets to Egypt (first tranche delivered until 2019, with an additional order in 2021). Morocco has modernized its combat aircraft fleet mainly through the purchase of US F-16s, while maintaining its aging Mirage F1s. Nigeria has broken new ground by taking delivery of three JF-17 Thunder (Sino-Pakistani light fighters), becoming the first African user of this aircraft in 2021. However, few sub-Saharan African countries have acquired new sophisticated combat aircraft recently due to a lack of resources. Notable efforts include those of Angola in the second half of the 2010s (Russian Su-30s) and Sudan (which integrated a few Chinese FTC-2000 fighters in 2018). Overall, Russia, the US, and France remain the dominant suppliers of supersonic fighter jets. China offers training and light aircraft, but has not yet exported any high-end fighter jets to Africa.
Helicopters: Helicopters are in high demand for their versatility (troop transport, fire support, medical evacuation). Russia has sold a large number of them: in addition to the Mi-24/35 attack helicopters (Nigeria, Mali) mentioned above, Mi-17 transport helicopters have been supplied to Kenya, Mali and Guinea. The United States has offered UH-1 Huey II and Bell 412 helicopters to various Sahelian partners (Niger, Mauritania). Europe has placed a few Airbus AS-550 Fennec helicopters in Senegal, and Italy has sold AW139s to Algeria for rescue missions. Turkey is also beginning to promote its T129 ATAK helicopter in North Africa. Thus, the range of helicopters on offer is diverse. Countries often combine several sources: for example, Nigeria operates Russian Mi-35s, Italian AW109s and American Bells, depending on purchasing opportunities and aid.
Main battle tanks and heavy armored vehicles: The best-equipped African armies (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, South Africa) have main battle tanks. During 2020-2025, a few acquisitions took place: In 2020, Nigeria purchased a dozen Chinese-made VT4 tanks (the first modern tanks for its army), as well as ST1 combat vehicles (wheeled tank destroyers). Uganda received Russian T-90 tanks donated by a third country (suspected to have been transferred via Algeria or Russia). Ethiopia has recovered second-hand T-72 tanks (probably supplied clandestinely by Eastern Europe or via Sudan) for its internal conflict. Overall, Western tanks (American Abrams, French Leclerc, etc.) are almost non-existent, with the exception of Egypt, which manufactures the Abrams under license. Russia has equipped Algeria with T-90S tanks in the past, but no major deliveries have been reported for Algiers during 2020-2025. China is taking advantage of the armored vehicle segment to place its more affordable models in sub-Saharan African countries that could not previously afford tanks. As for armored personnel carriers, they have flooded in from all over: Russia (BTR-80 in Central Africa), China (Type 07P, VN-4, etc.), South Africa (Paramount’s Marauder and Mbombe sold to Botswana and Malawi), Turkey (Kirpi in Tunisia), and the United States (MRAPs sold to Mali and Burkina Faso before 2020). This category is the most representative of the “mix” of origins within today’s African armies.
Artillery and missiles: Several countries have equipped themselves with modern artillery to increase their firepower. Morocco has acquired 155 mm CAESAR guns from France. Egypt produces American M109 howitzers under license and has imported Chinese rockets. Cameroon and Mali have purchased Chinese 122 mm multiple rocket launchers. In terms of missiles, the focus is on portable anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles to counter insurgents and air threats. Russian Kornet (anti-tank) missiles have been delivered to Nigeria and Algeria. China has exported its portable HN-5 portable missiles (similar to the Stinger) to East Africa. France and the US sometimes supply guided missiles as part of their contracts (e.g., TOW anti-tank missiles to North African armies, or Mistral air-to-air missiles carried by helicopters for certain countries in the Gulf of Guinea). There are also ballistic missiles: Egypt and Algeria have short-range missiles (old Scuds or North Korean variants) in their inventories, but no new acquisitions of this type have been noted recently, apart from possible cooperation with North Korea.Algeria** have short-range missiles (old Scuds or North Korean variants) in their inventories, but no new acquisitions of this type have been noted recently, apart from possible discreet cooperation.
Warships: While most African conflicts take place on land, a few coastal states have invested in their navies. Algeria took delivery of Chinese C28A-class corvettes (between 2016 and 2019) and is awaiting additional frigates from Italy or China. Morocco acquired a French FREMM frigate in 2014 and has purchased patrol boats from various countries (France, Spain). Egypt has been a spectacular case: it acquired two Mistral helicopter carriers and a FREMM from France, four French Gowind corvettes (including three built locally) to be delivered by 2020, as well as four German submarines and two Italian frigates during the same period. Egypt has thus diversified its naval suppliers (France, Germany, Italy, Russia for missile-launching patrol boats) and now has the most powerful navy on the continent. Sub-Saharan African countries, meanwhile, limit themselves to coastal patrol boats for maritime security: China has supplied them to Nigeria and Ghana, France to Senegal and Gabon, Israel has delivered patrol boats to Togo, etc.

In summary, the arms imported by Africa reflect current needs: counterinsurgency (drones, helicopters, mine-protected armored vehicles), regional deterrence (combat aircraft, tanks for major armies), coastal surveillance (patrol boats), etc. It can be seen that each category is covered by several competing suppliers. This plurality can benefit buyers (price competition, choice of technologies) but, as mentioned, poses a challenge for maintenance. African forces have to manage heterogeneous fleets: for example, the same country may have Russian, Chinese, and Western vehicles side by side, with three different supply chains. This is why some states are seeking to streamline their procurement by using a single main supplier, while others are hedging their bets so as not to be dependent on anyone.

The black market and arms trafficking in Africa

Beyond formal imports—i.e., contracts declared between states—Africa is unfortunately the scene of numerous illegal or informal arms transfers. These clandestine flows fuel civil wars, organized crime, and terrorism, and come from a variety of sources. Understanding where Africa “buys” its weapons therefore also means considering these parallel channels which, although unofficial, nonetheless constitute a crucial part of the arsenal available on the ground, particularly in conflict zones.

Several major channels of arms trafficking to or within Africa can be identified:

Post-Cold War arsenals and surpluses: After the end of the Cold War, huge stocks of Soviet- and Chinese-made small arms and ammunition became available on the black market. Many African countries—particularly conflict zones in the 1990s (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, etc.) – were flooded with AK-47 assault rifles, PKM machine guns, RPG-7s and other cheap weapons from Eastern Europe and Asia. These weapons are still circulating illegally from conflict to conflict today. For example, smuggling cartels have been transporting weapons from the Balkans and Ukraine to West Africa for decades in exchange for diamonds or resources (the arms for diamonds phenomenon, particularly during the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia)Similarly, old rifles and ammunition from Eastern Europe are finding their way to the Sahel via Libya.
Scattered Libyan stockpiles: The fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011 had a major destabilizing effect on the proliferation of weapons in the Sahel-Saharan strip. The Libyan regime had vast arsenals (small arms, portable missiles, mines, vehicles) that were largely looted during the post-revolution chaos. A considerable quantity of these weapons then crossed the borders into Mali, Niger, Chad, Algeria, and Egypt. For example, rebel groups in northern Mali recovered Libyan weapons, strengthening their firepower in 2012. Portable Libyan anti-aircraft missiles (SA-7) were scattered, creating a threat to civil aviation in the region. To this day, Libya’s ghost weapons continue to fuel trafficking: traces of them have been found in the caches of terrorist groups in Mali and insurgents in the Central African Republic.
Arms diversion from national armies: A significant proportion of the weapons in the hands of non-state groups in Africa come from war booty or from diversion from government stocks. For example, Boko Haram in Nigeria armed itself largely by recovering equipment abandoned by the Nigerian army during attacks on its bases (vehicles, rifles, ammunition). In Mali, jihadists seized Malian military equipment delivered by France when poorly trained Malian units fled the fighting. These captured weapons are then circulated through resale or exchange between armed groups. The porosity of certain armies, undermined by corruption, also means that unscrupulous officers discreetly resell part of their equipment on the black market.
Transnational criminal networks: Criminal organizations organize arms trafficking as a commodity, just like drugs or counterfeit money. For example, in West Africa, networks linking Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Guinea-Bissau have brought in illegal weapons by taking advantage of maritime smuggling. In southern Africa, mafias buy weapons in Eastern Europe and bring them in through the ports of Mozambique to supply gangs in South Africa and Mozambique. These networks use corruption to cross borders.
Clandestine deliveries by third countries: Sometimes foreign countries circumvent embargoes and secretly supply weapons to African belligerents to serve their own interests. The example of Russia in Libya (clandestine support for Haftar despite the UN embargo) was mentioned above. Similarly, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates violated the Libyan embargo by arming rival camps. Iran has been accused of sending weapons to Houthi rebels in Yemen via Somalia (and some may have ended up in the Horn of Africa). Ukraine itself, before the 2022 war, was a loose-cannon arms supplier selling to embargoed countries via front companies—several reports have implicated it in illegal deliveries to Sudan in the 2000s.

A recent development is causing concern: the war in Ukraine that began in 2022 has led to a massive influx of weapons into Eastern Europe and potentially an increased risk of diversion. African officials have expressed fears that some Western weapons supplied to Ukraine could end up “leak” onto black markets and end up in Africa in the hands of criminal or terrorist groups. For example, in 2022, the president of Nigeria publicly expressed concern that sophisticated weapons (rifles, explosives) sent to Ukraine could emerge from the conflict and fuel Boko Haram or armed gangs in the Sahel. Agencies such as Europol have also warned of the danger of small arms (pistols, rifles) circulating outside Ukraine via traffickers. Although few concrete cases have been documented until 2025, vigilance is required. History has shown with Libya that major conflicts allow entire arsenals to escape into the wild.

The impact of the black market is particularly evident in the proliferation of small arms in Africa. It is estimated that there are millions of illicit small arms in circulation on the continent. These weapons fuel crime (militias, bandits, kidnappings) and prolong civil wars even when official sources are cut off. For example, despite embargoes on the Central African Republic and South Sudan, fighting continues there, fueled by the illegal arms trade through neighboring countries. The Sahel has become a major corridor for this trafficking, linking the Mediterranean coast to the hotbeds of instability in Mali, Niger, and Nigeria.

It is important to highlight the role of certain notorious international brokers and smugglers who have operated in Africa. Individuals such as Viktor Bout (the Russian “merchant of death” active in the 1990s) have supplied weapons and ammunition to various African warlords, blurring the line between state complicity and outright criminality. Although the international community has stepped up controls and prosecutions against these traffickers, new figures are emerging and exploiting the existing demand, as long as there are buyers willing to pay and conflicts to fuel.

In summary, informal arms sales are unfortunately a significant source of weapons in Africa, parallel to official acquisitions. Some of these weapons were originally produced or sold by the same major suppliers (Russia, China, the West), but change hands through diversion and smuggling. These clandestine flows fuel instability and make peaceful resolutions more difficult, as embargoes and international pressure can be circumvented. Ideally, strengthening traceability mechanisms and international police cooperation would be necessary to stem this trafficking. But on the ground in Africa, where borders are vast and porous, this is a huge challenge. Illegal weapons are now part of the continent’s security equation, just like weapons officially supplied by one country or another.

Towards African autonomy in arms?

Faced with this landscape dominated by imports and foreign influence, the question arises: can African countries ever produce locally a significant proportion of their weapons and reduce their dependence? The development of an African defense industry is progressing slowly but deserves to be highlighted in conclusion, as it could be a game-changer in the long term.

Several African countries have invested in military industrial capabilities, with varying results:

South Africa is by far the most advanced player. With an industry developed under apartheid (in response to the embargo at the time), it has the Denel company and other private companies that design high-tech weapons. South Africa has produced locally armored vehicles (such as the famous Casspir MRAP), artillery, anti-tank missiles, and even a combat helicopter, the Rooivalk. The latter, which entered service in the 2000s, is a symbol of local innovation, although it has not been exported. Pretoria also manufactures and exports light drones and electronic systems. However, South Africa’s industry has suffered from financial difficulties and corruption in recent years, limiting its growth. Nevertheless, it remains the most diversified on the continent and often collaborates with other countries (for example, South African components are used in Emirati drones, etc.).
Egypt has a long-standing military-industrial complex (founded in the 1950s and modernized with US assistance since the 1980s). The Egyptian organization MIC (Military Industrial Complex) produces small arms, ammunition, armored vehicles (Fahd transporters) and assembles heavy weapons under license. As mentioned, Egyptian Abrams tanks are assembled in a Cairo factory from American kits. Egypt also manufactures Sakr anti-tank missiles (derived from Russian models) and has built ships in partnership (French Gowind corvettes, through technology transfer). With its large domestic market, Egypt is seeking to export to Africa—for example, it has sold armored vehicles to Zambia and offered equipment to several African countries to increase its influence.
Nigeria, a demographic giant, has recently entered the race. Its state-owned company DICON (Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria), created in 1964, had long been stagnant. But recently, Abuja has encouraged public-private partnerships. Nigerian companies have developed prototypes of armored vehicles (the Ezugwu MRAP) and surveillance drones (Tsaigumi, designed with the help of foreign consultants) and are producing ammunition locally. These initiatives remain modest in view of the Nigerian army’s needs, but they signal a desire for domestic innovation. In addition, Nigeria is collaborating with countries such as Pakistan to set up production units (e.g., manufacturing assault rifles under license). Its stated goal is to be able to cover part of its light weapons needs and eventually export to the region.
Algeria and Morocco have also begun local production. In 2015, Algiers inaugurated armored vehicle assembly plants (in partnership with Germany for the Fuchs 2, for example, and with China for other models). Morocco has recently set up units to maintain and modernize its equipment and is considering co-producing drones and ammunition in conjunction with Israel and other partners. For the time being, these Maghreb efforts remain focused on self-sufficiency rather than exports.
Other countries are beginning to develop embryonic industries: Ethiopia is building a small arms manufacturing plant, Kenya inaugurated a rifle assembly plant in 2021 (with a license from the Belgian firm FN Herstal), Uganda produces small-caliber ammunition, etc. These initiatives demonstrate a growing awareness that total dependence on foreign countries is strategically risky.

Despite this progress, we must remain clear-headed about the major challenges hindering military industrialization in Africa. Financing is the first hurdle: developing complex weapons is very expensive, and African defense budgets are barely sufficient to purchase proven foreign equipment, so investing millions in local R&D is difficult to justify for countries with limited resources. Then there is the problem of economies of scale: a single African country rarely has a domestic market large enough to justify mass production (except for giants such as Egypt and Nigeria). Regional cooperation could be a solution (e.g., a joint factory for several countries), but it faces political rivalries and the fragmentation of the continent.

Furthermore, the local industry must convince the national armed forces to trust local products. However, the latter may be tempted to prefer weapons that have already been used successfully elsewhere rather than local prototypes. For example, despite the Nigerian Tsaigumi drone, Nigeria still purchased proven foreign drones (Turkish and Chinese) for its operations because it could not wait for a local product to mature.

Finally, quality and international standards are an issue. Some innovative African equipment, although promising, does not yet meet Western or Asian standards in terms of reliability. This is improving over time (the South African Rooivalk, for example, is a fully operational helicopter), but initial mistrust must be overcome.

Despite everything, the rise of an African defense industry, even if slow, has positive effects: it creates highly skilled jobs, stimulates technological research, and can ultimately reduce import bills. Above all, it offers African countries strategic leeway. An Africa capable of producing at least its own small arms and ammunition and maintaining its vehicles would be less vulnerable to fluctuations in international geopolitics (sanctions, export blackmail).

If the period 2020-2025 confirms that Africa still buys the overwhelming majority of its weapons abroad—mainly from Russia, China, the United States, France, and others—we are seeing efforts to gradually reverse this trend. Within a few decades, with adequate investment and political stability, some African countries could become more militarily autonomous, or even exporters of equipment to their neighbors. For now, however, the continent remains a commercial battleground for global arms sellers, and this competition reflects the geopolitical influences at play in Africa.

War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.