Each division is set to receive around 1,000 drones by the end of 2026, reversing its reliance on manned aircraft in favor of unmanned systems.
The US Army is undergoing a major transformation: moving from approximately 90% manned aircraft to a target of 1,000 drones per division by the end of 2026. This reorganization is part of the Army Transformation Initiative, led by Secretary Daniel Driscoll and approved by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. This strategy is based on lessons learned from the conflict in Ukraine, where low-cost drones changed the dynamics of the battlefield. The goal is to integrate a dense unmanned fleet for surveillance, attack, logistics, and electronic warfare missions.
Doctrinal and structural transformation
The Hegseth directive mandates that each active division be equipped with approximately 1,000 drones, divided according to well-defined functions: ISR surveillance, attack with loitering munitions, light equipment transport, electronic warfare, and tactical support. Three test brigades have already implemented these capabilities, with the goal of widespread deployment within two years.
At the same time, the army plans to reduce its fleet of manned attack helicopters, such as the AH-64D Apache, which have an estimated cost of $10,000 per hour. This decision is accompanied by the withdrawal of systems deemed inefficient or obsolete (Humvee, MLTV, M10 light tank). The administrative framework is being streamlined, with some command units merged and resources redirected to drone systems.
The model is evolving towards modular “plug-and-play” divisions capable of integrating conventional armed brigades and tactical drones into each mission, forming a mixed continuum guided by a new doctrine. These unmanned drones will now be treated more like ammunition than conventional aircraft: authorization for use has been delegated to subordinate levels to ensure tactical responsiveness. This approach frees frontline units from administrative delays and optimizes the mass effects available in the field.
Technical capabilities and target systems
The transformation is based on “attritable” systems with reduced unit costs. The Replicator initiative aims to deliver thousands of autonomous systems (air, maritime, and counter-UAS) by August 2025. Funding includes $1 billion for suicide attack drones, $1.1 billion for small tactical UAS, and $500 million for anti-drone systems.
The focus is on tactical drones such as the Skydio X2D/RQ-28 or Red Cat Black Widow, designed to be portable, quick to deploy, and capable of carrying light payloads or grenades via automated devices (recently tested in Germany). These systems correspond to Group 1 to Group 3 of the US classification: from micro-UAVs (< 9 kg) to aircraft weighing several hundred kilograms. The budget allocation is massive and the production lines incorporate advanced 3D printing capable of producing 10,000 drones per month, with a move to injection molding planned.
Operational autonomy is enhanced by the use of on-board artificial intelligence, integrating detection, targeting, auto-routing, and auto-decision algorithms, powered by multi-domain tactical networks. These drones can operate in coordinated swarms to overwhelm enemy defenses, carry out precision strikes, or act as relay sensors in complex areas. They are designed to be inexpensive, easily replaceable, and therefore interchangeable in the event of loss.
Operational, logistical, and financial challenges
The transformation plan is estimated at approximately $36 billion over five years, financed without external funding by reallocating resources freed up by the elimination of certain programs. The logistical savings are substantial: no more frequent air refueling, less complex maintenance, and reduced crew sizes.
The ability to maintain a continuous presence in remote areas strengthens deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe without resorting to heavy deployments. For example, a squadron of small platforms could provide 24/7 surveillance, intelligence gathering, terrain reconnaissance, and support to ground or naval forces over areas covering several thousand square kilometers.
However, these transformations require a rethinking of divisional headquarters: creating dedicated UAS cells, integrating data from multiple swarms, and enabling rapid decision-making. Without adapting doctrine and command systems, the mass of information generated by drones could overload current structures.
Logistical challenges include mass production of components (outside China), modular drone maintenance, operator training, and cybersecurity for communications. The US military must also increase its capacity for emergency production via 3D printing and injection molding to ensure a parallel flow to combat wear and tear.
The limits and risks of this transition
This strategic direction is not without risks. The widespread use of cheap drones relies on smooth logistics: if one link in the chain—production, parts, software—is missing, the saturation effect disappears. The model inspired by Ukraine does not guarantee success in a more rigid, bureaucratic, and structured US model. Unit costs are lower, but the volume required demands a robust supply chain.
The US military does not yet have a UAS culture at all levels of command. Personnel must embrace this doctrinal and technological transformation. Programs such as COLDSTAR and tests in rural Europe in 2025 have revealed problems with cold battery performance, cooling, and radio links. Without real-world experience in conflict zones, anticipation remains limited.
Finally, on a strategic level, the increase in the number of drones is changing the balance with adversaries’ capabilities: China is focusing its efforts on autonomous swarms, with the goal of creating an “unmanned hell” in the Taiwan Strait. This means that the US military must not only produce its systems, but also interconnect them with its command, AI, and cyberwarfare assets.
The main risk is that this transformation will become more of a symbol than an operational reality. If tactical, logistical, and doctrinal integration is not mastered, the massive investment could seem disproportionate to the effectiveness achieved.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.