Technical analysis: how Ukrainian marine drones are neutralizing Nebo-M radars in Crimea with precision and innovation.
Ukrainian forces are using unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) to launch bomber drones to neutralize Nebo-M radars in Crimea. This approach, combined with satellite links and FPV drones, increases range, accuracy, and operational impact. It provides a repetitive, cost-effective strike capability that is well suited to contested environments, while highlighting Russian weaknesses in surveillance.
Tactical innovation: marine drones and bomber drones
The use of marine drones (USVs) to launch drone bombers represents a major technical and tactical advance. USVs serve as mobile, autonomous, and inexpensive platforms capable of transporting, relaying, and launching heavier payloads than FPV drones. During the operation on July 1-2, 2025, three components of the Nebo-M radar were destroyed in the Black Sea, on the Crimean side, at an estimated distance of 20 to 50 km from the coastline, without the need for any advance by ships or manned aircraft.
This method combines several advantages:
- Heavier ammunition: USV-launched drone bombers can carry payloads greater than those of an FPV (several hundred grams), enabling them to destroy armored ground installations.
- increased range: the USV extends the area of operation at sea, while the drone bombers can maintain radio contact without blending into the terrain;
- Reusability: USVs can launch several drones per mission, with recovery possible at the end of the flight or after release.
- Resilience to defenses: their small size, low signature, and dispersion make them difficult for Russian SAMs to intercept.
This tactic is part of the rapid evolution of unmanned warfare. The USV connects via Starlink or satellite, then transmits commands to the drone. In early 2025, Ukraine had already demonstrated successful engagements by combining marine drones and AIM-9X air-to-air missiles, notably on a Russian Su-30, then a Mi-8 in December. The recent operation confirms that marine drones are no longer used solely as decoys or suicide bombs, but as stable carriers for multiple, precise strikes on strategic targets.
Neutralization of the Nebo-M radar system: range and vulnerabilities
The Nebo-M is a mobile multiband radar system designed to detect stealth aircraft, ballistic missiles, and high-altitude targets. Developed by the Russian Almaz-Antey group, it entered active service in 2017. The system consists of three main modules: the RLM-M radar (VHF band), the RLM-D radar (L band) and the KU-RLS command post. Each component is mounted on a heavily armored 8×8 chassis. The estimated cost of an operational unit exceeds €90 million.
The RLM-M radar can detect targets up to 600 kilometers away, thanks in particular to its VHF band, which is capable of locking onto certain low-radar-signature aircraft (such as the F-35 or Su-57) at long range. The RLM-D radar complements this detection with more accurate L-band tracking, particularly for guiding surface-to-air missiles such as the S-300 or S-400. Both radars transmit their data to a mobile command center that feeds the air defense system.
The fact that Ukraine targeted this system on the western tip of Crimea is significant. This position provided radar coverage over the western Black Sea, the southern coast of Ukraine, and the transit route for Storm Shadow or SCALP-EG missiles. Its destruction creates a hole in Russia’s detection bubble, making certain approaches more accessible for long-range drones or precision strikes.
The loss of these elements weakens Russia’s ability to anticipate and intercept Ukrainian attacks on strategic points such as the Kerch Bridge, the Dzhankoy ammunition depots, or coastal naval aviation sites. This forces Russian forces to redeploy other systems or change the topology of their radar coverage, with immediate operational and logistical costs.
Cyber-space coordination: communication architecture and real-time control
The effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes in Crimea relies on reliable remote control in an environment where communications are regularly jammed. To coordinate drone bombers launched from USVs (Uncrewed Surface Vessels), Ukraine relies on a hybrid cyber-space architecture combining satellite and local radio frequency links. This configuration allows precise operational control to be maintained, even in an electromagnetically saturated environment.
The system is primarily based on a satellite link carried on board the USV. This uses several redundant channels, including Starlink, to ensure connectivity with ground command centers. The bandwidth provided allows real-time transmission of video streams, navigation data, and mission orders to the drones. On board the drone bomber, the link is then established via line-of-sight radio frequency between the USV and the aircraft, limiting latency and ensuring direct control during the terminal phase.
This model offers several technical advantages:
- The USV acts as a tactical relay at sea, reducing the distance between the operator and the target.
- The available bandwidth allows complex payloads (cameras, targeting sensors, munitions release modules) to be operated.
- The system is difficult to jam, as transmission is from multiple sources, geographically dispersed and with different spectra.
In maritime areas where Russian electronic warfare systems are very present (Murmansk, Krasukha-4), this architecture reduces the probability of loss of connection, which remains the main weakness of an unmanned system. It also allows for mission readjustment in flight if the mobile target or defenses are denser than expected.
In comparison, conventional FPV drones are often limited to a range of 5 or 6 kilometers. With this hybrid setup, drone bombers can operate more than 50 kilometers from the coast, with greater accuracy and a multiple strike rate per mission, thanks to their ability to carry multiple munitions.
The Russians have recognized the effectiveness of this approach. Telegram channels such as Two Majors have confirmed the drones’ ability to carry out multiple strikes from a single airframe and have called for enhanced electronic countermeasures and air patrols along the Crimean coast.
This cyber-spatial model demonstrates that naval and air combat in 2025 will no longer rely solely on conventional combat platforms, but on distributed networks that are mobile, autonomous, and capable of generating decisive effects with limited operational costs and virtually no human risk.
The medium-term military and strategic consequences for Russia
The confirmed destruction of a Nebo-M system by a Ukrainian drone bomber launched from a surface drone has direct strategic implications for Russia on several levels. It affects the coherence of Crimea’s radar coverage, Russia’s air response capability, and the credibility of the anti-access defense system (A2/AD) in place in the south.
The Nebo-M, in its full operational configuration, feeds the S-300PMU2 and S-400 Triumph systems. It is an essential component of Russia’s A2/AD system, designed to prevent enemy aircraft from approaching within a radius of 250 to 400 kilometers around the peninsula. The simultaneous destruction of the RLM-M, RLM-D and command post directly disrupts this coverage network. In the very short term, this creates a blind spot in western Crimea, particularly over the Kherson Oblast, the Dnieper islands and the Yevpatoriya coast.
Militarily, this disruption has two consequences:
- Reduced interception capability of SCALP-EG or Storm Shadow missiles, used from Mirage 2000D or modernized Su-24 aircraft. These weapons, with low-altitude penetration and a range of 250 to 300 kilometers, become more difficult to detect in time without long-range sensors.
- Increased vulnerability of Russian airfields, such as those in Belbek and Dzhankoy, which are often targeted by Ukraine to destroy Su-30SM and Su-34 multirole fighters and reconnaissance aircraft.
From a strategic point of view, these losses are forcing the Russian military command to reallocate mobile radar systems from other sectors, which is destabilizing its defenses in other sensitive regions, particularly Donbass and the border area with Kuban. This also means reinforcing air surveillance with AWACS aircraft, whose available fleet is limited and several of which have already been damaged or destroyed in the last two years.
The psychological effect is not insignificant. The strike demonstrates that Russia no longer has complete control over its strategic rear in Crimea, which undermines its message that it has secured the territory. It also gives Ukraine a tool for political pressure in the run-up to negotiations, demonstrating its capacity to strike regularly at high-value military assets at low cost.
Finally, the impact is also doctrinal. The vulnerability of a strategic radar system, supposed to be mobile and protected, to a remote-controlled device weighing less than a ton launched from an unmanned boat calls into question traditional anti-drone protection schemes. This is forcing Russia to adapt its rules of engagement, extend its patrol areas, and review the organization of its detection and engagement perimeters—which implies increased consumption of tactical resources and fragmentation of its defense capabilities.
Towards a new doctrine: the tactical integration of marine and aerial drones
The operation carried out in early July 2025 by Ukrainian forces in Crimea marks a step change in the tactical use of unmanned systems. The combination of marine drones (USVs) and aerial drones (UAV bombers) now constitutes a replicable, scalable model capable of having a measurable strategic effect without exposing pilots or manned aircraft.
This system is based on three solid technical pillars:
- platform modularity: the same USV can be used for different functions (kamikaze, relay, air-to-air firing, drone launch) by adapting its payload.
- consistent communication system: satellite for the operator/platform link, local radio for short-range control, ensuring mission continuity even in a jammed environment.
- economic optimization: with an estimated unit cost of $250,000 to $400,000 for a fully equipped Magura V7 USV, and $15,000 to $30,000 for a multi-munitions drone bomber, coordinated strikes offer a favorable cost-effectiveness ratio compared to the use of cruise missiles.
This approach also makes it possible to increase the density of strikes over a short period of time through saturation. A single USV can launch several successive drones, each capable of carrying out multiple strikes per mission, which complicates the enemy’s defense. This decentralized model is less vulnerable to the neutralization of a single access point. It meets the current constraints of the battlefield: rapid deployment, adaptability, low cost, and reduced logistics.
There are many operational lessons to be learned for Ukraine, but also for Western armies that are closely watching these campaigns:
- The effectiveness of unmanned platforms depends above all on their interoperability and multi-level coordination, rather than their pure autonomy.
- The cumulative effect of light but repeated strikes on key points (radar, logistics, communications) can erode the enemy’s operational capacity over time.
- The combination of marine drones and aerial drones creates a new layer of low-cost autonomous engagement between long-range artillery strikes and strategic missiles.
In the medium term, this type of doctrine paves the way for the standardization of hybrid platforms, integrating attack capabilities (drones, missiles), detection capabilities (onboard radars), and electronic warfare capabilities (directional jammers). This model can be adapted to coastal defense, asymmetric naval warfare, and even to project effects deep into occupied territory.
The conflict in Ukraine is therefore acting as an open-air tactical laboratory. This latest example in Crimea shows that decentralized innovations, driven by a need for strategic survival, can profoundly change the conduct of modern operations, to the detriment of heavy, expensive, and rigid systems.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.