Ukrainian long-range drones are targeting Russian refineries, cutting refining capacity and shifting the center of gravity of the conflict more than 1,000 km.
In Summary
For several months, Ukraine has been conducting a campaign of long-range drone strikes against energy targets in Russia: refineries, fuel depots, and logistics hubs. These drones are designed, assembled, and launched on Ukrainian territory, often at discreet locations at night, and can now reach targets more than 1,000 kilometers away. Ukrainian authorities claim to have carried out more than 160 successful strikes against Russian oil infrastructure since the beginning of 2025. These strikes have hit at least 16 major refining sites, representing approximately 38% of the country’s nominal refining capacity, according to estimates reported by Western analysts. This has led to gasoline shortages in several Russian regions, local rationing, and a decline in diesel and kerosene exports, while forcing Moscow to divert its air defenses away from the front line. Ukrainian drones are inexpensive (around €55,000 each), are manufactured in a network of workshops, and can be continuously adapted. The strategic objective is clear: to wear Russia down through logistical and financial attrition, degrade its ability to sustain the war effort, and make its territory vulnerable in depth.
The discreet modus operandi of Ukrainian long-range drones
The first key element is the operational method. Ukrainian units assemble and deploy Ukrainian long-range drones in secret rural locations. The teams operate at night, using red-light headlamps to limit visual and infrared detection. The procedures remain simple and straightforward: mechanical checks, starting piston engines comparable to those of small motorcycles, then successive takeoffs from improvised runways. The aircraft then head east toward Russian territory. This scene shows artisanal industrialization: no air-conditioned hangars, no heavy assembly lines, but a distributed production capacity, spread out across workshops, and therefore resilient to Russian strikes. Ukrainian military engineers use available civilian components, parts from several local suppliers, and make quick adjustments between flights. This means that Kyiv has been able to circumvent one of the key points of modern warfare: dependence on a large, centralized industrial base that is easy to target.
Ukraine claims to have carried out more than 160 successful strikes against Russian oil and energy infrastructure since the beginning of 2025, according to the head of the Ukrainian Security Service. These strikes have not targeted isolated garrisons, but sites critical to the Russian war economy: refineries, fuel depots, and rail hubs used to transport military diesel. The consequences are visible within Russia. Some regions have imposed gasoline rationing and limited individual fuel sales. Gas stations have reported gasoline shortages in oblasts close to and far from the front, including in Crimea, where the occupying authorities have had to restrict fuel sales to the population. These developments have been confirmed by Russian field reports and relayed by Western economic agencies.
This tactical choice is rational. By targeting energy and logistics infrastructure, Kyiv is striking at the source of Russia’s supply chain. Fuel powers tanks, ammunition trucks, attack aircraft, and bombers. When fuel runs out, operations slow down. The Russian military’s dependence on diesel fuel from refineries sometimes located hundreds of kilometers from the front line creates an exploitable weakness, and Ukraine is exploiting it.
Direct pressure on Russian refineries and the fuel market
Ukrainian drones have struck at least 16 major Russian refineries, representing about 38% of the country’s theoretical refining capacity. This figure does not mean that 38% of Russia’s fuel has disappeared, but that a significant portion of Russia’s oil industry has become vulnerable to repeated disruptions. The strikes have hit heavy sites such as Ryazan, Volgograd, and large petrochemical complexes. Some of these plants each process several million tons of crude oil per year, representing volumes of several million liters per day once refined. Russian authorities have acknowledged fires, damage to hydrocracking units and rail loading ramps, and temporary suspensions of activity.
Western assessments remain cautious. Think tanks such as Carnegie and energy analysts point out that Russia still has reserve capacity and that some of the affected refineries resumed partial production after a few weeks. Moscow has also diverted crude oil to less exposed facilities and used strategic fuel stocks to smooth out the short-term effect. But this reasoning masks two critical points.
First, repairs are costly and slow. Restoring a modern refining unit is not a matter of changing a leaky pipe. A hydrocracking or hydrotreating unit involves high-pressure and high-temperature equipment (several hundred degrees Celsius), which requires specific metallurgical parts. These parts often come from suppliers subject to Western sanctions. This creates a supply bottleneck. Energy analysts estimate that some units will remain partially shut down until 2026, representing a lasting loss of Russian crude processing capacity of around 500,000 barrels per day (approximately 79,500 m³ per day).
Second point: the internal effect. The strikes have led to gasoline shortages, price increases at the pump of more than 40% in some Russian regions in 2025, and fuel export restrictions decided by the Kremlin to stabilize the domestic market. Russia has even temporarily limited its exports of gasoline and diesel, which is weighing on its foreign exchange earnings. This economic pressure is direct. It reduces the budgetary margin available to finance the war effort, including salaries for contractors, bonuses paid to artillery crews, and subsidies to ammunition factories.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claims that these strikes have caused up to 20% of Russian gasoline supplies to be lost. Kyiv is therefore pursuing a clearly stated strategy of energy deprivation: hitting Russian fuel at the source, forcing Moscow to import expensive refined fuel, and compelling Russia to redirect its air defenses away from the front lines.
Increased operational range and technological advances in drones
A crucial factor is range. Ukrainian operators explain that drones that used to travel only 500 kilometers (about 310 miles) now reach 1,000 kilometers, an operational radius covering industrial targets deep within the Russian Federation, sometimes east of Moscow and as far as the Volga or Ural regions. This extended range is changing the map of the war. Russia’s strategic depth is no longer secure. Industrial facilities, depots, and refineries hundreds of kilometers from the border are now under threat at night, without the intervention of Ukrainian piloted aircraft.
This technical advancement is the result of three factors cited by Ukrainian operators themselves: the drone, the human factor, and the plan. First, the drone. The airframes are relatively simple: tubular fuselage, rear propeller, triangular tail. The engine is a basic, air-cooled piston engine that runs on regular fuel. Next, the human factor. Teams work in small numbers, with strict discipline. Finally, the plan. Each mission requires meticulous preparation: mapping Russian air defenses, choosing low-altitude approaches, radar avoidance trajectories, and GPS jamming management. This tactical sophistication contrasts with the unit cost of the drones.
The gross success rate remains limited: the Ukrainian army acknowledges that “less than 30%” of drones actually reach the target area. This reflects the density of Russian defenses: electronic warfare, anti-aircraft guns, short-range surface-to-air missiles, piloted interceptors, and radar networks spread across several regions. But even a 30% success rate can be sufficient if the launch volume is high and the unit cost remains low. A salvo of 20 drones at €55,000 each represents €1.1 million. Firing modern surface-to-air missiles costing several hundred thousand euros each, or even more, erodes the Russian defense economy over time. It is no longer just a matter of physical destruction. It is a matter of budgetary attrition.
Finally, these drones have become a political tool. Kyiv is proving its ability to hit deep targets without resorting to cruise missiles supplied by its allies, which are subject to political veto. This strengthens its operational autonomy vis-à-vis the United States and European countries, which are sometimes reluctant to authorize the use of long-range missiles on Russian territory.
Industrial logic: the Liutyi drone as a rational war product
The Liutyi drone (often spelled Liutiy or Lyutyi) illustrates this logic. Described as a long-range aircraft capable of carrying a significant explosive payload over approximately 1,000 kilometers, it has become one of the main vectors for strikes on Russian refineries. It is sometimes compared to the Shahed-136 drones used by Russia, but with Ukrainian adaptations. Industrial and military sources describe it as a drone powered by a single combustion engine, guided by a combination of inertial navigation, satellite support and, increasingly, software assistance from artificial intelligence for terminal navigation or jamming compensation.
The announced cost for some recent operational models is around $55,000, or approximately €55,000 given the current exchange rate of close to $1 to €1 in the fall of 2025. At this price, we are talking about a long-range attack system capable of hitting a refinery located 800 or 1,000 kilometers away, i.e., very far from the front line, for the cost of a new utility vehicle. By way of comparison, a Western long-range air-to-ground cruise missile can cost several hundred thousand euros, or even more than a million euros per unit. The cost difference completely changes the economic equation of strategic strikes.
The production method is also revealing. The Liutyi is not produced in a single giant factory, but in a network of assembly sites, including semi-industrial workshops that manufacture sub-assemblies (airframe, tail, avionics modules, warhead). This makes production more difficult to halt by Russian retaliatory strikes. It also promotes incremental design evolution: greater range, better resistance to jamming, reduced radar signature. This industrial flexibility is reminiscent of the logic of micro-factories producing loitering munitions or suicide drones already seen in other conflicts, but Ukraine is applying it on a strategic scale, directly targeting the Russian energy economy.
As a direct consequence, Moscow must now deploy its air defenses not only around logistics hubs and depots near the front line, but also around the energy sites that support its war machine. This dilutes its local defense density. It is a concrete and measurable military development.
The transformation of the front: a war entering Russian territory
Security analysts point out that Russia has long considered its territory a sanctuary. The massive, daily bombardments targeted Ukraine; the interior of Russia remained relatively calm, apart from a few symbolic strikes. That pattern is over. Ukrainian drones struck up to 13 Russian airports in a single night, leading to the temporary suspension of commercial air traffic in several regions, including the Moscow region. Some raids also targeted strategic air bases, such as during Operation Spiderweb, which reportedly damaged or destroyed several Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 heavy bombers more than 1,000 kilometers from Ukraine. These aircraft are used to launch cruise missile strikes against Ukrainian cities.
The strategic message is clear: Ukraine is seeking to impose a direct cost on Russia’s depth, not just to contain forces at the front. This is referred to as deliberate logistical attrition. Forcing Moscow to defend refineries, fuel depots, petrochemical sites, rail hubs, and distant air bases means forcing Moscow to disperse its modern ground-to-air defense systems. However, these systems are not infinite. High-performance surface-to-air missiles, capable of intercepting low-altitude drones, are expensive to produce and often rely on a supply chain that is subject to sanctions.
This deep penetration also has an internal political effect in Russia. Russian public opinion is accustomed to the idea of war “elsewhere.” Seeing a local refinery burn, experiencing gasoline shortages, or learning that the regional airport is temporarily closed due to a drone alert is a different experience. This can create social irritation, questions about the effectiveness of air defense, and criticism of the military command. The Russian authorities must then arbitrate between censorship and managing economic discontent. This internal pressure is not a side effect. It is one of the goals.
From a purely military point of view, this Ukrainian capability reduces Russia’s freedom of action. An army that must simultaneously protect its strategic air bases, rail hubs, and refineries 800 or 1,000 kilometers from the front cannot concentrate all its defenses above the troops engaged. This is a structural constraint that weighs heavily over time.
The operational, economic, and political consequences of the drone campaign
This drone campaign has three major consequences.
First consequence: Russia’s energy constraints. Russia’s refining capacity was reduced by approximately 500,000 barrels per day (approximately 79,500 m³/day) in the fall of 2025, according to the International Energy Agency. This level of loss is not expected to be fully recovered before mid-2026. This means that Russia will have to import more refined fuel or redirect crude oil to more distant and potentially less efficient facilities. This is a lasting strain on its war economy.
The second consequence is the Western response. Western allies have stepped up sanctions on Russian oil giants and restricted Russia’s access to the technology needed to quickly repair its refineries. Washington and Brussels know that the oil sector is financing Russia’s military effort. Let’s put it simply: cutting Russia’s refining capacity reduces the cash available to pay for bombs that then fall on Kharkiv or Odessa. It’s brutal, but it’s true.
Third consequence: Ukrainian strategic autonomy. Kyiv is showing that it can strike far away without waiting for Western approval to use long-range missiles such as Tomahawks. The drones are designed locally, modified locally, and launched locally. This technical autonomy reduces the political leverage of Western allies over the Ukrainian operational tempo. It comes at a human cost: operators speak openly about the fact that they are learning “on the job,” that they are losing comrades, and that they consider the mission a moral obligation to their children. This rhetoric is not military marketing. It reflects a reality: Ukraine has understood that it cannot afford to wage a purely defensive war. It must impose a direct cost on Russia, on Russian territory, and it is doing so.
However, this strategy carries a risk. As strikes penetrate deeper into Russia, Moscow may seek to respond symmetrically or asymmetrically, including against civilian sites in Ukraine or against Western interests considered to be complicit. We are not just talking about ballistic missiles. We are talking about cyberattacks, electronic warfare against European energy networks, or clandestine actions on NATO soil. The geographical extension of the conflict therefore increases the likelihood of serious international incidents.
One final point: this campaign is setting a global precedent. Ukraine is lending credibility to the idea that a country without air superiority can inflict profound strategic damage on the territory of a better-equipped adversary, using relatively inexpensive, mass-produced drones guided by artificial intelligence and launched by small mobile teams. Military leaders are watching. Manufacturers are watching too. The market for low-cost, long-range attack drones is already emerging, with offers where a craft capable of flying 750 kilometers with a military payload costs less than $30,000 each (around €30,000), thanks to simplified architecture and minimal avionics. The effect is simple: saturate the enemy’s defenses and force them to waste expensive interceptors.
This development will weigh heavily on all high-intensity conflicts in the coming years: the Baltic, the Middle East, and the China Sea. Ground-to-air defenses will have to integrate the threat of dozens of drones costing €55,000 each rather than a few cruise missiles costing several million. Refineries, fuel depots, rail hubs, and airports will no longer be considered rear sanctuaries. They will become part of the battlefield.
Sources:
Associated Press
International Energy Agency
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Bloomberg
The Moscow Times
Financial Times
Kyiv Post
Reuters
Business Ukraine Magazine
RANE
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.