Technical analysis of the Kremlin’s gray tactics and specific strategies to strengthen NATO’s deterrence against Russia’s hybrid aggression.
We examine the rise of Kremlin-orchestrated gray zone aggression and its implications for NATO. It shows how these acts—a mix of disinformation, cyberattacks, and sabotage—circumvent the legal thresholds of war. He proposes a two-pronged strategy: deterrence through preparation (building societal resilience, proactive information campaigns, cooperation with civil society) and deterrence through response (agile communication, targeted sanctions, cyber counter-operations, internal pressure on Russian narratives).
The definition and challenge of the gray zone
The gray zone covers coercive actions by a state or non-state actor, situated between peace and war. It includes disinformation, espionage, sabotage, economic interference, and diplomatic pressure, while avoiding the thresholds that would trigger a conventional military response.
In this context, Kremlin aggression does not take the form of conventional military attacks, but relies on hybrid tactics that weaken democracies while making attribution uncertain. This strategy gives the Kremlin a margin of simulated impunity and allows it to test NATO’s cohesion and response.
Past failures of deterrence in the gray zone
Two situations illustrate the weakness of Western responses to these tactics:
- Crimea 2014: The illegal annexation illustrates the gray strategy. Disguised as “little green men,” Russian agents enabled Moscow to create a fait accompli while spreading disinformation about the orchestration of the operation. NATO was neither prepared nor coordinated to counter such a maneuver.
- War in Syria (2011-2024): By supporting the Assad regime with disinformation campaigns, the Kremlin helped sow international doubt. It thus reduced the willingness to respond, even after proven chemical attacks.
These two cases show how the gray zone weakens the alliance, makes attribution ambiguous, divides minds, and slows NATO’s ability to respond.
Strategy of deterrence through preparation (deterrence through denial)
Societal resilience and proactive information
- In times of war, World War II demonstrated the effectiveness of public campaigns promoting civilian vigilance (information and preparedness exercises).
- Today, modern models exist: the British campaign “See it, say it, sorted” and the Swedish program “In Case Crisis or War Comes” reinforce public preparedness in the face of manipulation and intrusion.
Cooperation and knowledge sharing
- Network institutions and civil society with Ukrainian experts who are already familiar with the Kremlin’s modus operandi.
- Provide tools to journalists, activists, and local communities to identify and counter malicious influence campaigns.
Global vigilance
- The Kremlin also targets countries in the Global South to circumvent sanctions and strengthen its influence. NATO must therefore extend its resilience efforts beyond its borders through strategic communication and targeted economic support.
Deterrence strategy through retaliation (deterrence through punishment)
Agile and reputational communication
- Example: the Salisbury poisoning (2018). The United Kingdom deployed a two-phase communication strategy: rapid attribution, followed by sustained diplomatic pressure. The result was the coordinated expulsion of Russian agents, without compromising democratic values.
Responding without mirroring Moscow
- This does not mean adopting the Kremlin’s methods, but using them to develop calibrated responses: targeted sanctions, cyber counter-operations, deplatforming, internal communications in Russia focused on corruption or the power of elites.
- Precise strikes on internal narratives can affect what the Kremlin values most: control of domestic opinion.
Allied coordination and interoperability
- A common language around threats is essential: NATO can draw inspiration from the DISARM Framework to classify influence and disinformation tactics.
- At the alliance level, SHAPE (the Allied Command in Europe) has a strategic HQ and a communications officer—levers that can be used to coordinate the strategic response to the gray zone.
Current context: beware of NATO’s erosion in the gray zone
- Recent incidents show the diversification of the Kremlin’s gray tactics, including sabotage, drones around US bases in Great Britain, and acts of underwater sabotage in the Baltic Sea. These actions undermine internal trust within the alliance.
- The head of the German secret service warns that these attacks could prompt NATO to invoke Article 5 in the event of serious danger.
- Western governments are reluctant to respond militarily to minor incidents, which encourages gradual escalation. For now, measures such as visa restrictions and targeted public information are being considered.
Towards a comprehensive and credible deterrence model
- The classic deterrence model centered on military threats is becoming insufficient in the face of hybrid tactics.
- The Western concept must shift to deterrence based on risk management (consequential deterrence). NATO must send a clear signal that any gray zone action will be met with a coherent and proportionate response.
- Robust societal preparedness coupled with effective public responses, even non-military ones, can deter the Kremlin without resorting to open warfare.
This combined approach—preventing through resilience, responding with balance, unifying allied responses, communicating clearly and transparently—offers a pragmatic and technical way to defend NATO’s interests against the Kremlin’s gray strategies.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.