Chinese defense universities are strengthening their Sino-Russian partnerships, circumventing sanctions and export controls and accelerating aerospace development.
In summary
Since 2019, all 68 Chinese universities linked to the military-industrial complex have “intensified” their ties with Russian institutions. This dynamic, documented by ASPI, connects key hubs: Beihang–MAI on aircraft engines, Xi’an Technological University–Peter the Great SPbPU on weapons systems, and the Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT) with Bauman and other Russian partners. Scissor effect: Moscow recovers know-how and R&D in dual-use technologies despite sanctions, while Beijing draws on Russian niches of excellence (propulsion, hydro-aerodynamics) while offering its advances in drones, materials, and algorithms. Bilateral trade reached approximately $245 billion (≈ €228 billion) in 2024, a sign of a highly interdependent ecosystem. For Europeans and Americans, the challenge is clear: without governance of academic collaborations and control of knowledge flows, sanctions and export control regimes lose their effectiveness.
The observation: an academic network that compensates for sanctions
Recent work by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) indicates that the 68 Chinese institutions officially linked to the defense system have “deepened or significantly deepened” their research collaborations with Russian institutions since 2019. This is not a side effect: the trajectory is part of the “no-limits partnership” proclaimed by Beijing and Moscow on February 4, 2022, and then consolidated by state visits in 2024–2025. In practice, this network gives Russia indirect access to scientific results, testing platforms, and human expertise in dual-use technologies that it is deprived of by Western sanctions. Conversely, it opens up Russian niches of excellence in aero-propulsion, fluid mechanics, high-temperature measurements, and endurance testing to Chinese groups and laboratories. In other words, sanctions slow down the flow of materials, but knowledge circulates through joint supervision, dual degrees, and joint laboratories.
Key partnerships: from engine workshops to drone swarms
Several duos structure the cooperation. Beihang University (a member of the Seven Sons of National Defense) and the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI) have been running a joint master’s program in aeronautics and aircraft engines since 2017, with an explicit goal: to move from “copying and testing” to independent design on the Chinese side. The key: cross-transfers in turbomachinery design, high-performance materials, and bench testing. Xi’an Technological University, for its part, opened a joint institute in 2023 with Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University (SPbPU), equipped with hydro-aerodynamic research capabilities and connected to the Russian military-industrial complex. Finally, the Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT)—sanctioned by Washington in 2020—has been leading the Association of Sino-Russian Technical Universities (ASRTU) since 2011 and is multiplying joint centers and programs (including a science center with St. Petersburg State University). These academic structures serve as “bridges” for sensitive topics: swarm dynamics, autonomous navigation, CMC materials, thermal control, and embedded sensors.
In the field of drones, Russia relies on proven platforms such as Orlan-10 (designed by the Special Technology Center, sanctioned by the United States and the EU). Operational needs related to Ukraine (reconnaissance, target acquisition, electronic warfare) are creating demand for components, software, and production methods in which Chinese laboratories are skilled. This research-industry continuum is fueling incremental gains: spectrum management, redundant data links, laser designator integration, and jamming resistance.
Aircraft engines: a very concrete exchange of interests
On the Chinese side, the critical issue remains propulsion. Despite the progress made with the WS-10 and the arrival of the WS-15 on the J-20 (test flights and ramp-up announced since 2023), very long-term reliability and material performance under extreme temperatures remain sticking points. Russia retains a historical advantage in this area (AL-31/AL-41 families), the result of decades of engineering and experience. For Beijing, cooperating with MAI, Bauman, or other Russian centers secures applied know-how: blade geometries and hollow blades, perspiration cooling, joint segmentations, high-speed bearings, and endurance test protocols. For Moscow, the interest is symmetrical: materials, advanced digital simulation, additive manufacturing, and optimization methods from the Chinese ecosystem can compensate for the drying up of Western components. The result is a technological workaround: no direct export of a sanctioned turbofan, but a continuum of academic results and talent that shortens maturation cycles.
Operationally, the equation is simple: a hotter, more durable engine increases specific thrust, reduces fuel mass for the same range, and frees up electrical and thermal margins for sensors and weapons. This is precisely the area of interdependence: Russian warfighters want to keep up the pace in Ukraine and modernize their fleet; Chinese manufacturers are aiming for performance in fighter jets and heavy UCAVs within 5–10 years.
The figures: trade, co-publications, and training capabilities
Bilateral trade peaked at ~$240 billion in 2023 and ~$244.8 billion in 2024 (≈ €228 billion), reflecting a reconfiguration of supply chains (energy to China, industrial goods to Russia) . At the same time, the share of Russian articles co-published with authors based in China exceeded co-publications with Germany and the United States, even though the total volume has plateaued: Russian scientific dependence is shifting eastward. Among the 68 Chinese defense universities, ASPI has observed a systemic intensification of ties with Russia since 2019, particularly in aerospace, robotics, and dual-use technologies. In terms of training, the infrastructure is already in place: the joint HIT–Bauman institute welcomes 59 undergraduate students (dual Russian/Chinese degree program) and a new scientific center with St. Petersburg State University trains more than 1,500 Chinese and Russian students. These figures show that cooperation is not based on trade show signings: it produces cohorts of engineers, co-supervised theses, and shared experimental databases.
Western responses: sanctions, lists, and academic hygiene
The Western approach combines sectoral sanctions, export controls (EAR), and entity lists: HIT was placed on the BIS list in 2020; recent revisions (2025) further tighten entries, and waves of sanctions target evasion networks (including those linked to the Special Technology Center, a key player in Orlan-10). On the university side, we are seeing the emergence of “due diligence” policies: project traceability, co-author mapping, stop lists on sensitive subjects (guidance, propulsion, crypto-GNSS, etc.). In Europe, investigations into “sensitive” collaborations (e.g., drone swarms with members of the Seven Sons) have led to projects being reconfigured or suspended. Let’s be frank: without robust governance of academic collaborations and funding, sanctions and controls remain porous, because the object being sanctioned (a component) is not the object that circulates (knowledge).
The consequences for Europe and industry: prioritizing risk and choosing your battles
For European aerospace manufacturers and their academic partners, there are three implications:
- Prioritizing risk: carefully mapping subjects, laboratories, and joint supervision connected to the Seven Sons of National Defense, and discontinuing projects where transfer is uncontrollable (source code, optimization algorithms, test data).
- Technological realism: understand that Sino-Russian partnerships are not only aimed at short-term results in Ukraine; they seek to fill structural gaps (propulsion) and capitalize on strengths (navigation, sensors, swarms) over 5–10 years.
- Protection of talent: prevent PhD students and postdocs funded in Europe from contributing, sometimes unwittingly, to dual-use product lines. This requires publication control clauses, technical ethical assessments and, yes, the possibility of universities saying “no” when a project ticks too many red flags. Finally, the EU must treat experimental data as a strategic asset: “paper” does not tell the whole story, but collections of measurements, models, and scripts are enough to accelerate R&D on both sides of the Urals. This is an area where Europe can still be firm, without taking unnecessary moral stances: defining operational red lines, not slogans.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.