Germany threatens to reconfigure the FCAS after tensions over workshare. Alternative scenarios with GCAP, Wingman drones, and F-35A.
Summary
Berlin believes that the distribution of tasks within FCAS is no longer tenable. Political and industrial sources mention a French demand for up to 80% of the NGF piloted aircraft, which Paris disputes. Germany is considering three options: continuing with Spain (and Belgium) without Paris, joining GCAP (UK, Italy, Japan) or opening up a partnership with Sweden. At the same time, Airbus is pushing for a “manned-unmanned teaming” approach with the Wingman drone and, in partnership with Kratos, the XQ-58A Valkyrie. To avoid a capability gap between now and 2040, Berlin is banking on the F-35A (35 aircraft already ordered) as a bridge. The choices to be made will determine European industrial autonomy and the 2040 entry into service schedule.
The breaking point on workshare
The heart of the deadlock is industrial: who leads and who does what on the NGF. On the German side, Airbus is calling for consistent governance and clear responsibilities by “pillars,” while Dassault Aviation is defending its role as architect of the piloted aircraft. Since September, several reference articles have confirmed that Berlin has put forward scenarios that exclude Paris if the balance is not restored. The German argument is simple: too dominant a share would jeopardize the Bundestag’s support and the program’s social acceptability (jobs, spin-offs). Conversely, Paris wants to speed up decisions and avoid technical dilution that would cause the schedule to slip. This tension is not theoretical: phase 1B has already been slowed down by governance disagreements, while phase 2 (demonstrators) must be started before the end of 2025-2026. In concrete terms, each semester lost pushes back the first demonstration flights (target 2028-2029) and lengthens the path to entry into service in 2040. In the short term, Merz and Macron have agreed on a policy decision by the end of the year: either consolidation with explicit sharing, or an orderly separation. In the latter case, the marginal cost would rise (duplication of teams, tests, test benches) and the critical size of the series would become a challenge. European precedents (Rafale vs. Eurofighter) show that two parallel channels increase the unit cost and complicate exports.
Alternative scenarios: GCAP, Spain, and the Swedish option
Three realistic options are emerging. 1/ An FCAS without France, with Spain and a more assertive role for Belgium (observer since 2023, budgets increased to around €300 million for 2026-2030). Viable on paper, but fragile: Madrid and Brussels could remain with Paris due to industrial affinity. 2/ A shift to GCAP (United Kingdom, Italy, Japan). Advantages: governance agreed, public milestones (flight demonstrator targeted for 2027, entry into service “around 2035”), broad industrial base (BAE, Leonardo, MHI). Limitations: technology agreements already distributed, reduced integration margins and sensitive trade-offs on transfers. 3/ A Swedish rapprochement. Saab has relaunched national studies (2024-2025) and outlined an “F-series” with a significant proportion of collaborative drones. Strength: culture of agility, complementarity in sensors/software. Limitation: earlier timetable, modest national volumes. In any case, multiplying European sectors (France-Spain-Belgium on one side; Germany-Spain or Germany-UK-Italy-Japan on the other; Sweden in parallel) would lead to budgetary dispersion. However, the cumulative cost of the systems (aircraft, swarms, cloud, weapons) amounts to tens of billions of euros; without substantial export markets (≥ 300 aircraft), the unit equation becomes abrasive.
Escort drones: Wingman and XQ-58A Valkyrie
Whichever path is taken, the “system of systems” architecture requires distributed sensors and expendable vectors. Airbus is promoting its Wingman: a stealth escort drone, armable, operated by a lead fighter, with a target cost equivalent to “about one-third” of a manned aircraft. The benefits are twofold: generating mass (2-4 drones per patrol), diluting risk, and expanding the envelope of effects (SEAD/DEAD, sensor relay, decoy). In terms of timing, Airbus is aiming for entry into service in the 2030s, coupled with current fighters and then NGF. At the same time, Airbus and the American company Kratos are offering the Luftwaffe the XQ-58A Valkyrie: take-off weight ≈ 3 t, operating altitude up to 13,700 m, announced range around 4,800 km (≈ 3,000 miles), ramp launch, contained costs. The goal is to deliver a “learning vehicle” by the end of the decade (around 2029) to train crews in “manned-unmanned teaming” and pave the way for European CCAs. This building block is crucial: in 2030+, superiority will come from real-time orchestration (embedded AI, multi-sensor fusion, robust links) rather than from the piloted platform alone. In short, even a FCAS/GCAP divorce must not interrupt the ramp-up of these drones, otherwise there will be a capability gap with the United States and Asia.
Germany’s capability trajectory: F-35A and the 2040 horizon
To avoid a capability gap around 2035-2040, Berlin is securing a bridge: the F-35A to take over the nuclear mission (B61-12) at Büchel. Thirty-five aircraft have been approved, with the first ones scheduled to enter service in 2027, subject to the completion of infrastructure (runways, shelters, secure areas) currently under construction. The possibility of increasing the number to 50 aircraft was mooted this summer, but this was publicly denied by the ministry, indicating that the decision remains a political and budgetary one. From an operational standpoint, an additional batch (e.g., +15) would reduce pressure on the Eurofighter fleet and facilitate MUM-T training if Germany introduces escort drones in 2029-2030. But there is a trade-off: the larger the F-35A fleet grows, the less incentive there is to accelerate a European NGF, as the marginal gains (signature, range, payload) will have to justify a higher cost of ownership. Realism therefore dictates an honest timeline: demonstrators in 2028-2029, industrial consolidation in 2030-2032, and first tranches around 2038-2040. Without this, maintaining two lines (F-35A/Eurofighter) will increase the MCO bill by several hundred million euros per year and weigh heavily on R&D credits.
The industrial and strategic consequences of a split
A FCAS split would have three effects. First, an increase in fixed costs: double the number of test benches, wind tunnel tests, and separate software chains. At €10-15 billion per major pillar (piloted aircraft, swarms, cloud), duplication could add €3-5 billion over ten years. Next, exports: two competing European aircraft would cannibalize the same campaigns (Europe, Middle East, Asia) against the GCAP and the F-35A. Without an overall volume of ≥ 300-400 units, unit prices and hourly costs (fuel, spare parts, MCO) would remain high: +10 to +20% likely. Finally, sovereignty: splitting the project would stretch the supply chain (sensors, computers, source codes), increase ITAR/BAFA risks, and weaken control over critical components (CNI, electronic warfare). If, on the contrary, Paris and Berlin agree on a stable sharing arrangement, economies of scale will once again become accessible, the 2040 entry into service will once again become credible, and Europe will be able to finance a portfolio of effects (stand-off weapons, anti-radar, active decoys) rather than structural duplications. To put it bluntly, four parallel European programs (France-Spain-Belgium, Germany-Spain, Sweden, plus GCAP) do not have the budgetary mass to survive for ten years. Choices will have to be made, governance concessions will have to be accepted, and visible annual milestones (design reviews, ground tests, demo flights) will have to be delivered to keep parliaments and taxpayers on board.
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