Financial, technological, and export constraints make a 100% Dassault 6th generation aircraft illusory, despite the ambition. Key figures and partnerships.
In summary
Éric Trappier’s statement that Dassault Aviation could design a 6th generation aircraft “all by itself from A to Z” comes amid tensions within the SCAF/FCAS. The ambition faces three obstacles: financing, industrialization, and market access. The scale of competing programs (the American NGAD, the Anglo-Italian-Japanese GCAP) exceeds what a single European country can sustainably support. Key technologies—advanced stealth, embedded AI, combat cloud, multispectral sensors, adaptive cycle engines—require deep supply chains and a critical mass of skills that the French base alone cannot fully cover. Finally, without partners, amortization through exports would be riskier, given better-equipped competitors and tight schedules. Dassault retains major advantages as an integrator, but the 6th generation aircraft is a system of systems where cooperation determines credibility, cost, and timeframe.
The context of the statement and the status of SCAF/FCAS
Éric Trappier’s departure comes after months of industrial and political wrangling within the Future Air Combat System. Shared governance with Airbus Defence and Space and the entry of Spain have complicated the distribution of responsibilities for the NGF (Next Generation Fighter), Remote Carriers, and the combat cloud. In the background, Berlin has publicly expressed its doubts, while raising the possibility of alternative paths if the balance of power does not shift. This climate explains Dassault’s message of assurance: France would be able to do it if cooperation stalls. In terms of communication, the effect is real; in terms of programming, the structural constraints remain.
The financial framework: a budgetary wall
The first obstacle can be quantified. The American NGAD has seen its unit estimates reach the $300 million per aircraft mark, with a multi-year investment trajectory of tens of billions for the U.S. Air Force alone. The GCAP aims to enter service by 2035, with a massive national effort in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan, already debated in the British Parliament. For its part, the 2024-2030 military programming law sets a budget of €413 billion for all branches of the armed forces in France, with a defense mission budget of €50.5 billion in 2025 (excluding pensions) and a target of around €67 billion in 2030.
As a benchmark, the Rafale—a multigenerational program launched in the 1980s—represents a cumulative cost of around €46 to €47 billion for a historic target of 286 aircraft, with a unit production cost long estimated at close to €100 million. The sixth-generation aircraft adds new technological building blocks, lower initial volumes, and a “system-of-systems” scope that includes accompanying drones, sovereign networks, and tactical cloud computing. In other words, the financial equation of a purely national program would be disproportionate to the French budgetary framework, even if it were increased. Without European pooling, there is a risk of a protracted pace, reconfigurations of requirements, and additional costs that would undermine sustainability.
The industrial constraint: too narrow a base alone
The second barrier is industrial. A 6th-generation fighter is not just a stealth airframe. It is a supply chain hub spanning propulsion, materials, microelectronics, sensors, data links, cybersecurity, actuators, real-time software, and testing. Propulsion is a case in point. The NGF engine is being developed by a Safran-MTU-ITP alliance, with performance and endurance targets specific to 2040+ standards. An adaptive cycle engine is not an upgrade of the current M88: it is a different technological class, to be developed using rare and costly testing resources.
In terms of sensors, France has leading players (Thales for AESA radar, IRST, electronic warfare). But the move towards certifiable embedded AI, modular architectures, and safety-critical software on a system-of-systems scale requires broad ecosystems: universities, deep-tech SMEs, foundries, specialists in hardened components, crypto specialists, and resilient links. Total autonomy would require securing capabilities that are currently scattered across Europe in France, or under French control.
Sixth-generation technology: a system-of-systems that is costly to integrate
The technological leap concentrates the risks. In addition to the stealth cell, there is the fusion of multi-band sensors, adaptive electronic warfare suites, new-generation weapons, escort drones, and a combat cloud interconnecting sensors, effectors, and C2. This approach changes everything: the value lies in the architecture, interoperability, and resilience of the network. It requires standards, APIs, integration benches, distributed simulators, and progressive testing campaigns. The cost of integration is growing faster than the cost of subassemblies, especially when cybersecurity, anti-jamming, and data sovereignty become cardinal requirements.
The schedule and the risks of slippage
A 6th generation fighter jet takes 15 to 20 years from initial studies to credible combat capabilities. Comparable programs have already slipped. US budget debates have led to the rescheduling of NGAD; on the GCAP side, the 2035 target is regularly questioned. The longer the schedule is extended, the heavier the annual financial burden becomes: maintaining teams, extending testing, compensating for technical obsolescence, and inflation of critical components. On its own, France would bear the brunt of these uncertainties—a risky asymmetry regardless of Dassault’s industrial commitment.
Export constraints: market, politics, and governance
The third obstacle is commercial and political. A purely national program automatically reduces the initial customer base to the French government and possibly a few partners willing to accept a 100% customer position. However, the price competitiveness of such a complex system depends on margins on volumes and the pooling of support. Partners provide initial “domestic” orders, support relays, maintenance chains, and training schools—all of which lower the total cost of ownership.
Political sensitivities must also be taken into account. Recurring controversies over export vetoes within Eurofighter have shown that poorly regulated governance can block sales, or conversely unblock them when the political line changes. A clear-headed cooperation architecture must take these realities into account: export clauses, intellectual property rules, arbitration mechanisms. Conversely, a purely French program would avoid certain vetoes, but would deprive the aircraft of a pan-European commercial network that is useful for amortizing development costs.
Lessons from the Rafale and the realistic approach
The Rafale proves that France knows how to lead a major program, export it, and develop it (F3R, F4, F5). But this history is based on decades of established supply chains, a mature standard, and a mastered architecture. The 6th generation approach combines advanced stealth, increased endurance, saturated connectivity, teaming logic with drones, and onboard AI. It requires a shift from a highly integrated aircraft to a highly distributed and scalable airborne system. This naturally exceeds the scope of a single manufacturer, even a leader.
This is the meaning behind the pillars of SCAF/FCAS: NGF, Remote Carriers, combat cloud, propulsion, sensors, stealth, and weapons. Each pillar has a “champion” and an ecosystem. This organization is not diplomatic posturing; it is a response to complexity.
What Dassault can do on its own… and what requires allies
Dassault has the assets to lead the design of the airframe, systems integration, cockpit ergonomics, flight testing, and aeronautical certification. The company knows how to industrialize at a sustained pace, manage a multi-standard configuration, export, and provide support on several continents. From a purely aeronautical standpoint, its expertise is undeniable.
But next-generation propulsion, power electronics, certain advanced materials, critical semiconductor supply chains, next-generation electronic warfare, mesh datalinks, and sovereign software architectures require critical mass and deep industrial partnerships. The players exist in France and Europe; the challenge is to bring them together under clear governance. Without them, the aircraft would be, at best, a costly demonstrator; at worst, a program with revised ambitions.
The consequences of a national “plan B”
A “go-it-alone” scenario would probably lead to a refocusing: upgrading the Rafale F5/F6, launching a stealth drone based on nEUROn, strengthening data links, introducing technological sovereignty components (sensors, cryptography, tactical cloud), and preparing for the gradual integration of “loyal wingmen.” Technically pragmatic, politically acceptable, but it would not tick all the boxes for a complete 6th generation fighter by 2040. At the same time, the international landscape would be advancing: the American NGAD, the GCAP/Tempest and their “systems of systems” would structure standards, set prices and capture the first export markets.
A strategic challenge: remaining the leader… by accepting cooperation
The question is not whether Dassault “can” design an aircraft; it is whether France wants to and can finance, industrialize, and sell a 6th generation aircraft system with its companion drones and combat cloud on its own. The figures, value chains, and time horizons argue for a negative answer. The realistic path combines strong project management on the part of Dassault, consolidation of roles with Airbus and key partners, and governance safeguards on intellectual property and exports. It is under these conditions that French industry will retain control over the architecture, while spreading the risk, expanding the market, and accelerating commissioning.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.