Technical analysis of the Chinese Air Force (PLAAF): possible incursions, air blockades, and airborne assaults against Taiwan, doctrine, and actual capabilities.
The Taiwan Strait is currently one of the most tense areas in the Pacific. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is at the heart of conflict scenarios with Taiwan. Frequent incursions into the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), the threat of an air blockade, and the possibility of an airborne assault on the outlying islands are all strategies that have been discussed. This article examines the PLAAF’s capabilities in the event of a conflict with Taiwan, focusing on its air assets, doctrine, strategic transport, logistical support, and the limitations it may face. The aim is to understand what China can really do — and what it cannot do — in an air and amphibious conflict around Taiwan.
ADIZ incursions and air coercion
The PLAAF regularly uses sorties around Taiwan to apply pressure and test defenses. Since 2019, violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ have increased, with bomber aircraft (“H-6”), electronic warfare aircraft, fighter patrols such as J-16 or J-11, sometimes accompanied by Y-20U / YY-20 refueling aircraft. These incursions follow a doctrine of graduated coercion: testing reactions, exhausting the opponent’s sorties, increasing flight times, and asserting a continuous presence. Refueling flights extend patrol time, increasing the complexity for Taiwanese air forces, which are forced to monitor large areas. Chinese air power now appears capable of conducting penetration and return missions without immediate repercussions, making coercion credible.
Air blockade as a possible strategy
An air blockade would involve closing or severely restricting civil and military air traffic to and from Taiwan. To achieve this, the PLAAF would have several assets at its disposal: long-range bombers, precision air-to-ground missiles, reconnaissance and suppression drones, and a growing density of anti-radar systems. The presence of H-6s or long-range attack aircraft, combined with AEW (early warning) and tanker aircraft, would make it possible to create A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) zones around the island. The possession of coastal radars, low-trajectory ballistic missiles, and anti-ship missile batteries would complete the system. The blockade would require the ability to interrupt air supply lines: closing international airports, banning overflight corridors, imposing strict air defenses, and saturating the airspace with patrols. This requires logistical, infrastructure, and air control. The PLAAF has invested in electronic warfare, radar jamming, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capabilities. This type of operation requires China to gain early dominance over anti-aircraft systems, radars, and interceptors.
Logistical capabilities: transport, resupply, and power projection
An assault or blockade requires considerable projection capabilities. The PLAAF has approximately 55 Xi’an Y-20 heavy transport aircraft in service (2025), supplemented by older Il-76s. The Y-20s are capable of carrying up to 66 tons of payload, which can include light armored vehicles, airborne troops, or heavy equipment. In addition, refueling versions of the Y-20 (YY-20 or Y-20U) extend the duration of fighter, bomber, or escort missions in areas near or far from Taiwan. The PLAAF’s Airborne Force itself has approximately 40,000 personnel, organized into brigades, but it is heavily dependent on strategic and tactical transport for insertion. These capabilities give China the ability to launch airborne raids to capture peripheral islands (Kinmen, Matsu, Penghu) as staging areas for a future larger amphibious or air assault.
Possible airborne assault doctrine
The PLAAF’s Airborne Corps doctrine calls for light or mechanized forces to be inserted by parachute or helicopter to capture key points behind enemy lines. These actions would target airfields, anti-aircraft defense points, bridges, and command centers to cut off Taiwanese communications and disrupt defenses. Recent exercises have shown parachute drops from Y-20s and deployments of transport helicopters such as the Z-20K and Z-8 for rapid insertions. However, Taiwan’s terrain—mountains, forests, and limited road infrastructure—makes maneuvering extremely difficult. A combined approach (airborne + amphibious + air support) is the most plausible. A realistic scenario would see the Chinese air force begin with intensive aerial bombardment of defenses, ensuring the suppression of radars, then using strategic transport to move forces and equipment to captured or temporarily constructed airfields.
Operational limitations and challenges for the PLAAF
Despite its growing capabilities, the PLAAF faces several major constraints in a conflict over Taiwan. First, air-to-air refueling capability remains limited compared to Western forces: even though Y-20 refueling aircraft exist, their numbers and availability in high-threat situations are uncertain. Second, real combat experience is limited: much of the equipment and tactics remain tested in exercises but untried under intense enemy fire. Third, amphibious-air logistics require naval support, operational ports, and maritime control. Taiwan has strengths in coastal defense, anti-ship missile systems, and sea mines. An isolated airborne assault without air and maritime superiority could be difficult. Fourth, Taiwan’s air defenses are modern: Patriot systems, medium-range missiles, advanced radar, and modern fighters such as the F-16V, capable of intercepting or deterring incursions. Finally, the United States and its allies could intervene politically and militarily: intelligence, resupply, logistical support, and even targeted strikes that would complicate the PLAAF’s massive air operations.
Conflict scenarios: what China could actually do
Several scenarios stand out:
- Coercive scenario: intensification of incursions into the ADIZ, flights by bombers and refueling aircraft, threats of a limited air blockade, but without launching an assault. This scenario maximizes the psychological and diplomatic effect while minimizing risks.
- Island hopping scenario: capture of peripheral islands (Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu) via airborne and amphibious forces to isolate Taiwan, cut off supply lines, or reinforce nearby bases.
- Direct entry scenario: massive air launch to neutralize airfields, suppression of air defenses, parachuting or helicoptering in a landing force, followed by a naval or amphibious landing. Very demanding in terms of coordination, logistics, air power, and supply.
For each of these options, the decisive factor is time: rapid control of the air, neutralization of radars, reduction of anti-aircraft missiles, armored vehicles, or enemy ships. Without this temporary superiority, even a large force could be disorganized.
These analyses show that the PLAAF has solid capabilities to conduct a campaign around Taiwan: Y-20 transports, resupply capacity, robust airborne forces. But these capabilities, although growing, do not guarantee the success of a massive assault without naval and logistical coordination, nor without initial air superiority. Chinese doctrine relies on a combination of coercive measures and limited assault options, rather than a conventional large-scale invasion. Control of Taiwan’s electromagnetic spectrum, enemy radars, and anti-aircraft capabilities could become the real tipping point.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.