PLAAF J-20 stealth fighters are patrolling around Taiwan and practicing long-range firing. Taipei sees this as a strategic signal to regional allies.
In summary
China has increased military pressure on Taiwan by stepping up air incursions around the island, some of which now include the J-20, a fifth-generation stealth fighter. Beijing is staging “combat readiness patrols” and “precision strike” scenarios against key targets in Taiwan. These flights regularly cross the median line of the Taiwan Strait, long considered a tacit boundary, and enter Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Taipei has recorded several thousand Chinese sorties around its airspace since the beginning of 2025, with up to 26 aircraft detected in a single wave and more than two-thirds crossing the median line. The PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) fighters are no longer content with exerting psychological pressure: they are now practicing long-range strike profiles, in line with the very long-range capabilities of the PL-15 missile and air-to-ground guided munitions. For Taiwan, but also for Washington and Tokyo, these patrols are no longer a simple provocation: they are testing the island’s real ability to detect, track, and engage a modern stealth aircraft before it can neutralize its radars, runways, and command centers.
The rise of Chinese stealth patrols
China’s air strategy around Taiwan changed scale in 2025. Taipei claims to have detected more than 4,000 incursions into its ADIZ between January and September 2025, a figure higher than in the same period the previous year. Volume is not the only signal. Beijing is sending increasingly structured air packages: J-16 multi-role fighters, electronic warfare aircraft, YY-20 refueling aircraft, H-6 bombers capable of carrying cruise missiles, and now J-20 stealth fighters integrated as high-value scouts.
These patrols no longer just fly along the Chinese coast. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) regularly reports groups of 20 to 30 aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entering Taiwan’s ADIZ in the north, center, and southwest. On October 8, 2025, for example, Taipei detected 26 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft, 18 of which crossed this median line to operate in these sensitive airspace sectors. This shift is significant: the median line was traditionally respected, even during periods of tension. Beijing is now publicly erasing this line, which amounts to challenging the very idea of an air buffer zone between the two sides of the strait.
In this dynamic, the PLAAF’s overt or implied presence with J-20 stealth aircraft plays both a political and operational role. The Chinese military media is highlighting “combat readiness patrols” involving the J-20, including in highly monitored airspace, and claims that the aircraft operated without being immediately detected by allied regional radar networks. The message is clear: Beijing wants to show that its fifth-generation fighter can approach Taiwan—and therefore its military centers—by reducing the warning window.
The operational range of the J-20 in Taiwan’s ADIZ
The stealth J-20, also known as the “Mighty Dragon,” has become the Chinese Air Force’s prestige tool for imposing credible regional deterrence. The fleet is now expected to exceed 300 aircraft in operational service by the end of 2025, making it the largest fleet of fifth-generation stealth fighters in the world after the American F-35. The transition from a handful of prototype aircraft to several hundred units is changing the military landscape around Taiwan. A critical mass of 300 aircraft not only allows for sustained rotations, but also simultaneous presence in several theaters: the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea.
Technically, the J-20 is designed to penetrate enemy air defense bubbles. Its swept-back airframe, S-shaped air intakes, and extensive use of absorbent materials are intended to reduce its radar cross-section. Its active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, with a reported detection range of over 200 km, merges data with other infrared and electro-optical sensors to provide the pilot with a complete tactical picture without constantly turning on a detectable radar transmitter.
The aircraft carries long-range air-to-air missiles such as the PL-15 missile, credited with a range of over 200 km or more, which would allow it to engage an airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft or a tanker without exposing itself to short-range defenses. The same internal volume can be adapted to carry air-to-ground guided munitions, paving the way for long-range strikes on fixed infrastructure, such as ground-based radars, C2 centers, or Taiwanese airstrips.
When a J-20 approaches Taiwan’s ADIZ, even without crossing sovereign airspace, it is not a mere symbolic overflight. It is a demonstration that a stealth vector can, in theory, launch guided weapons against Taiwanese radar equipment from outside the defense bubble, while remaining difficult to track. This capability is the basis for the “decapitation strike” and early warning neutralization scenarios that Beijing is now disseminating through its official military media.
Precision strike exercises against Taiwan
Beijing no longer hides the purpose of the exercises. During large-scale air and naval maneuvers around the island, the PLA released video footage showing pilots training to strike “key targets” in Taiwan, presented as government centers or military hubs. These images were described as “joint precision strikes” carried out by several branches of the Chinese forces.
This language matters. For years, Chinese rhetoric focused on “routine patrols” or “protecting sovereignty.” In 2025, the official narrative now refers to “blockade,” “encirclement,” “neutralization of strategic targets,” and “ability to isolate the island.” The geographical extension of Chinese flights east of Taiwan—beyond the strait—is explicitly intended to show that the PLA can threaten the air and sea lanes through which allies could resupply the island with ammunition, aviation fuel, or critical parts in the event of a prolonged crisis.
In this scenario, the J-20 is not just an air superiority fighter. It becomes a stealth scout capable of leading the way. Its combination of stealth, sensors, and long-range missiles makes it the ideal tool for degrading Taiwan’s air defense before the heavier waves arrive: H-6K bombers carrying air-to-surface cruise missiles and J-16 multirole fighters loaded with conventional guided munitions.
The limits of Taiwan’s defense against the J-20
Taiwan is not defenseless. Taipei deploys a multi-layered defense: modernized F-16V fighter jets, long-range radars, Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air batteries, domestic Tien Kung (Sky Bow) systems, and anti-ship missiles. The MND says it systematically activates combat air patrols, naval vessels, and coastal missile systems as soon as a Chinese air group approaches.
But the arrival of a fifth-generation stealth aircraft changes the reaction time equation. Detecting a J-20 from a distance requires either less accurate low-frequency radars or the support of allied assets (radar surveillance aircraft, satellites, passive networks). However, Taiwan must maintain continuous surveillance, sometimes facing waves of more than 20 aircraft detected in a matter of hours.
Taiwan also recognizes the exhaustion caused by this constant pressure. The Ministry of Defense is now setting out clear priorities: strengthening anti-drone defenses, dispersing resources, hardening critical sites, training in night firing, and increasing the resilience of command networks. Taipei is working to accelerate its forces’ ability to absorb an initial shock while maintaining a credible response capability for several days, not just a few hours.
This approach requires significant budgetary choices. Washington is pushing Taiwan to increase its defense spending to 5% of GDP, up from around 3% today, insisting on preparing for a scenario of blockade and coordinated strikes rather than an immediate amphibious invasion. The stealth patrols around the island serve precisely to make this scenario credible.
Strategic messages to Taiwan’s allies
Each overflight is a message. In Taiwan, the signal is direct: Beijing wants to show that its local air superiority is becoming structural. In Washington, the message is different. Beijing wants to test the US’s ability to maintain an airlift to Taiwan if the first Chinese salvo destroys or neutralizes Taiwanese air bases. The “precision strike” sequences are intended to indicate that Taiwanese political and military centers would be targeted first, before US intervention.
In Tokyo, the message concerns strategic depth. The J-20 has already been presented by the Chinese media as capable of operating in highly monitored areas, such as the Tsushima Strait between Japan and South Korea, without being immediately detected. For Japan, this means that the southern approaches to the archipelago and access to Okinawa are now exposed to a stealthy Chinese intruder operating far from the mainland coast. For the United States, this complicates the role of American bases in the western Pacific, already considered priority targets for Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles.
In other words, these patrols off the coast of Taiwan are not just a bilateral issue. They are part of a regional demonstration of power: Beijing’s regional deterrence is no longer limited to the Taiwan Strait but extends to the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and even allied logistics lines.
The trajectory of aerial escalation
The pace observed at the end of 2025 suggests that the pressure is not going to ease. The volume of Chinese sorties, the normalization of crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait, and the promotion of the J-20 as a stealth platform capable of long-range strikes indicate a normalization of aerial harassment around the island.
For Taiwan, the immediate challenge is the endurance of its Taiwanese air defense, both in material terms (wear and tear on F-16V airframes, flight hours consumed, strain on crews) and in political terms: how to maintain the morale of the population if incursions become daily occurrences, while avoiding incidents that would give Beijing a military pretext? For its allies, the challenge is to prevent these stealth patrols, repeated without a firm response, from eventually becoming a new strategic norm in the strait.
In this climate, each appearance of a J-20 near the ADIZ is not a simple technical gesture. It is a dress rehearsal for the first day of war, in which Beijing would seek to paralyze the island before its external partners even have time to get involved.
Sources
– Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan), daily reports on air and naval incursions around Taiwan in October-November 2025.
– Aggregate data on the number of incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ in the first nine months of 2025.
– PLA statements and images of combat readiness patrols, joint precision strikes, and the encirclement of Taiwan (April 2025 – November 2025).
– Known technical details of the J-20 stealth fighter (stealth, AESA radar, PL-15 long-range weaponry, multi-role air-to-air/air-to-ground capability) and estimate of a fleet exceeding 300 aircraft by the end of 2025.
– Recent Taiwanese defense guidelines: anti-drone defense, increased defense spending, priority given to resilience after an initial strike.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.