Discover how the USA can influence the use of high-tech weapons supplied to the EU, between software restrictions and strong dependence.
The principle of American dependence
The purchase of weapons and defensive systems from the USA often raises a central question: can the supplier restrict or curb the operation of this equipment, especially when its software component remains proprietary? Various European countries are turning to American products because of their claimed reliability and performance. However, many observers believe that the presence of codes and configurations inaccessible to purchasers makes this equipment vulnerable to unilateral decisions emanating from Washington.
Most modern equipment, whether radar, missiles or combat aircraft, now includes digital components. These elements, often protected by industrial secrets, cannot be manipulated without the designer’s agreement. If a system is maintained via a secure network or requires recurring software validation, the American manufacturer may decide to limit certain functions or block essential updates. This reality fuels doubts about the true operational autonomy of European armies that choose to import such equipment.
The technical scope of control
American technologies generally feature encrypted components and software locks, making local reprogramming impossible without the manufacturer’s approval. Firmware updates, for example, can become a pressure point: an acquiring country must comply with a schedule and content dictated by the company or the US administration. Without approval, the equipment may not function optimally, or may suffer remote-orchestrated failures.
Fighter aircraft such as the F-35 illustrate this phenomenon. Their diagnostic system, called ALIS (Autonomic Logistics Information System), transmits data to servers in the USA. This configuration not only ensures constant monitoring of the fleet, but also enables the manufacturer and the US government to manage access to spare parts, and to activate or deactivate certain performances. The result? Reduced sovereignty for the end-user.
Specialists also point to the dependence maintained via essential parts and subsystems. So, even if a country chooses to maintain its equipment on its own soil, the ordering of critical components remains subject to the exporter. This logistics chain, combined with the proprietary nature of the code, suggests that Washington can influence the actual effectiveness of a system if the political situation so requires.
Concrete examples in the EU
Several members of the European Union have acquired American equipment. Poland, for example, has signed a contract to acquire the Patriot anti-missile system. The project, worth around 3.8 billion euros, includes sophisticated electronic devices and AESA radar. The Poles have been promised access to some of the software, but a critical portion of the source code remains out of reach. In the event of diplomatic tensions, the question arises: could the USA restrict maintenance or block updates?
Belgium, for its part, has opted for the F-35 fighter to replace its aging fleet of F-16s. Each aircraft costs between 80 and 90 million euros, depending on its configuration. Here again, the centralized maintenance mechanism raises fears of dependence on the manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, and the US Air Force. Belgian military officials assert that the country will have the full capacity to use its aircraft. However, the lack of access to the core ALIS software makes complete independence unlikely.
The financial stakes
Beyond operational constraints, the financial issue is crucial. For the United States, arms exports are a major market: in 2022, foreign military sales reached over 150 billion euros, according to several estimates. European countries, for their part, spend over €200 billion a year on defense. A substantial proportion of this is spent on American equipment, considered to be field-proven.
Each contract includes maintenance, support and training costs. In some cases, the vendor retains the right to monitor technical interventions. A country wishing to optimize its equipment must then pay for additional services and comply with imposed licensing terms. This dependence, maintained by the software-based nature of the equipment, results in recurring costs that are difficult to anticipate over the long term.
Risks to sovereignty
The acquisition of so-called “turnkey” weapons from Washington can weaken the sovereignty of client states. If the U.S. decides that a given use is unsuitable, or if a diplomatic context deteriorates, European decision-makers are faced with the threat of service interruption or a drop in performance. The governments concerned may be forced to moderate their foreign policy, fear the loss of essential capabilities, or seek a compromise to guarantee American technical support.
Some cite the precedent of the embargo on spare parts for various systems deployed in the Middle East. The United States has already used its power to ban exports as a means of exerting pressure on allies deemed to be too strategically independent. In the European sphere, there is a risk that the same logic will apply if a geopolitical dispute arises.
Strategic repercussions
The ability to act autonomously is a cornerstone of many nations’ defense policies. The potential ban or partial limitation of high-end equipment can alter the regional balance of power. In the event of a crisis, if a European power were suddenly deprived of crucial updates, its defense would be weakened.
This situation could complicate international collaboration, for example within NATO. European forces, dependent on external technical support, could be forced to adapt their plans. The United States would retain a discreet lever of control, increasing its weight in collective military decisions. Public opinion, sensitive to the question of sovereignty, could then become suspicious of any commitment to intervention if material reliability is not guaranteed.
European autonomy initiatives
Faced with this situation, several European Union countries are seeking to strengthen their production capacities for armaments and critical components. France and Germany have launched joint projects, such as the Next Generation Combat Aircraft (FCAS), in the hope of reducing their dependence on American manufacturers. This program, estimated to cost several tens of billions of euros, aims to design an integrated aircraft and UAVs, with local control of the software. The aim is to ensure that European operators have complete freedom of action in the development and maintenance of these aircraft.
At the same time, start-ups and groups specializing in defense electronics systems are trying to develop solutions specific to the European market. They are striving to create radars, missiles and electronic warfare devices without recourse to American technologies. However, this effort is fraught with difficulties: budgets are sometimes limited, skills are dispersed across several countries, and there is a need to align with NATO standards.
Nevertheless, this approach offers a way of limiting Washington’s role as arbiter in theaters of operation. European states can now validate and modify their systems without having to call on American engineers. What remains to be done, however, is to consolidate industrial cooperation and harmonize military requirements in order to achieve genuine independence.
Some political leaders are calling for the pooling of resources to create a European defense ecosystem. With this in mind, the European Union is encouraging joint financing through the European Defense Fund, which will invest several billion euros in research and development of sovereign equipment. Furthermore, the creation of common standards could reduce the influence of foreign systems and guarantee, at least in the long term, greater freedom of action.
The question remains: can the U.S. activate, at will, a stop or restriction device on military equipment sold to the EU? Given the software logic, it seems plausible that Washington retains significant leverage. This situation places a responsibility on the purchasing states, who must assess the strategic consequences of such a choice. The current drive to develop purely European solutions comes up against the power of the American market, but reflects a growing desire to no longer depend on an external partner for such vital issues.
Experience shows that high technology almost always requires constant software monitoring. If this monitoring is carried out abroad, local control is reduced. EU countries therefore have a duty to examine each contract in terms of on-board code, maintenance agreements and operating licenses. This is not to deny the operational value of an American product, but to clearly understand the implications of such an acquisition.
In the long term, the solution undoubtedly lies in maintaining a balance. European countries can benefit from American advances, while pursuing a policy of developing their own industries. Such a compromise requires sustained investment and increased collaboration between EU partners. Without such a move, effective control over the latest weapons is likely to remain partly dependent on Washington’s wishes.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.