From the escalation in August 2025 to the raid on January 3, 2026: ISR, electronic warfare, SEAD, urban assault, and exfiltration, minute by minute.
Summary
Since August 2025, Washington has been building up a military option against Caracas in successive stages: deployments and surveillance, “anti-drug” strikes at sea, then economic pressure with cargo seizures and a maritime blockade. At the end of 2025, the logic changed: the campaign became coercive and prepared for a shift, with a saturated information environment, cyber disruptions to oil administration systems, and an operational ramp-up in the Caribbean. On the night of January 3, 2026, the operation, dubbed “Operation Absolute Resolve,” combined local air superiority, partial neutralization of defenses and communications, and then a special forces assault on a target in Caracas, before rapid extraction to a naval platform and transfer out of the country. The key point was not the strike itself, but the timing: blind, isolate, capture, exfiltrate, then lock down the narrative. The strategic shock was immediate: legal debate, risk of regional escalation, questions of governance and energy infrastructure security.
The rise to extremes that began in the summer
From the outside, January 2026 looks like a flash in the pan. In reality, the capture of Nicolás Maduro is the culmination of a patient sequence of events, launched in August 2025, where the objective is not to “invade” Venezuela but to create the conditions for a dragnet. In Washington, the logic is simple and brutal: if economic and legal pressure does not achieve a departure, an option is needed that imposes a fait accompli.
This option is only credible if three obstacles are overcome. The first is access: entering a protected urban environment without getting bogged down. The second is speed: reducing the interval between the first alert and the exit of the target. The third is information dominance: preventing the adversary from coordinating their response and then controlling the story told to the world.
As of August, the idea is therefore not to “win a battle,” but to win a race against the clock. Capturing a head of state is not a frontal maneuver. It is a precision operation where the element of surprise is often more valuable than sheer force.
The ISR architecture that makes the target “capturable”
A capture of this level does not begin with a helicopter, but with months of gathering information. The framework is a multi-domain ISR system: space, air, sea, cyber, human. The goal is not to know everything. The goal is to know enough to reduce the unknown at the critical moment.
In this type of case, the first obsession is the “pattern of life.” Where does the target sleep, how often does he or she change residence, who makes up the inner circle, what vehicles are actually used, which windows are “quiet” in the guard rotations. A capital city like Caracas is a mille-feuille: presidential guard, regular forces, militias, family loyalties, and political interference. ISR must map not only buildings, but also behaviors.
Second obsession: C2 nodes. It is not enough to identify the target; you have to understand who triggers the reaction. The forces that would protect or evacuate Maduro depend on orders. Cutting off or delaying those orders transforms an organized defense into scattered reactions.
Third obsession: the adversary’s escape routes. A regime that feels threatened prepares routes and fallback points. The ISR mission is to anticipate these escape routes and to put in place a temporary closure at the right moment, either through strikes, local air control, or physical blockades.
It is this preparation that makes the target “capturable” in a single night, rather than “untouchable” all year round.
The pressure campaign that prepares the operational ground
Between September and December 2025, the dynamic shifts to a campaign of gradual coercion. The reported actions combine an “anti-drug” posture at sea with pressure on energy flows: strikes on boats suspected of trafficking, seizures of cargo, and, in December, a blockade on certain tanker movements. This sequence has a direct effect: it reduces the number of commercial actors willing to approach Venezuelan waters, creates uncertainty, and weakens logistics.
The reported figures on the impact on oil give an idea of the violence of this economic tool: a significant drop in exports compared to November, and stocks accumulating due to a lack of outlets. In a country where oil revenues structure the state, affecting flows means affecting the regime’s ability to pay, retain loyalty, and control.
At the same time, the emergence of IT disruptions within oil-related administrative structures, described as a cyber event that forces certain processes to switch to manual mode, acts as a stress multiplier. Even if cyber is not “the cause” of a raid, it weakens normality. It overloads decision-makers, degrades coordination, and fuels an atmosphere of siege.
It’s a familiar mechanism: you don’t just “prepare” the battlefield. You prepare for fatigue.
Electronic warfare as a weapon of tempo
The popular myth of electronic warfare is that it is a magic switch that plunges a city into darkness. The reality is more utilitarian. In a capture operation, EW is primarily used to buy time. It creates a gap between what the adversary believes it sees and what is actually happening.
The first layer is the degradation of tactical communications. There is no need to erase the entire spectrum. It is enough to destabilize critical channels: radios of intervention units, links between checkpoints, reports to the decision-making center. If, for five to ten minutes, messages no longer arrive, arrive in duplicate, or arrive with noise, the organization cracks.
The second layer is the attack on the “situation picture.” In a capital city, security forces rely on a combination of cameras, local radars, human alerts, and sometimes drones. A modern operation will seek to saturate the sensors, generate false signals, or force unnecessary redeployments. The goal is to pin units down in the wrong place.
The third layer is defensive: protecting friendly assets. Jamming can also mask the approach of helicopters, disrupt surface-to-air missile launches, or reduce the accuracy of certain threats. But we must be clear-headed: EW that is too broad impacts civilians. It causes network failures, panic, and accidents. It creates political images.
This is where the nature of the operation becomes clear: if collateral effects on communications are accepted, it means that the political decision has already been made. You don’t jam a capital city for “demonstration” purposes. You do it when you want to get the job done.
The SEAD/DEAD logic in the face of a Russian-origin ecosystem
For years, Venezuela has been deploying ground-to-air defense systems associated with Russian equipment. Their actual availability, stocks, and training are under discussion. But when it comes to planning, the prudent assumption is that they can kill. The question then becomes: how can we reduce the risk to aircraft, helicopters, and exfiltration?
In a SEAD/DEAD approach, the goal is not necessarily to “destroy everything.” It is to neutralize the essentials during a short window of opportunity. Sometimes it is enough to break a radar, degrade a link, saturate a battery, or strike a logistical support point.
Air defense is not just a launcher. It is a chain: detection, identification, attribution, engagement. If one of the links is broken at the right moment, the system becomes slow, hesitant, or blind.
Reports mention explosions around military sites and infrastructure near Caracas and La Guaira, as well as events close to sensitive areas. In operational terms, this looks like the opening of a corridor: reducing threats that could engage low-altitude aircraft and creating a bubble of local superiority stable enough to bring in and out assault assets.
It is also a way of obscuring instant attribution: a strike on multiple points forces the adversary to wonder where the main target is. While they hesitate, the assault takes place.
Urban assault as a coercive arrest operation
Once the bubble has been created, the main action takes place on the ground. A special forces raid in the city is nothing like what you see in the movies. It is constrained by stairs, corridors, doors, civilians, short-range fire, and confusion. The objective is not to “hold” the ground, but to seize and leave.
The most coherent account, based on public information, describes a pre-dawn operation at a site in Caracas, involving the capture of Maduro and Cilia Flores. This type of operation is based on a simple structure: a crossing team, a control team, an identification team, a medical team, and peripheral security elements.
The weak point is positive identification. Arresting a head of state means being sure of the man. Operations of this type rely on visual and biometric recognition, or human confirmers. This is where the months of preparation come in: knowing who is in the room, who is guarding the door, and at what minute passage is “possible.”
The second weak point is escalation. The longer the raid lasts, the more local forces converge. Hence the obsession with reducing contact time. In a successful raid, you don’t “win” because you are stronger. You win because you are already out when the opponent begins to understand.
Exfiltration as the most dangerous phase
It is often believed that the danger lies in the entry. In reality, the most risky phase is exfiltration. Once the capture has been announced by the dynamics of the combat, all security forces seek to converge. They can improvise: roadblocks, opportunistic fire, use of heavy weapons, attempts at jamming, or activation of remaining surface-to-air batteries.
The exfiltration described involves rapid extraction to a naval platform and transfer out of the country. This is consistent with a logic of control: once at sea, the environment is more controlled, and the capacity for local retaliation falls.
The success of this phase requires continuity: local air superiority, EW to reduce ground-to-air engagements, and the ability to deal with medical or mechanical incidents. Even a helicopter breakdown can turn a raid into a strategic crisis. This is why this type of operation is planned as a chain, not as a heroic act.
In this context, information about massive air support, with a wide range of aircraft, is not a detail. It indicates a choice: oversizing the umbrella to minimize the chance of a “black event.”
The battle of the narrative and immediate information pollution
No sooner is the action over than a second operation begins: the battle of the narrative.
The first few days are saturated with images, videos, rumors, and false content. This phenomenon is not noise. It is a battlefield. It influences international reaction, internal mobilization, and legal legitimacy.
From an American perspective, publishing evidence of capture serves to lock in the fait accompli: if the world sees it, the world must react. From a Venezuelan perspective, contesting, demanding evidence, and denouncing an illegal kidnapping serves to maintain a political base, attempt to activate regional support, and frame the debate in terms of international law.
This is a key moment: military technique meets politics. A raid can succeed and fail politically, or vice versa. Here, the intensity of condemnation and support shows that the operation has fractured the diplomatic landscape.
The secondary strategic effects that Washington must now manage
The shock of January 3, 2026 raises a question more dangerous than the assault itself: what happens next? Three risks stand out.
The first is internal instability. A regime is not a man. It is a coalition of forces: the army, the services, parties, militias, economic networks. Removing the head can trigger succession struggles, violence, or fragmentation. If institutions tear themselves apart, the humanitarian crisis worsens.
The second risk is regional. Some states see the operation as an intolerable precedent. Others see it as an opportunity. In both cases, the area becomes more volatile. The response may be indirect: cyber attacks, pressure on flows, cross-border unrest, support for criminal networks.
The third risk is energy-related. Even if the oil infrastructure has been relatively preserved, port logistics and the commercial environment are sensitive. The mere perception of a war zone is enough to scare away shipowners, increase insurance costs, and disrupt flows. Managing the “return to normality” is often more difficult than breaking normality.
This is where the analysis must be frank: a capture operation can be militarily brilliant and strategically costly. The real test begins when it comes to providing daily security, a credible political transition, and a defensible legal framework.
The military lesson that the operation leaves behind
This sequence illustrates a significant trend: the merging of intelligence, EW, SEAD, and special forces in highly political operations. The raid is not an end. It is a spearhead. The real “system” is integration: seeing before acting, jamming before striking, striking to open, seizing to exit, then communicating to lock down.
If we are looking for a formula, it can be summed up in one sentence: the capture of Maduro was less a battle than an orchestration of windows. A few minutes of blindness. A brief bubble of superiority. An entry, a seizure, an exit. And then a diplomatic storm.
The problem is that this orchestration does not answer the most important question: who will control Caracas tomorrow, and with what mandate? As long as this answer remains unclear, the raid will remain a major military event and an open strategic gamble.
Sources
- Reuters, “Venezuela’s oil facilities unscathed in US strike, sources say,” January 3, 2026.
- Reuters, “Exclusive: US to launch new phase of Venezuela operations, sources say,” November 22–23, 2025.
- Reuters, “Trump confirms he spoke with Venezuela’s Maduro,” November 30–December 1, 2025.
- Reuters, “Trump rejected Maduro requests on call, options narrow…,” December 1, 2025.
- The Guardian, “US has captured Venezuela’s President Maduro and wife, says Trump,” January 3, 2026.
- Axios, “World leaders denounce U.S. operation to capture Maduro,” January 3, 2026.
- Associated Press, “Maduro’s ouster sparks celebrations…,” January 3–4, 2026.
- Air & Space Forces Magazine, “US Airpower Paved Way for Delta Force to Capture…”, January 3, 2026.
- CBS News, live updates “U.S. strikes Venezuela and captures Maduro…”, January 3, 2026.
- Euronews, “Trump says Maduro and his wife were ‘captured’ amid US strike…”, January 3, 2026.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.