UAC and Rostec accelerate Su-34 deliveries to the VKS. Summary: production, gliding munitions, losses, effects in Ukraine, and current key limitations.
Summary
Russian factories are delivering new Su-34s to the VKS at a pace described as “regular” by UAC and Rostec. These long-range support bombers carry UMPK guidance kits that transform smooth bombs into gliding munitions at 60–80 km, limiting exposure to Ukrainian air defenses. The platform is evolving (Sych pods, Khibiny electronic warfare) but suffers from documented attrition. The increase in production is intended to support the effort in Ukraine and compensate for losses, without resolving structural constraints: dependence on jammed satellite guidance, mobile surface-to-air threats, and production under sanctions. Public figures confirm several batches delivered in 2025 (April, July, August) and a “record month” cited by UAC management, while open sources report Su-34 destruction since 2022. The main military effect remains the massive use of glide bombs against fixed targets and logistics lines; the strategic effect is more nuanced: tactical gains, industrial costs, and persistent vulnerabilities.
The main fact and industrial dynamics
Official Russian communiqués indicate the delivery of a “new batch” of Su-34s to the VKS on several occasions in 2025. The sequences observed show at least three waves (April, July, August), with an emphasis on the “regularity” of supplies and a “record month” declared by UAC CEO Vadim Badekha. These announcements use recurring vocabulary: factory-completed ground/flight tests, formal acceptance by regiments, and a “steady” ramp-up. The Rostec website and the TASS agency emphasize the continuity of production and the execution of the state program, without systematically specifying the number of aircraft per batch—a classic indicator of opacity in times of conflict. Reports in the defense media confirm this timeline and suggest an annual increase target consistent with the industrial effort undertaken since 2022. In the Russian aerospace ecosystem, the main Su-34 production line is located in Novosibirsk (NAPO), with incremental upgrades throughout the series. At the same time, UAC is communicating about industrial efficiency gains and internal trade-offs aimed at producing more combat aircraft despite labor and component constraints. This “cadence-capacity” narrative serves a dual purpose: to reassure the political-military leadership about the execution of the budget and to signal to the outside world that the tactical fleet is being maintained in volume in the face of attrition. For observers, the factual element remains the recurrence of the 2025 batches and the confirmation of a monthly high point, which confirm a sustained production trajectory, without it being possible to infer the exact totals delivered quarter by quarter.
Su-34 technical specifications and capability developments
The Su-34 is a side-by-side two-seater derived from the Flanker family, optimized for medium/long-range penetration and guided munitions firing. Public data puts the maximum takeoff weight at around 44–45 tons, the payload at around 8 tons on 12 hardpoints, a ceiling of nearly 17 km, a maximum speed of around Mach 1.8 (≈ 1,900 km/h) and a range of around 1,000–1,100 km depending on profile and load, which can be extended by in-flight refueling. The Sh-141/V004 radar provides ground mapping and terrain tracking, with announced ranges of around 200–250 km for large surface targets and ~120 km for fighter-type targets. The aircraft carries a 30 mm GSh-30-1 cannon and retains defensive air-to-air capability (R-73/R-77), while prioritizing air-to-ground: KAB-500/1500, Kh-29, Kh-31, Kh-35, Kh-59, as well as FAB-500M-62 equipped with UMPK kits. Recent developments include the integration of Sych reconnaissance pods (optical, radar, and electronic flaps) for real-time intelligence gathering without sacrificing bomb load capacity, and the upgrade of the Khibiny electronic warfare system, designed to complicate acquisition by enemy engagement radars. In terms of avionics, the standards produced since 2022–2024 include improvements in data links and weapons compatibility. Technically, the Su-34 remains positioned as a heavy strike fighter: endurance, payload capacity, and airframe robustness (armored cockpit, canard configuration) to carry heavy munitions over long distances, under ground-to-air threat, with a demanding mission profile involving low-altitude navigation and firing beyond the range of defense systems.
Use in Ukraine: gliding munitions and tactical effect
Since 2023, the core of its operational use has been FAB-500/1500s equipped with UMPK kits, which provide satellite guidance and folding wings for typical ranges of 60 km (up to ~80 km depending on profiles) . The objective is simple: to strike depots, railway junctions, fortified positions, and strongpoints without crossing the front line at low altitude. This method has been observed on a large scale around Avdiivka and other sectors, where the “pressure” from gliding bombs has facilitated tactical gains by neutralizing structures and hard points. Ukrainian sources mention the appearance of a UMPB-5 with a different geometry, a sign of a Russian effort to diversify its arsenal of inexpensive gliding bombs, while feedback from the field suggests a temporary drop in effectiveness when countermeasures jam satellite guidance. The military effect of glide bombs is asymmetrical: they reduce crew exposure but rely on a vulnerable GNSS chain; they inflict heavy damage on infrastructure, but their accuracy can decrease under jamming, sometimes requiring multiple shots to saturate the target area. At the operational level, the Su-34 alternates between strike and tactical reconnaissance missions using Sych pods, integrated into “packages” combining jamming, air-to-air cover, and sequenced strikes. This is where we see the Russian compromise: producing inexpensive kits in volume and supporting a long-range harassment campaign, while accepting variable effectiveness depending on the density of Ukrainian ground-to-air defenses and the enemy’s electronic warfare capabilities.
Losses, attrition, and the industrial response
Despite these adaptations, the fleet is not immune. Losses documented by open sources indicate that several dozen Su-34s have been destroyed or damaged since 2022, some of them struck at long range by Patriot systems operating in ambush, or during drone attacks on bases. These findings are not sufficient to describe the total losses, but they do pose an operational reality: Russia must deliver regular batches to compensate for attrition and maintain availability rates. On the industrial side, UAC claims increased productivity and organizational optimization to “keep up” with state orders; this rhetoric is consistent with announcements of “record months” and repeated quarterly batches. For the analyst, three consequences emerge. First, repeated deliveries of aircraft do not change the structural vulnerability to multi-layered defenses; they cushion the effects, but do not cancel them out. Second, dependence on sanctioned component supply chains complicates any rapid upgrade; incremental modernizations (pods, links, jamming) remain plausible, but a capability revolution is less so. Third, the tactic of massed gliding munitions remains tactically effective against fixed targets, but struggles to produce decisive effects without air superiority and sustained real-time intelligence. In summary, the “production-attrition” curve works to Moscow’s advantage locally when the enemy’s defenses are saturated, and vice versa when the enemy combines ground-to-air mobility, sensor intelligence, and effective jamming.
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