Developing, maintaining, and modernizing a nuclear arsenal costs a fortune. Here are the actual costs, public figures, and blind spots.
In summary
A nuclear weapons program is not a “budget line item” but an industrial, human, and technical machine that runs nonstop. The total cost begins well before the first warhead, with research, fissile materials, safety, and infrastructure. It then skyrockets with delivery systems (missiles, submarines, bombers), production lines, training, alert posture, and maintenance. Public figures from the US provide a useful order of magnitude: between 1940 and 1996, the total cost exceeded $5.8 trillion, with the share dedicated to the warheads themselves remaining a minority. Today, modernization is once again becoming a bottomless pit: the US budget projection for 2025–2034 is approaching $946 billion. Added to this are costs that are difficult to quantify: cyber, intelligence, physical security, network hardening, and above all, industrial and environmental legacy. The question is not only “how much,” but “how long” and “at what cost.”
The total cost, a mille-feuille that far exceeds warheads
Talking about the cost of a military nuclear program while only looking at nuclear warheads is a classic mistake. States pay above all to make the weapon “usable,” credible, and available on command. This is the heart of nuclear deterrence: a capability that must function even if the country is struck, disrupted, or partially paralyzed.
There is a historical order of magnitude, and it is brutal. A widely cited summary of US spending from 1940 to 1996 comes to more than $5.8 trillion (in constant dollars). Of this sum, the portion devoted to the development, testing, and manufacture of bombs and warheads is reported to be very small, while delivery systems and associated systems account for the majority.
The message to take away is simple: “military nuclear” is an ecosystem. If you cut one layer, you undermine the credibility of the whole. And if you want to modernize, you pay for all the layers at the same time.
The development phase: a very high entry cost
Building nuclear military capability is not just a matter of “knowing how to make a bomb.” It requires:
- a scientific and industrial base (physics, materials, rugged electronics, metrology);
- sensitive infrastructure (laboratories, workshops, security, radiation protection);
- a supply chain for fissile materials and special components;
- a culture of extreme safety and quality control, which cannot be improvised.
Even when a country already has a civilian nuclear program, the bar is high. Military standards, tolerances, and constraints are not the same. Militarization also requires secrecy, controls, and segmentation of industrial chains, which makes everything more expensive.
Another point that is rarely stated clearly is that the development phase “eats up” budgets even before the weapon is deployed. You pay teams for years, sometimes decades, before the capability is operational. And if you want to reduce the risk of failure, you finance redundancies.
Delivery systems, the item that consumes the largest share of budgets
In historical aggregates, delivery systems often account for the largest share. The logic is mechanical: a ballistic missile, a missile-launching submarine, a strategic bomber, or a missile base are complex systems that are expensive to design, build, maintain, and modernize.
The American case is illuminating because the items are documented: from 1940 to 1996, a large portion of spending was associated with delivery systems and their deployment.
Today, the modernization of the nuclear triad remains a massive undertaking, as it involves platforms that take a long time to manufacture and qualify, and are designed to last 30 to 50 years.
This point applies to all countries: the more demanding the posture (permanent presence at sea, alerts, rotations), the higher the cost. Equipment ages.
So do skills. This means that continuous reinvestment is necessary.
Operational maintenance, the invisible everyday costs
An arsenal never “sleeps.” Operational maintenance, logistics, inspections, non-nuclear tests, surveillance, and training all come at a cost every year. Even with few warheads, the fixed costs remain high.
A US budget projection for 2025–2034 estimates the total cost at $946 billion over ten years, or about $95 billion per year, including operations, support, and modernization.
The published breakdown highlights a large “operate and support” block ($357 billion) and another “modernize systems” block (309 billion), plus laboratory infrastructure and command and warning modernization.
Readers need to understand one thing: this expenditure is not a one-off spike. It is a curve that does not come back down. And when a generation reaches the end of its life, the bill goes up a notch.
Security and safety, the most underestimated layer
Credibility depends on the ability to “operate at will,” i.e., to survive a crisis. This requires high levels of physical security and safety:
- guarding and specialized units;
- access control, perimeters, sensors, hardening;
- secure transport;
- two-person rule procedures, checks, audits;
- prevention of insider threats.
Added to this is cyber and electromagnetic hardening. Networks must operate in a contested environment. Components must be qualified, sometimes remanufactured, sometimes recertified. This layer grows over time, as threats evolve faster than platforms.
Command and control, the expense that decides everything
Without NC3, there can be no credible arsenal. It is not enough to have weapons. It is necessary to be able to give orders, verify orders, prevent illegitimate orders, transmit information, and continue after a major shock.
Recent U.S. budget documents highlight a specific item for the modernization of command, control, communications, and warning systems.
A U.S. Congressional reference document cites a CBO estimate of $154 billion (2025–2034) for NC3 support and modernization efforts.
This item is a “multiplier”: if you neglect it, you weaken the entire posture. And if you improve it, you pay for space equipment, radars, networks, centers, software, teams, and exercises. Very expensive. And very sustainable.
Modernization: a political as well as a technical obligation
Arsenals are aging. Submarines are aging. Missiles are aging. Guidance and communication systems and industrial chains are aging. Even if a warhead can be extended, everything around it wears out.
Modernization is therefore a form of debt. You can put it off, but then you pay more and faster. The CBO’s projection of $946 billion over ten years illustrates this looming wall: part of the increase is associated with new programs and cost overruns.
Globally, the trend is the same: states are modernizing, sometimes expanding, and reinvesting in production lines. SIPRI highlights the dynamics of modernization and replacement of systems, particularly among the two main arsenal holders.
Industrial infrastructure: the fixed-cost trap
A military nuclear program is like a high-tech industry “under a bell jar.” Rare skills must be maintained. Specific facilities are required. Qualified suppliers, sometimes unique, are needed. Low production rates must also be accepted, which increases the cost of each part.
A telling example: the rebuilding of production capacity for sensitive components, such as certain plutonium parts, is described by US regulatory agencies as difficult to quantify and prone to schedule and cost overruns.
The root of the problem is structural: if you lose the expertise, you pay dearly to rebuild it. And in the meantime, you also pay to maintain what you have.
The environmental legacy: a bill that spans generations
Nuclear programs leave behind waste, contaminated soil, facilities that need to be dismantled, and legal responsibilities. This is the most politically toxic aspect, and therefore often underreported, but it can reach staggering amounts.
An official document on the Hanford site in the US, a major legacy of plutonium production, estimates the remaining costs to be in the range of approximately $364 billion to $589 billion.
And again, this figure is an estimate, dependent on technical choices and timelines.
This point changes the interpretation of the “full cost”: part of the expenditure does not purchase any future capacity. It pays for the past. It is a balance sheet cost, but a very real one.
The global cost, a weak but steadily rising signal
Although transparency varies, one public indicator exists: the annual expenditure of nuclear-armed countries. An ICAN report estimates that in 2024, the nine nuclear-armed states spent $100.2 billion, up about 11% year-on-year.
The same set of sources also highlights the importance of private contracts and the associated industrial economy.
This figure does not give the “creation” cost of a new arsenal. But it does say something else: once you’re in, there’s no cheap way out. You pay every year, even in the absence of a crisis.
The real issue: opportunity cost and long-term dependence
The most honest question is this: what are we giving up in order to finance this? The answer depends on the country, but the mechanics are the same. An arsenal requires stable budgets, rare skills, and lasting political priority.
The more ambitious your posture, the more you pay:
- permanence at sea, or alert posture;
- diversification of vectors;
- redundancy of transmissions;
- hardening against cyber and jamming.
And the smaller your arsenal, the higher the fixed costs “per weapon.” It’s counterintuitive, but common: the industrial base and security cost almost as much, regardless of the number of warheads.
What the US figures and global trends show is a simple truth: military nuclear weapons are a financial commitment lasting several decades. It is not a decision for a single term of office. It is a decision for a generation, with a bill that outlives governments and sometimes even strategies.
Sources
- National Threat Initiative (NTI) / Brookings, “The Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” September 30, 2008.
- Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2025 to 2034,” April 24, 2025 (and associated PDF report).
- Reuters, “US nuclear force costs projected to soar to $946 billion through 2034, CBO says,” April 24, 2025.
- ICAN, “Hidden Costs: Nuclear Weapons Spending in 2024” (page + Executive Summary PDF), 2025.
- SIPRI, “SIPRI Yearbook 2024” (chapter World nuclear forces + press release), 2024.
- Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3),” January 8, 2026.
- U.S. GAO, “Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Does Not Have a Comprehensive Schedule or Cost Estimate for Pit Production Capability” (GAO-23-104661), January 12, 2023.
- U.S. DOE, “Hanford Lifecycle Scope, Schedule, and Cost Report” (2025 edition, PDF).
- Brookings, “Maintaining Our Nuclear Arsenal is Expensive,” March 26, 1997.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.