Technical and quantitative analysis of Russia’s cognitive warfare: challenges, methods, effects, and strategic responses for the United States.
Cognitive warfare aims to manipulate perceptions and discourage opponents without resorting to force. Russia relies on multigenerational campaigns, cyberattacks, and targeted disinformation, particularly through AI. The United States must fight not on the level of isolated facts, but by thwarting the strategic preconditions imposed by Moscow in order to maintain its decision-making autonomy.
Cognitive warfare: definition and scope
Cognitive warfare refers to all techniques aimed at altering an adversary’s perception, reasoning, and strategic choices without directly resorting to military force. It is not just propaganda or isolated disinformation, but a structured, multidimensional, and often difficult-to-detect process. This approach relies on partial truths, manipulation of narratives, cyberattacks, and the exploitation of cognitive and social weaknesses in the targeted societies. It is part of a broader strategy that also includes diplomatic, economic, and military tools.
Unlike conventional warfare, cognitive warfare does not aim to destroy infrastructure or armies, but to influence the enemy’s decisions to their disadvantage by changing their understanding of the world. The central challenge is therefore to construct an alternative reality that is perceived as legitimate by the targets. This warfare can be waged continuously, over several generations and across vast geographical areas, combining traditional media channels, social networks, political discourse, international conferences and multilateral forums.
According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russia consistently applies this method, drawing on the legacy of the Soviet doctrine of reflexive control, which aims to influence enemy decisions by anticipating and manipulating their strategic assumptions. A study published in 2025 indicates that 587 active Russian influence operations were recorded between September 2024 and May 2025, an increase of more than 150% compared to the previous year, which saw 230 such operations. These figures highlight the growing scale of this silent war and its implications for democracies.
The Russian way: a multifaceted and multigenerational framework
Russia’s cognitive warfare strategy is based on a complex and enduring architecture structured around several interdependent axes. This approach is not limited to isolated campaigns, but is part of a coherent, long-term strategic vision that combines psychological influence, control of domestic information, and concrete physical actions.
The first pillar of this method is psychological warfare. The Kremlin believes that victory begins in the mind of the enemy. By spreading deliberately false narratives, such as the fallacious denunciation of Ukrainian neo-Nazism or the alleged ineffectiveness of Western sanctions, Moscow seeks to disorient public opinion and influence the political choices of targeted governments. This type of manipulation relies on repetition, information saturation, and confusion of cognitive reference points.
Secondly, information governance within Russia’s borders plays a key role. Through tight control of the media, social platforms, and education systems, the central government maintains a unified narrative among the population, thereby reducing the risk of dissent. This internal lockdown also makes it possible to mobilize public opinion in favor of external operations, while generating a human and logistical resource base for the war effort.
Finally, Russia’s strategy includes a physical dimension that complements cognitive manipulation. Disinformation campaigns are often combined with targeted cyberattacks, intimidating military exercises, infrastructure sabotage, and recruitment of young people via platforms such as Telegram and Discord. According to Ukrainian sources, more than 700 people involved in sabotage operations have been arrested, nearly 25% of whom were minors, indoctrinated remotely by Russian agents.
The effectiveness of this hybrid approach is remarkable. In the case of the war in Ukraine, cyber disinformation has been implicated in nearly 80% of the tactical impacts observed, thanks in particular to the amplification provided by drones, falsified videos, and campaigns relayed on digital platforms. This sophisticated and evolving model gives Russia an asymmetric capacity for action whose effects extend far beyond the traditional military sphere.
Specific cases and figures
Russia’s cognitive warfare relies on organized, coordinated, and quantifiable campaigns. Several recent events illustrate the scope of this strategy, revealing the scale of the resources mobilized and its concrete effects on the ground, both in Ukraine and in Western Europe.
The “Operation Overload” campaign, documented by several Western observers, is particularly revealing. Between September 2024 and May 2025, 587 pieces of targeted disinformation were identified, compared to 230 the previous year. This represents a 155% increase, signaling a clear intensification of Russian efforts on social media platforms, particularly through content produced using generative artificial intelligence tools. These messages are designed to disrupt the strategic analysis of targeted governments, divert media attention, or accentuate internal divisions in democratic societies.
Another worrying example is the use of social networks such as Telegram and Discord to recruit minors for sabotage operations in Ukraine. In 2024, more than 700 arrests were recorded, and 25% of those arrested were under the age of 18. These teenagers were encouraged to plant explosives, pass on sensitive information, or carry out acts of local sabotage. This tactic reveals a Russian desire to weaken Ukrainian social cohesion while exploiting the psychological vulnerability of very young targets.
The trend is similar in Europe. The number of sabotage operations attributed to Russian networks rose from 12 in 2023 to 34 in 2024, an increase of 183%. These actions have mainly targeted logistics infrastructure, railway centers, and weapons depots intended for Ukraine. They demonstrate an extension of Russian capabilities well beyond the Ukrainian theater.
Finally, a report by the Belfer Institute warns of the prevalence of disinformation in the Baltic states. According to the study, this phenomenon is now the main threat to democratic stability, surpassing even cyber hacking. The repetition of pro-Russian narratives on topics such as national history, Russian-speaking minorities, and state sovereignty aims to weaken trust in institutions and delegitimize electoral processes.
These figures confirm that cognitive warfare is not limited to abstract narratives, but has tangible, quantifiable, and geographically widespread effects.
Consequences: weakening democracies and alliances
The cognitive warfare waged by Russia is having a profound impact on Western democracies, far beyond the military sphere. It is affecting the internal dynamics of states, weakening their ability to respond collectively, and permanently altering the bond between governments and citizens. Three major consequences emerge: strategic paralysis, political disunity, and erosion of public trust.
Firstly, decision-making paralysis. By creating a climate of uncertainty around Russia’s intentions, notably through ambiguous statements on the use of nuclear weapons or the deployment of tactical weapons in Belarus, the Kremlin is slowing down Western military support mechanisms for Ukraine. This strategy aims to slow down equipment deliveries, divide parliamentary opinion, and deter any escalation without having to mobilize its own forces on a large scale.
Second, the cognitive war exacerbates internal divisions between allied states. Moscow is playing on existing fault lines: differences over the effectiveness of sanctions, tensions over the reception of Ukrainian refugees, and inequalities in the distribution of defense spending. These narratives are amplified by opinion leaders, social media, and media outlets linked to Russia. The goal is clear: to weaken the unity of the European Union and NATO by sowing doubt about the legitimacy or sustainability of the commitment against Moscow.
Finally, the most insidious effects concern public opinion. The constant repetition of messages aimed at discrediting institutions, trivializing state violence, or presenting Russia as a victim of the West leads to a gradual weakening of democratic cohesion. This phenomenon is not isolated. It is a cumulative erosion that makes societies more vulnerable to subsequent campaigns and more hesitant to support assertive foreign policies.
Russia’s cognitive warfare does not produce a single shock, but a series of diffuse imbalances that weaken democracies in the long term. It is these internal divisions, skillfully exploited, that today represent Moscow’s main lever for increasing its global influence without direct confrontation.
Possible responses and weaknesses
Faced with a structured and persistent cognitive war, the United States and its allies must adopt a defensive and offensive posture that is strategic, educational, informational, and diplomatic. Responding point by point to Russian campaigns would be ineffective: rather, it is a matter of challenging the cognitive frameworks in which Moscow is attempting to trap Western democracies.
The first priority is to adopt a strategic, not factual response. Correcting every piece of misinformation produced by the Kremlin is tantamount to playing on its own turf. The real challenge is to reject the Russian narrative—for example, the idea that NATO is responsible for the war in Ukraine—and to refuse to reason on the basis of these biased assumptions. This requires strategic discernment and an understanding of Moscow’s real objectives in each campaign.
Second, strengthening digital literacy is essential. This applies to citizens as well as political and administrative elites. It means learning to spot cognitive manipulation techniques, understanding how fake narratives are structured, recognizing vectors of influence (bots, forums, coordinated networks), and strengthening mechanisms of collective psychological resilience. Institutions such as the RAND Corporation and the German Marshall Fund already offer concrete tools in this area.
Third, exposing the flaws in the Russian system is an effective strategy. Highlighting logistical weaknesses, contradictions in official discourse, and the lack of real popular support for the war effort helps to dispel the myth of a monolithic and unshakeable regime. This approach reverses the narrative power balance by reminding us that Russia, far from being all-powerful, is acting in response to its own vulnerabilities.
Finally, transatlantic coordination is essential. This involves pooling monitoring tools (cybersecurity, automated detection of malicious content), sharing databases on suspicious sources, harmonizing counter-narratives at the European and North American levels, and anticipating peaks in cognitive activity (particularly during election periods). Common rapid response mechanisms should be considered so that states are not left alone to face coordinated attacks.
Long-term implications
Cognitive warfare is a continuous process designed to operate over long time scales. Some campaigns are activated, suspended, and then reactivated depending on geopolitical developments. Digital memory and the imprint left by Russian narratives allow them to act with a delayed effect, several years after their creation.
The development of artificial intelligence technologies, in particular text and image generators and deepfakes, greatly increases the threat. Fake videos can be produced in minutes and disseminated on a massive scale. In 2023, a fake statement by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky calling for surrender briefly circulated on several platforms before being denied. But the immediate psychological impact was real.
The fragmentation of the field of action makes the response particularly complex. It is not just a matter of disinformation, but of an operational ecosystem that includes cybersecurity, digital diplomacy, platform regulation, public education, and algorithmic language monitoring. The response cannot therefore be sectoral: it must be comprehensive, coordinated, and interdisciplinary, mobilizing technical experts, lawyers, military personnel, sociologists, and strategic communicators.
This structural complexity is precisely what makes Russia’s cognitive warfare so difficult to counter without a systemic, anticipatory, and transnational strategy.
Cognitive warfare is not a secondary issue; it is becoming the core of Russian strategy, compensating for its military and economic limitations through the systematic manipulation of perceptions. The figures—explosion of content, networks of influence, sabotage in Europe—show the scale of this threat.
To counter this, the United States and its allies must refuse to debate within the Russian narrative framework, strengthen the cognitive resilience of their populations, cooperate closely with allies, and publicly expose the Kremlin’s inconsistencies and weaknesses. It is by maintaining control over the construction of strategic reality that democracies will find a lasting advantage.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.