The VC-25B program climbs to $4.32 billion: the US Air Force is funding a communications upgrade to deliver two Next Air Force One aircraft by 2026.
Summary
The US Air Force has just added a contract amendment capped at $15.5 million (approximately €13.2 million) to the VC-25B program to expand the secure communications expected on the Next Air Force One. This amendment brings the cumulative value of contract FA8625-16-C-6599 to $4.315 billion (approximately €3.68 billion). The work is scheduled for completion on December 1, 2026, in San Antonio, Texas. The objective is clear: to deliver two aircraft capable of ensuring, in all situations, presidential liaison, command and control, and continuity of government, based on a militarized 747-8, while the program remains under budgetary and scheduling pressure.
The contract and the increase to $4.32 billion for the VC-25B
Modification P00161 and what it really changes
The announced modification (P00161) adds up to $15.5 million to expand the communications capabilities necessary to deliver two “fully mission-capable” aircraft. In other words, this is a targeted increase, but on a critical issue. On this type of platform, connectivity is not an “accessory.” It is a combat function in the strict sense, just like electrical power, protection, or avionics integration. The amount may seem small in relation to the total, but it often corresponds to very specific items: encryption equipment, antennas, reinforced satellite links, electromagnetic hardening, redundancies, integration, and testing.
This contractual action brings the cumulative value to $4,315,589,245 billion (approximately €3.68 billion, based on a dollar exchange rate of close to €0.85 in mid-December 2025). This is important for public monitoring: it shows that the program is not limited to a single budget that is “frozen” in time. Even when an industrial core is under a fixed-price contract, additional contracts can be awarded for separate scopes (in this case, explicitly separate from engineering and development/industrialization efforts). This is a classic mechanism for aircraft with extreme requirements: needs are refined, risks are eliminated, and certain lots are isolated to secure the technical trajectory.
The 2026 schedule and financing logic
The end of the work is scheduled for December 1, 2026, in San Antonio. The funds committed at the time of award include $0.5 million for fiscal year 2025 and $4.5 million for 2026, under RDT&E (research, development, testing, and evaluation) lines. This detail is important: we are well into the maturation, integration, verification, and qualification phases, rather than simply installing equipment. On a presidential aircraft, a capability only exists once it has been demonstrated, tested, certified, documented, and proven to be maintainable. The real cost is therefore not just material. It lies in integration, testing, cybersecurity, traceability, and acceptance by the authorities.
Finally, the fact that the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) is the contracting entity highlights the “life cycle” nature of the subject. We are not just buying an aircraft. We are buying a system, its upgrades, its testing, and its ability to remain available. For a symbol like Air Force One, availability is not a marketing KPI. It is an operational constraint, with very low tolerance for breakdowns, planned downtime, and vulnerabilities.
The communications mission aboard the Next Air Force One
The role of the “flying White House” and the technical constraint
The term “flying White House” refers to a functional reality: enabling the president to exercise his prerogatives while in flight. In concrete terms, this translates into complete voice and data communication channels, with encryption, prioritization, resilience, and multi-path redundancy. The requirement is not just to “be able to call.” It is to be able to communicate under constraints: major crises, degradation of the terrestrial network, cyber attacks, jamming, or electromagnetic events.
On a platform derived from the Boeing 747-8, integration also imposes physical constraints. The antennas (satcom, protected links, UHF/VHF, etc.) must coexist without interference on an airframe that is already under heavy demand. The aircraft must have enhanced electrical power, adapted cooling, and a hardened network architecture. At this level, cybersecurity is not an “add-on” software layer. It is a design: segmentation, access control, supervision, logs, intervention procedures, and proof of compliance.
The requirement for “equivalent to what is available on the ground” is, in practice, more stringent than its wording suggests. On the ground, fiber links, stations, teams, and secure rooms can be stacked. In flight, everything must fit into a limited volume, with constraints on weight and power consumption, and maintenance that must remain feasible. This is precisely why communications packages can have their own contractual trajectory: they are fast-cycle systems, sensitive to threats, and often overtaken by obsolescence if the schedule slips.
Typical capabilities and reasons for secrecy
The text indicates that the technical details have not been published. This is normal. But we can explain the “type” of capabilities without going into classified information: multi-band satellite communications, secure voice, secure data, gateways to government networks, situation links, and fallback options in case of segment loss. The core issue is resilience: if one link fails, another must take over, with clear procedures and no unacceptable service interruption.
This is where the announced extension becomes structural. A presidential aircraft must be able to ensure the continuity of national decision-making. This implies secure communications, but also quality of service, acceptable latency, and real availability. Connectivity must remain stable over long distances, including over areas with weak infrastructure or in the event of denial of access. The aircraft is not simply a VIP transport. It is a mobile command and control platform.
Finally, communications integration is a multiplier of complexity. Each hardware addition impacts aerodynamics, electromagnetics, certification, documentation, and sometimes even maintenance chains. In an already tight program, it makes sense to address this issue incrementally. It is not a matter of “adding options.” It is a matter of securing a functional core that is essential for entry into service.
Program drift: schedule, costs, and industrial causes
The reality of delays and the mechanics of cost overruns
The VC-25B program attracts attention because it combines complexity and visibility. Officially, the first aircraft is now expected to enter service around mid-2028, according to several recent sources, after an initial trajectory that targeted 2024 at the time of contracting. On the industrial side, cost overruns are also well documented: Boeing has recorded significant losses on this program, illustrating the structural tension between specific requirements, schedule, and negotiated contract.
Let’s be frank: a presidential aircraft is the antithesis of a “standard” product. Requirements for security, survivability, connectivity, and autonomy cause engineering hours and test cycles to skyrocket. And when the schedule slips, the bill automatically goes up: re-qualification of equipment, obsolescence management, workforce re-planning, reopening of tests, and renegotiation of subcontracts. The program also suffers from a scissor effect: the longer it lasts, the more “modern” components change, and the more complicated integration becomes.
Another point that is rarely stated clearly is that a very restrictive initial contract can backfire on the final objective. If the financial ceiling is tight, the prime contractor absorbs losses, arbitrates, reorganizes, and this can generate internal friction. The result can be paradoxical: the aim was to “keep costs down,” but the result is delays, rework, and more cumbersome governance. This is not an automatic rule, but it is a known dynamic in atypical programs.
The supply chain, the San Antonio site, and the end of the 747
Delays are also fueled by the supply chain. When certain suppliers disappear, alternatives must be re-qualified. When a component is no longer produced, it must be redesigned or recertified. In the case of the 747-8, the industrial context is unique: production of the 747 has been discontinued, and even though it is still possible to modify existing aircraft, the ecosystem is becoming increasingly scarce. This does not make the program impossible, but it does increase the risks: availability of certain parts, maintenance of skills, and configuration management.
The choice of San Antonio as the site for modification and heavy maintenance reflects an organization where the aircraft is, in practice, rebuilt. The interior, mission systems, power, protection, networks, and connectivity transform the aircraft into a militarized platform. In this context, communications are a big deal because they affect everything: structure (antennas), power (power), cooling (racks), cyber (network), and testing (electromagnetic compatibility).
We must also consider the “portfolio” aspect: the VC-25B is part of a set of government and support aircraft programs. The AFLCMC manages a portfolio where priorities shift, budgetary trade-offs exist, and the ability to maintain the availability of the current VC-25A fleet remains a constraint. In short, until the VC-25B is ready, the existing fleet must be maintained, which means paying twice for the complexity.
The consequences: continuity of government, industry, and the special aircraft market
Operational risk and government continuity
The first concrete effect is prolonged dependence on the current VC-25A fleet. Until the VC-25B reaches full operational capacity, the US Air Force must maintain older aircraft, with their own maintenance, availability, and obsolescence issues. This can be turned into a symbol, but it is above all a risk issue: the older a system gets, the greater the maintenance effort required, and the greater the likelihood of unplanned downtime.
The second effect concerns government continuity. An air command platform serves precisely to reduce vulnerability in the event of a crisis. If the schedule slips, the modernization of this capability also slips. Hence the importance of extending communication: even before full service entry, each increment that secures connectivity improves the credibility of future capability. From a defense perspective, this is not a matter of comfort. It is part of the national posture.
The third, more political effect is that a highly visible program becomes a marker of industrial credibility. When the delay is measured in years, the question is no longer “who was right in the initial negotiations.” The question becomes “how to prevent the requirement from turning into a never-ending saga.” And this has repercussions in budget debates, but also in the way administrations structure their future contracts: risk sharing, obsolescence clauses, technical governance, and cyber integration.
The government platform market and industrial lessons
The market for “highly modified” government aircraft is narrow but very demanding: heads of state, armed forces, strategic authorities. Volumes are low, requirements are high, and unit costs are high. The VC-25B reminds us of a simple truth: you can’t treat a presidential aircraft like a conventional VIP conversion. The gap is massive in terms of security, communications, autonomy, and certification requirements.
For Boeing, the stakes go beyond the contract. It is a technical showcase for the integration of complex systems into a converted commercial airframe. But it is also a reputational risk if the public narrative remains focused on the delay. And for the US Air Force, the challenge is to preserve capability “no matter what,” without accepting compromises that would weaken command and control.
Finally, this $15.5 million modification illustrates a pragmatic approach: move forward in stages, secure what is essential for mission capability, and absorb industrial reality. This may be frustrating from a political standpoint. But technically, with such a specific system, it is often the only realistic approach: lock in critical functions, prove, certify, and only then declare the aircraft fully ready.
Sources
- U.S. Air Force / AFLCMC: public information on presidential recapitalization (announcements and institutional communication).
- Defense Daily: award notice and modification P00161, cumulative values and December 2026 deadline.
- Reuters: status updates on delays, timeline, and losses recorded by Boeing.
- Aviation Week: update on the mid-2028 horizon and program context.
- DoD Selected Acquisition Reports / MSAR (public documents): cost/schedule tracking information and mention of reported losses.
- GAO Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: public assessments of the performance and risks of major programs, including VC-25B.
- ECB: euro/dollar reference rate (benchmark for indicative conversion).
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