With funding of around $24.4 billion, Golden Dome aims to provide a national defense system. Where will the interceptors be located, how will they work, and how will they deal with hypersonic threats?
Summary
The Golden Dome concept has returned to the center of the American debate since an initial budget of approximately $24.4 billion was earmarked to launch the program. The stated ambition is spectacular: to build a national missile defense shield capable of protecting the United States against a full spectrum of threats, from ballistic missiles to advanced cruise missiles, including Russian and Chinese hypersonic missiles. The logic would be “multi-layered”: detection satellites, tracking sensors, command centers, and then interception at different phases of flight. But the gap between the political idea and the technical and industrial reality remains significant. The Pentagon has not yet published a final architecture or indicated precisely where all the interceptors will be positioned, which fuels both fantasies and criticism. The first credible indications point to a multi-stage ramp-up, with a target of “initial capability” around 2028 and a longer trajectory for truly robust coverage. Golden Dome may strengthen US defense, but promising total protection against hypersonic weapons is still more about communication than engineering.
The birth of a political project that aims to become a military system
Golden Dome is first and foremost a political promise: to give the United States back a form of “protective dome” against strategic strikes. The administration has presented the project as a response to the rapid evolution of adversaries’ arsenals. Russia and China have been investing for years in delivery systems that are more difficult to intercept: maneuverable hypersonic gliders, ballistic missiles with complex trajectories, saturation by volume, and combinations of decoys.
In reality, the United States is not starting from scratch. It already has missile defense elements in place: sensors, radars, chains of command, and land- and sea-based interceptors. What Golden Dome seeks to do is unify, densify, and extend this architecture to a “strategic” defense of the territory, with a significantly more ambitious space layer.
The budget announcement sparked a surge of public interest, but also institutional tension. Several members of Congress demanded answers: how will these billions be spent, what is the timeline, and what performance is expected? The initial criticism is not about the idea of protection, but about the lack of a clear plan and credible metrics at this stage.
The allocated budget and what it actually finances
The initial budget is described, according to sources, as between $23 and $24.4 billion, which corresponds to a “starting point” rather than a complete budget. The important point is simple: this amount does not build an operational national shield. It mainly finances the architecture phase, initial developments, the ramp-up of certain sensors, and initial demonstrations.
To put this into perspective, public estimates of the total cost vary widely. The White House has communicated a trajectory of around $175 billion, while other long-term estimates are much higher depending on the level of coverage and the number of space elements. This dispersion is logical: the more we want to “be everywhere, all the time,” the more sensors and interceptors we need, and therefore the more we have to pay for maintenance, renewal, and system resilience.
Another very concrete point: lawmakers are requesting steering documents and requiring regular reports from the Pentagon. This reflects a classic concern about large programs: cost overruns, overly ambitious promises, and delayed results.
How layered missile defense works
To understand Golden Dome, we need to go back to a basic rule of physics: intercepting a missile is not the same as “shooting down an airplane.” The goal is to destroy a very fast object, sometimes small, sometimes accompanied by decoys, and often within extremely short time windows. Effective missile defense therefore relies on a complete chain:
- detecting the launch very early
- tracking the trajectory without interruption
- calculating a firing solution
- transmitting an interception order
- guiding the interceptor to the point of collision
- confirming destruction and, if necessary, firing again
Golden Dome aims to strengthen this chain at every stage, with a clear priority: improving detection and tracking using space sensors, then adding additional interception options, including in orbit.
Detection by satellites and radars
Infrared satellites can detect the thermal signature of a launch. Ground-based and sea-based radars then track the trajectory and refine the firing solution. This combination of satellites and radars is vital against modern threats, and even more so against hypersonic threats, which require continuous tracking.
Hit-to-kill interception
Most modern interceptors use kinetic collision logic: not a “near miss” explosion, but a direct or near-direct impact at very high speed. This requires extremely precise guidance, high tracking quality, and minimal latency.
Multi-layer logic
In theory, Golden Dome aims to intercept at several points:
- very early, during the propulsion phase (the most vulnerable, but also the most difficult)
- during the mid-flight phase
- during the terminal phase, when the threat is descending
This logic is robust because it offers several chances. But it is expensive, because each layer must be redundant and hardened.
The location of interceptors and what we already know
This is the question most sought after by the public: “Where will the interceptors be located?” The honest answer is that some already exist, while others are still being defined.
Existing homeland defense sites
The most iconic current system is the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, with land-based interceptors dedicated to defending the homeland against long-range ballistic missiles. These interceptors are deployed mainly in Alaska, at Fort Greely, and in California at Vandenberg. The most commonly cited public figures mention 44 deployed interceptors (40 in Alaska, 4 in California).
These sites are not chosen at random: geography, interception windows, and radar coverage. Alaska offers a relevant position for certain trajectories coming from the northern Pacific.
Possible extensions and the space component
Golden Dome could add:
- new radars and sensors
- additional ground-based interceptors
- and, above all, an orbital component with orbital interceptors
This is where uncertainties prevail. The Pentagon has not yet published the final map or the exact volume of space components. Discussions are focusing on large constellations, as a boost-phase interception from space requires an interceptor to be close enough at the time of the enemy launch, which implies a high density in low orbit.
The timeline: what we can hope for, and what is just sloganeering
“National” missile defense is not a two-year project. The most credible indications point to a gradual ramp-up, with initial capability demonstrated around 2028, followed by progressive maturity thereafter.
Why the delay?
- The entire architecture must be designed.
- Industrial contracts must be awarded.
- Sensors, interceptors, and software must be produced.
- Testing under real conditions must be conducted.
- Everything must be integrated into the chains of command.
The most difficult part is not the interceptor alone. It is the coordination of the whole system, cybersecurity, resilience to attacks, and the ability to function even if some elements are destroyed or jammed.
Intercepting hypersonic missiles: between feasibility and limitations
This is the core of American curiosity: “Can we stop Russian and Chinese hypersonic missiles?” The answer is more nuanced than the communication suggests.
A hypersonic glider is not “just a faster missile.” It is often a maneuverable craft, flying at high speed in atmospheric layers where detection is more complex and where the trajectory can change. This breaks simple prediction models.
Why it’s difficult
There are three main reasons:
- Maneuverable trajectory, making it less predictable
- Reduced decision window
- Need for continuous “fire-control quality” tracking
If the sensor loses track for a few seconds, the firing solution may become inaccurate.
What Golden Dome aims to improve
Golden Dome uses layers of space sensors to ensure continuous tracking. The goal is to provide sufficient tracking quality to guide an interception. In this context, one concept often comes up: the Glide Phase Interceptor, designed to intercept hypersonic threats during their maneuvering glide phase.
What needs to be said frankly
Even with high-performance sensors and interceptors, there remains a structural limitation: saturation. A system can handle a few threats, but if it is attacked by salvos, decoys, or combined attacks, the defense is stressed. This is not an ideological judgment, it is mathematical logic: each interception consumes an interceptor, radar time, and decision bandwidth.
This is why many experts consider a “total dome” to be a horizon, not a guarantee. Golden Dome can increase protection, but claiming to reliably neutralize a massive, high-intensity attack is still more of a statement than an established fact.
Concrete interception scenarios, step by step
To visualize this, here is how a typical interception would work.
Early interception
- Detection of a launch by infrared satellite
- Immediate transmission to command
- Attempt to engage very early, ideally during the propulsion phase
This is the most “cost-effective” phase because the target is visible and energetically constrained. But it is also the most difficult, as it requires the interceptor to already be well positioned, often very close to the enemy launch zone.
Midcourse interception
- Continuous tracking by space sensors and radars
- Trajectory calculation and selection of the interception layer
- Firing of a land- or sea-based interceptor depending on the angle and window
This is the logic of the current GMD system, but Golden Dome aims to densify and better connect these building blocks.
Terminal interception
- Last chance before impact
- Requires highly responsive interceptors and radars
- Useful against certain profiles but requires minimal latency
How Golden Dome changes the overall US strategy
Golden Dome is not just about defense. It is also a signal sent to adversaries: the US wants to reduce the credibility of adversarial strategic threats, or at least complicate coercion calculations.
But there is a mirror effect: if one country thinks it can protect itself, the adversary may be tempted to increase its volumes, its decoys, or invest in other avenues of attack.
This is a classic technology race dynamic.
On the American side, the debate is also industrial: satellites, software, interceptors, cyberdefense. Golden Dome could become a major project, comparable in complexity to large space programs, with winners and losers in the defense industry.
The key point that the Americans will have to watch
The most useful question is not “where will the interceptors be,” because the architecture can evolve. The right question is: what actual capabilities will be demonstrated, on what dates, and with what level of transparency?
The reality of Golden Dome will be judged on:
- the maturity of the sensors
- the consistency of the command system
- the industrial cadence
- the ability to test in real conditions, often
- robustness against jamming and attacks
If these milestones are met, Golden Dome will strengthen the defense of the territory. If they are not, the project will remain a grand strategic narrative, costly, politically useful… but militarily incomplete.
Sources
Congressional Research Service, Defense Primer: The Golden Dome for America, September 29, 2025
White House, Fact Sheet “Iron Dome Missile Defense Shield for America,” January 27, 2025
Associated Press, “Trump selects concept for $175 billion Golden Dome missile defense system,” May 20, 2025
Politico, “Trump unveils $175B… Golden Dome,” May 20, 2025
Federal News Network, “Golden Dome got $23 billion, but lawmakers still don’t know how it will be spent,” January 23, 2026
Defense One, “Where’s all that Golden Dome money going? Lawmakers want to know,” January 21, 2026
Air & Space Forces Magazine, “Congress Wants More Insight into Golden Dome Budget,” January 22, 2026
The Guardian, “Golden Dome missile defense program won’t be operational by end of Trump’s term,” May 30, 2025
CSIS Missile Threat, “Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system,” July 26, 2021
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Fact Sheet: Golden Dome,” June 9, 2025
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,” May 21, 2025
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