Europe is increasing its purchases of F-35s and F-16s at the expense of its own fighter jets. What are the figures, what are the industrial losses, and what are the alternatives for strategic autonomy?
In summary
Europe is facing a paradox. On the one hand, defense budgets are skyrocketing, with nearly €343 billion planned for 2024 for EU member states, including more than €88 billion for the purchase of new equipment. On the other hand, Europe’s purchases of foreign aircraft largely benefit the United States: nearly half of the fighter jets in service with European armies are American-made, mainly F-16s and F-35s, even though the continent produces three modern aircraft – the Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, and JAS 39 Gripen. This reality has a direct impact on the European development of fighter aircraft and on the strategic autonomy of the European aerospace industry, diverting tens of billions of euros in potential orders. The reasons are well known: time pressure in relation to Russia, the promise of interoperability within NATO, American influence, and the slowness and divisions of European programs. But initiatives such as the SAFE fund (€150 billion in loans conditional on a majority European content) are attempting to reorient defense procurement policy in Europe. The future will depend on the ability of Europeans to agree on joint programs (SCAF, GCAP) and a coherent industrial strategy, rather than continuing to arbitrate, country by country, between American aircraft and competing European projects.
The reality in figures of European purchases of foreign aircraft
The amounts involved give an idea of the scale of the challenge. In 2023, European Union member states spent around €279 billion on defense, including €72 billion on investment, or 26% of the total, a record since the European Defense Agency began tracking this data. In 2024, the European Commission estimates that the defense effort of the 27 member states will reach around €343 billion, with €88 billion dedicated to the acquisition of new equipment alone, more than 80% of which will be for new equipment.
The exact share of US aircraft purchases in this volume is not published in detail. However, several analyses converge on the structure of the fleets. A study by The Guardian, based on military inventories, indicates that nearly half of the combat aircraft in service with European forces are of American origin, mainly F-16s, F-15s, and F-35s. The F-16 alone accounts for almost 600 aircraft in Europe outside the United States, all versions combined.
At the same time, European aeronautical programs only provide three modern fighter jets: the Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, and JAS 39 Gripen. The combined annual production of these aircraft remains limited to a few dozen units per year, far below the pace of American industrial production.
The shift is even more noticeable when looking only at recent orders. The F-35 Lightning II has already been ordered or is in the process of being ordered by at least thirteen European countries, including Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Poland, Finland, Germany, Greece, Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Romania. Ultimately, the volume could exceed 500 to 600 F-35s deployed on the continent.
In terms of value, if we take an “all-inclusive” unit cost (aircraft + support + armament) of around €150 to €180 million per F-35A, each tranche of 100 aircraft represents between €15 and €18 billion in expenditure, most of which goes to American industry. Even taking into account industrial offsets, this is the equivalent of orders that are not being placed for the construction of a European aeronautical industrial base.
The operational and political reasons behind the American choice
Why, in this context, does European dependence on American aircraft continue to grow? Both European armies and governments put forward several very concrete arguments.
Operationally, the F-35 is seen as a “passport” to technological superiority. A fifth-generation, stealthy, highly digitized aircraft, it is presented as the future backbone of NATO’s air defense. An analysis by European Security & Defense notes that, even though Europe produces three modern fighter aircraft, the F-35 is set to become the backbone of the Alliance’s air defense.
This argument is coupled with an imperative for interoperability. The United States controls a large part of NATO’s “enabling capabilities”: in-flight refueling, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), command systems, cruise missiles, and long-range air-to-ground weapons. Choosing an F-35 or an F-16 ensures that the fleet can be seamlessly integrated into US campaign plans and immediately benefit from threat libraries, data links, and software updates.
Politically, the role of alliances in military aircraft purchases is decisive. For Eastern countries—Poland, Romania, Finland, and the Baltic states—buying American sends a clear message to Washington: “We are counting on you as the ultimate guarantor of our security against Russia.” Poland’s mega-contracts for F-35s, Abrams tanks, and HIMARS are part of this strategy of aligning itself with American power.
Finally, the United States sells a complete “package”: aircraft, weapons, initial training, support, and sometimes even financing. The F-16 is historically cheaper to purchase and own than a Rafale or Eurofighter, while offering performance considered “sufficient” for most missions. In an emergency context—accelerated rearmament after 2022—this price/speed of acquisition argument is decisive for several capitals.
Hidden costs for the European aerospace industry
From the perspective of the industrial challenges facing the European aerospace industry, the picture is much less favorable. Every F-35 purchased is a Rafale, Typhoon, or Gripen aircraft that may not be sold, and this loss of revenue translates into tens of thousands of industrial jobs over the lifetime of the programs.
Yet Europe produces combat aircraft that cover a wide range of needs. The Rafale has demonstrated its versatility in operations in the Sahel, Iraq, and Syria; the Eurofighter Typhoon remains a high-performance air-to-air platform, modernized for ground strikes; and the JAS 39 Gripen is optimized for small countries seeking reduced operating costs.
However, the cumulative annual production of these aircraft remains limited. An analysis by Simple Flying highlights that European manufacturers deliver only a few dozen fighter jets per year, which does not allow for economies of scale or fully drive down unit costs.
On a macroeconomic level, we can estimate the order of magnitude. In 2024, EU member states’ defense equipment purchases will reach €88 billion. If, hypothetically, only a third of this amount is spent on air capabilities, that represents around €30 billion. If half of this amount goes abroad – mainly to the United States – that is potentially €15 billion per year that does not contribute to the strategic autonomy of the European aerospace industry.
Over twenty years, the typical lifespan of a fighter fleet, we are talking about a potential cumulative total of €300 billion in orders that could be captured by European manufacturers, if political choices were made to move massively in this direction. This calculation remains hypothetical, but it gives an order of magnitude of the shortfall in revenue for supporting the development of European aircraft.
Added to this is a strategic cost: dependence on algorithms, source codes, spare parts, and supply chains controlled by Washington means that Europe cannot entirely decide on its own how to use its fleets or which technological developments to prioritize. The Le Monde article on the F-35 emphasizes this dependence, pointing out that the aircraft requires data and maintenance to flow through American systems.
Structural obstacles to European aeronautical sovereignty
Beyond the specific issue of the F-35, it is the entire European defense industry strategy that is at stake. The EU now has a defense industrial strategy and powerful financial instruments, but these are coming up against national reflexes.
The European Commission is clearly pushing in one direction: increasing the “European content” of purchased equipment, developing common industrial capabilities, and ensuring that states “buy together and buy in Europe.” The White Paper on Defense Preparedness and the “ReArm Europe” agenda envisage mobilizing up to €800 billion in funding over several years, largely for armament programs.
The new SAFE (Security Action for Europe) instrument illustrates this shift. It provides up to €150 billion in long-term loans for defense purchases, with one important condition: at least 65% of the value of the equipment financed must come from suppliers based in the EU, Norway, or Ukraine.
On paper, this should promote the construction of a European aerospace industrial base and reorient defense procurement policy in Europe towards continental equipment. In reality, several obstacles remain:
Divisions between Member States
Not all countries share the same vision of European aeronautical sovereignty. France advocates an unapologetic “Buy European” policy. Others, such as Italy and Hungary, are more reluctant to accept constraints they consider too rigid and fear being forced to make choices that run counter to their industrial or budgetary interests.
The countries most exposed to the Russian threat (Poland, the Baltic States, Finland) favor speed and the American guarantee, even if it means sacrificing part of the goal of industrial autonomy. Others, such as Spain and Portugal, are beginning to question certain American purchases, particularly the F-35, in favor of European solutions such as the Eurofighter or the future SCAF.
The fragmentation of European programs
Europe is simultaneously preparing two major new-generation European aeronautical programs: the SCAF (Future Combat Air System), led by France, Germany, and Spain, and the GCAP (Global Combat Air Program), bringing together the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan. The Commission recently approved the industrial joint venture that will carry out GCAP, confirming the existence of two competing sectors on the same continent.
This complicates the task: rather than a single large, unifying program, Europe now has two ecosystems that will have to share funding, engineers, and exports. In the short term, these projects will not enter service before 2040, leaving a “capacity gap” that states are currently filling… with the F-35.
Political disagreements among Europeans over aircraft purchases
Behind the figures lie profound differences of opinion. The debate over foreign aircraft in Europe is primarily a political one.
Spain has chosen to forego the F-35 for its future needs, preferring to extend and modernize its Eurofighter Typhoon fleet and invest in the SCAF with France and Germany. This decision is as much industrial as it is symbolic: Madrid intends to defend competition between American and European aircraft and reject a de facto monopoly of the F-35 on the continent.
Conversely, Germany illustrates the contradictions within Europe. Berlin has announced the purchase of at least 35 F-35As to ensure NATO’s nuclear sharing mission, while investing several billion in the SCAF and in the modernization of the Eurofighter. This dual strategy reflects a political compromise: guaranteeing credibility with Washington in the short term, while preserving a role in the future of European fighter jets.
Public opinion is also divided. A poll for the European Council on Foreign Relations shows that the majority of Europeans now accept an increase in defense spending, but there is no clear consensus on how to spend it. For some, buying American remains the quickest and surest guarantee; for others, every billion that crosses the Atlantic weakens the option of a “powerful” Europe, capable of defending itself if the United States withdraws.
Finally, an often underestimated factor fuels the disagreement: many so-called “European” aircraft themselves incorporate critical American components or systems (engines, electronics, weapons). For example, a significant portion of the Gripen’s onboard systems come from American suppliers. This complicates the distinction between Europe’s purchases of foreign aircraft and “truly” European purchases.
The future of European fighter jets: between dependence and a leap forward
The decade from 2025 to 2035 will be decisive for the future of European fighter jets. Several major trends are emerging.
On the one hand, the current trajectory is automatically reinforcing European dependence on American aircraft. The F-35 is becoming the NATO standard, there are still many modernized F-16s in service, and guided weapon, intelligence, and communications capabilities remain largely under American control.
On the other hand, the EU has finally begun to align its political ambitions with its financial instruments. The SAFE program, the target of 40% of orders being placed cooperatively by 2030, and the principle that the majority of equipment financed must come from the EU are powerful levers for redirecting European investment in combat aircraft programs.
For this to have a concrete impact, several conditions will have to be met:
- shorter decision-making cycles, capable of competing with the responsiveness of US Foreign Military Sales;
- a reduction in duplication between the SCAF, GCAP, Eurofighter, and Rafale programs, in order to avoid diluting budgets and skills;
- a more aggressive approach to exports, with Europeans jointly defending their aircraft against American competition, rather than fighting over the few markets available;
- political clarification: NATO as an alliance remains indispensable, but Europe must decide to what extent it accepts that its European air security and fleet choices depend on a single supplier located outside the continent.
A decisive decade for choosing between comfort and autonomy
Europe is not faced with a simple choice between “American aircraft” and “European aircraft.” The reality is more nuanced: even by redirecting financial flows, the continent will remain dependent on the American ecosystem for ammunition, sensors, information and command systems for a long time to come.
The central question is another: how much of its already rapidly increasing budgets is Europe willing to devote to equipping its armed forces while consolidating, or not, the construction of a European aeronautical industrial base?
As long as each country decides independently between the F-35, Rafale, Eurofighter, and future SCAF or GCAP, the United States will retain a structural advantage, fueled by mass effect, industrial consistency, and political centralization. If, on the contrary, Europeans manage to transform their new financial instruments into genuine joint fleet decisions, then Europe’s purchases of foreign aircraft will not disappear, but they will cease to be the default course of action.
The coming decade will reveal whether the continent chooses the ease of American “plug-and-play” or accepts the political, financial, and industrial price of greater autonomy. In the field of combat aircraft, as elsewhere, this choice will not be made in press releases, but in signed contracts.
Sources
– European Defense Agency, “Defense Data 2023–2024 – Key findings on EU defense spending”
– European Commission, “Defense industrial strategy and ReArm Europe agenda,” 2024–2025
– Council of the EU, “SAFE – Security Action for Europe, €150 billion for joint defense procurement,” 2025
– The Guardian, “Armed by America: how Europe’s militaries depend on the US – a visual analysis,” June 24, 2025
– Le Monde, “The American F-35, a fighter jet symbolizing European dependence,” June 15, 2025
– European Security & Defense, “European combat aircraft SITREP,” July 19, 2024
– European Security & Defense, “F-35 in Europe: a takeover?”, July 25, 2024
– Reuters, “EU approves British, Italian, Japanese joint venture for combat aircraft (GCAP),” June 2, 2025
– Financial Times, “Spain shuns US F-35 jets as tensions grow with Washington,” 2025
– Simple Flying, “How many fighter jets are produced annually in Europe?,” August 20, 2024
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.