Industrial leadership, intellectual property, exports: the SCAF is stumbling over fundamental differences between France, Germany, and Spain.
Summary
The Future Combat Air System (SCAF/FCAS) brings together France (Dassault Aviation), Germany (Airbus Defense and Space) and Spain (Indra). Behind the political posturing, disagreements center on the leadership of the new generation fighter (NGF), intellectual property, the distribution of workshares, the control of remote carriers and the combat cloud, as well as export rules. The official schedule calls for a flight demonstrator around 2029-2030 and entry into service around 2040, after a Phase 1B costing €3.2 billion. France is calling for tighter control of the NGF and protection of its know-how; Germany advocates balanced sharing, demanding industrial returns and tripartite governance; Spain wants to guarantee its position as co-leader in sensors and combat cloud. In the short term, these tensions are slowing down technical milestones; in the long term, they raise the question of European sovereignty in the face of NGAD/GCAP programs and the risk of increased dependence on the United States.
The programmatic and financial context that is fueling friction
The SCAF is a “system of systems” linking an NGF, remote carriers (escort drones), a secure combat cloud, and effectors. Phase 1B (signed at the end of 2022, €3.2 billion, approximately 3.5 years) finances critical demonstrators; the first flight of the NGF has been pushed back to 2029-2030, with an operational target of around 2040 . The overall value of the program is often estimated at >€100 billion over several decades. However, as the sums involved and the stakes in terms of sovereignty increase, issues of governance and industrial returns become increasingly important. This is the backdrop to the “heated exchanges” between Dassault and Airbus, regularly highlighted by management and political leaders, with Indra as the third pillar claiming major roles on the Spanish side. These tensions are not just part of the folklore of air shows: they determine the actual technological trajectory of the program and its credibility vis-à-vis its competitors.
The French position: NGF leadership and protection of know-how
On the French side, the requirement is clear: Dassault Aviation wants clear leadership on the NGF (airframe, flight controls, critical integration), with intellectual property rights preserved on its key components. France has specific operational requirements: airborne deterrence missions, penetration in A2/AD environments, from the sea operations from a 75,000-ton aircraft carrier (PA-NG), and compatibility with autonomous payloads. Paris believes that the success of a breakthrough fighter requires a short decision-making chain and a prime contractor capable of making quick decisions on the airframe and mission architecture. Concerns relate to the dilution of responsibilities if every decision has to go through a “three-person committee.” Finally, France is seeking guarantees on the rights of use for the developed components, so as not to freeze its sovereign developments (avionics, electronic warfare, weapons) in the future.
The German position: balanced sharing and export guarantees
Berlin, strongly supported by Airbus Defence and Space, defends the balance of the industrial load and the development of expertise in areas historically dominated by France (aircraft integration). Germany insists on tripartite governance and refuses to be a mere “subcontractor ” for the aircraft core. Politically, export rules remain a sticking point: despite the Aachen Treaty (2019) and bilateral arrangements (content thresholds), Berlin wants a mechanism that does not hinder either its parliamentary doctrine or its industrial policy. For Germany, overly unilateral commitments on IP and technical arbitration would set an unfavorable precedent for economic returns, even as the Eurofighter approaches a generational shift. Implicitly, Germany’s demand is to have a say in structural choices and to secure a flow of skilled jobs over several decades.
Spain’s position: a structural role in sensors and cloud combat
Madrid, via Indra, is aiming for an architect role in the areas of sensors, electronic warfare, and cloud combat. Spain has institutionalized its status as national coordinator and is promoting a vision in which the nube de combate becomes the backbone of multi-domain collaborative combat. In concrete terms, this means piloting open architectures for data exchange, multi-sensor fusion, controlled latency (< 50 ms intra-packet target) and resilience to jamming. Madrid wants guarantees of co-leadership on these digital layers, without which its participation would amount to little more than an assembly of sub-assemblies. Spain also supports a 33/33/33 distribution on certain cross-functional activities in order to establish its ecosystems (SMEs, R&D centers, supercomputing, flight testing).
The Dassault–Airbus node: NGF leadership, IP, and task distribution
The most visible sticking point pits Dassault against Airbus on three issues: 1) who arbitrates the NGF design choices; 2) how far does intellectual property sharing go; 3) how to distribute project management and work packages. Paris wants a strong lead integrator for the airframe/flight controls to avoid slow and costly compromises; Berlin/Madrid want workshares aligned with their financial contributions and sufficient technical access to capitalize on the future. However, the pace of Phase 2 (after 2026) depends on a stable decision-making chain. Every month lost to organizational disputes delays structural tests, wind tunnel tests, and critical software-hardware validations, with a snowball effect on the 2040 agenda.
The NGF engine: the EUMET Safran–MTU–ITP equation and hot section sovereignty
On the engine pillar, the EUMET joint venture (Safran Aircraft Engines/MTU Aero Engines) brings together ITP Aero on the Spanish side. The division of responsibilities sees Safran as the design/integration leader and MTU as the MRO leader, with ITP contributing its expertise in hot/cold modules. The technical challenge lies in the hot section (high temperatures, single-crystal materials, ceramic coatings) and low-emission combustion. The French strategy is to guarantee control of the core component for sovereignty and export purposes; the German position is to co-own critical expertise, particularly for maintenance and upgrades over 30-40 years; and Spain’s ambition is to establish ITP as an indispensable player. Any contractual ambiguity regarding module ownership and modification rights may block access to certain sales or increase fleet maintenance costs over several thousand hours (beyond 6,000–8,000 hours per cell).
Cloud combat and remote carriers: who holds the keys to the network
The cloud battle determines the effectiveness of remote carriers (3–8 t, sub/supersonic profiles, payload 300–800 kg), sensor fusion, real-time allocation of sensors/weapons, and survivability under jamming. France advocates a sovereign and cyber-secure architecture that is compatible with deterrence; Germany advocates maximum NATO interoperability and sharing of software components; Spain wants to co-pilot the architecture to avoid second-tier dependency. Behind the words lies a simple question: who defines the standards, certifies the software updates, and controls the cryptographic keys? Whoever controls the network holds a decisive share of the operational value and… the long-term industrial margin.
Exports: a recurring dividing line and capacity effects
Despite bilateral agreements (Aachen 2019, mechanisms on national shares < 20%), the German doctrine on exports remains more restrictive than the French one. Paris wants to avoid a third-party purchase being blocked by a late veto; Berlin wants political safeguards on sensitive destinations. This divergence is not theoretical: it weighs on the business case for the SCAF (series, unit costs, MCO), and therefore on competitiveness vis-à-vis the American NGAD, the Anglo-Italian-Japanese GCAP, and turnkey F-35 offers. Without clear and predictable rules, export prospects may favor platforms where the governance of authorizations is more transparent—a direct risk of loss of market share and erosion of the European industrial base.
Short-term consequences: milestone delays and hidden costs
Over the next 12–24 months, tensions will result in: delays in structural testing, postponements of design reviews (partial PDR/CDR), sub-optimization of flight testing on integration benches, and cost overruns for coordination (duplicate teams, contractual loops). Each quarter lost on critical paths delays supplier orders, blocks productive investments, and increases engineering costs. SMEs suffer from reduced visibility and are reluctant to hire and invest in equipment. In budgetary terms, millions of euros are wasted on friction rather than technological maturation (compliant sensors, RAM materials, real-time software).
Long-term consequences: power architecture and strategic risk
Over the next 10–20 years, two trajectories are emerging. If a clear compromise emerges (assertive NGF lead, sensor/cloud co-leads, stable export rules, protected but licensable IP), the SCAF can deliver a credible capability leap: stealth NGF, mass remote carriers, NATO-ready combat cloud, and smoothed ownership costs through export volumes. Conversely, if Phase 2 stalls, Europe will see the gap widen with the American NGAD/CCA and GCAP, while the temptation to buy F-35s or F-15EXs to “hold out” until the 2030s will be strong. NGAD/CCA** and GCAP, while the temptation to purchase F-35 or F-15EX aircraft to “hold out” until the 2030s will grow. The most serious consequence would be doctrinal: losing control over system architecture (from sensor to effector) and confining ourselves to the role of third-party equipment manufacturers. We must be frank: without stable steering rules, the 2040 timeline will become a moving target and the promise of sovereignty will be diluted.
Sources
— Breaking Defense, “FCAS drama: ‘Difficulties’ between Airbus and Dassault…,” June 18, 2025.
— FlightGlobal, “Airbus, Dassault tensions rise over Phase 2 workshare for FCAS,” June 18, 2025.
— Airbus (press release), “Europe’s Future Combat Air System: on the way to the first flight,” Dec. 16, 2022.
— Reuters, “Merz urges France to stick to deal on joint fighter jet project,” July 9, 2025; “Berlin weighs developing fighter jet without Dassault…,” Sept. 26, 2025.
— Le Monde (en), “French-German future combat aircraft project on the brink of collapse,” Oct. 3, 2025.
— Safran/MTU (press releases), creation of EUMET for the NGF engine, Apr. 29, 2021.
— Indra (press releases), Spanish coordination role, sensors, and combat cloud, Dec. 15, 2022; June 30, 2025; Oct. 15–16, 2025.
— FR/DE ministries, Aachen Treaty and statements on exports, 2019–2024.
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