Ursula von der Leyen’s plane lost its GPS navigation in Bulgaria, forcing a manual landing. A suspected electronic attack, technical and geopolitical issues.
Ursula von der Leyen’s air incident in Bulgaria
The official flight of the President of the European Commission from Chisinau to Athens was marked by a worrying incident on August 31, 2025, as it passed over Bulgarian territory. As it approached Plovdiv, the aircraft’s satellite navigation system stopped transmitting reliable data. The GPS jamming in Bulgaria caused a total loss of satellite positioning, a particularly critical phenomenon during the approach and landing phases. For several minutes, the crew had to manage disrupted air navigation, relying solely on the on-board inertial navigation system (INS) and transmissions from air traffic controllers. To ensure a safe final descent, the pilots used ground-based aids, notably the Instrument Landing System (ILS), which guaranteed alignment with the runway despite the absence of satellite guidance. This incident involving Ursula von der Leyen’s aircraft highlights the vulnerability of official aircraft to electronic threats and the growing dependence of air transport on GPS signals.
How GPS jamming works
The Global Positioning System (GPS), or more broadly GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System), relies on a constellation of satellites placed in medium orbit at an altitude of approximately 20,200 kilometers. These satellites continuously transmit coded signals that allow receivers on board aircraft to calculate their position by cross-referencing data from multiple sources. In modern aviation, this information is used not only for trajectory tracking, but also for synchronizing onboard systems and managing precision approach procedures.
GPS jamming occurs when a ground-based transmitter broadcasts a spurious signal that is much stronger than the signal received from the satellites. The onboard receiver becomes saturated and unable to distinguish the authentic signal. There are two main forms: simple jamming, which completely blocks reception, and spoofing, which is more sophisticated and involves the device receiving false coordinates without necessarily alerting the crew immediately. The former causes a sudden loss of guidance, while the latter misleads the aircraft by providing it with incorrect position data.
In the case of GPS jamming in Bulgaria affecting Ursula von der Leyen’s plane, reports indicate a clear signal interruption, which corresponds to simple jamming rather than spoofing. Experts point out that implementing such jamming does not necessarily require massive state resources: portable systems costing a few hundred euros are sufficient to block reception over several kilometers. On the other hand, more powerful devices are needed to affect an aircraft in cruise mode. Military systems such as the R-330Zh Zhitel or the Krasukha-4, deployed by Russia in Crimea, Kaliningrad, and Belarus, have ranges of several hundred kilometers and are capable of simultaneously affecting numerous civil and military aircraft.
This modus operandi illustrates the electronic threat to civil and official aircraft, a growing challenge for air safety in Europe.
The risks and dangers of jamming
The GPS jamming in Bulgaria that affected Ursula von der Leyen’s plane illustrates the threats posed by a loss of satellite signal during flight. Firstly, the absence of satellite guidance leads to a decrease in location accuracy, which is particularly critical during final approach and landing. In these phases, an error of a few meters can be enough to compromise the safety of the aircraft and its passengers.
Pilots do have backup systems, such as the INS (Inertial Navigation System), which calculates position based on measured acceleration and speed. However, this system gradually drifts and requires regular recalibration using GPS, limiting its autonomy over long distances. In the event of prolonged interference, the reliability of the INS becomes insufficient.
In complex geographical areas, such as the mountainous environment around Plovdiv, the lack of precise guidance increases the cognitive load on the crew and increases the likelihood of errors. The situation can become critical when combined with poor weather or low visibility.
Fortunately, ground-based systems such as the ILS (Instrument Landing System) ensure a safe approach trajectory. In this incident, these devices played a central role in preventing a tragic outcome, but they serve as a reminder of the vulnerability of official aircraft to electronic jamming.
Who could be responsible?
The Bulgarian authorities and the European Commission suspect interference by Russia, described as technological interference in European airspace, particularly in the context of growing tensions related to the war in Ukraine.
Similar incidents have already been reported:
- Baltic Sea: interference with civil and maritime flights;
- Finland: temporary suspension of flights to Tartu;
- Flight of a British minister assigned near Russian territory.
Moscow denies the allegations, with the Kremlin stating that “the information is incorrect.”
A real danger or an exaggeration?
The GPS jamming in Bulgaria that affected Ursula von der Leyen’s plane has reignited the debate on the seriousness of such interference. From a technical point of view, the threat is real, as the loss of satellite signal during the approach phase deprives pilots of a positioning aid that has become essential in modern aviation. However, transport aircraft have redundant systems: INS to estimate the trajectory, ILS to ensure final alignment with the runway, and the constant assistance of air traffic controllers. These alternatives significantly reduce the risk of an immediate accident.
In the Bulgarian incident, these solutions worked as intended, ensuring a safe landing despite disrupted air navigation. The delay did not pose a vital threat, but it did highlight the vulnerability of official aircraft to electromagnetic attacks. The danger therefore lies not so much in the immediate disaster as in the demonstration of power and technological interference in European airspace.
The European response to this threat
The Ursula von der Leyen air incident served as a wake-up call for European institutions. In Brussels, several officials stressed the need for a plan to strengthen air safety in Bulgaria and more broadly throughout European airspace. The vulnerability highlighted by this incident serves as a reminder that the official flights of the President of the European Commission do not always have electronic protection measures comparable to those of military aircraft.
In response to this situation, the European Union wants to accelerate its technological defense capabilities, in particular by consolidating the Galileo program and developing tools capable of detecting and neutralizing jamming or spoofing operations. The Bulgarian episode has also revived the issue of deterrence vis-à-vis Russia, which is already suspected of having carried out similar actions in the Baltic Sea and around Kaliningrad.
Finally, this issue is part of a broader context of solidarity with Ukraine, with the Commission considering these incidents to be part of the hybrid war being waged against Europe. This view is pushing for the fight against electronic jamming to be integrated into the EU’s overall security and defense strategy.
European skies appear more vulnerable than they seem: this incident illustrates that even Ursula von der Leyen’s plane, symbol of the official flight of the President of the European Commission, is not immune to the risk of GPS jamming in Europe. This GPS jamming in Bulgaria is undoubtedly a show of force, an electronic threat to civil and official aircraft that calls for a firm technical and political response. The challenge is clear: to preserve the sovereignty of European airspace in the face of these invisible but very real threats.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.