In Ukraine, 12,000 North Korean soldiers are supporting Russia. Half of them are already out of action, revealing a brutal military system.
For the past year, Russia has been using 12,000 North Korean soldiers in Ukraine. This alliance has come about in a context of a lack of human and material resources on the Russian side. More than 50% of the North Korean troops have already been killed, wounded or captured, with an extreme disciplinary system and unsuitable medical practices in the field. This North Korean involvement highlights Russian logistical failings, the brutal realities of Pyongyang and the opaque militarization of Moscow-Pyongyang relations. The North Korean commitment is part of a strategy of human exploitation, with lasting operational and political consequences.
North Korean reinforcements: a forced choice for Moscow
In 2024, Russia hired around 12,000 North Korean soldiers to support its offensive in Ukraine. This decision illustrates the lack of qualified military manpower on the Russian side, as the war entered its third year. According to available figures, half of these troops – 6,000 soldiers – have already been killed, wounded or captured.
The use of North Korean labor is indicative of Moscow’s growing isolation. While Ukraine receives aid from more than 40 countries, Russia depends mainly on two military suppliers: Iran and North Korea. Iran, weakened militarily by Israeli strikes and the overthrow of the pro-Iranian Syrian regime, can only supply Shahed-136 drones with low tactical added value.
North Korea, on the other hand, has stocks of 122 mm and 152 mm shells, compatible with Russia’s Soviet arsenal, and a pool of soldiers trained for a war of attrition. The transfer of entire units to Ukraine was facilitated by a direct agreement between Moscow and Pyongyang, with remuneration paid to the North Korean government, not to the soldiers. It is estimated that each soldier is paid around €300 per month, most of which is confiscated by Kim Jong-un’s regime.
This partnership highlights North Korea’s war economy, based on the export of militarized labor (already exploited in construction sites in Russia and the Middle East), and Russia’s desire to compensate for a high turnover rate of its own troops.
The human cost: discipline, brutality and poor communication
The North Korean deployment is accompanied by extreme disciplinary supervision, based on the prohibition against surrendering to the enemy alive. Documented cases show that wounded soldiers commit suicide on command, or that their own superiors execute them if they refuse. This practice, derived from North Korean military dogma, aims to avoid any capture that could compromise the regime.
This method of command has a direct impact on the management of the wounded. Russia has committed to treating North Korean casualties, but a lack of interpreters in Russian military hospitals has led to serious medical errors. Several sources indicate that hundreds of North Korean soldiers have died due to a lack of appropriate care, even though their wounds were treatable.
This communication deficit also led to fratricidal fire, due to the inability of Russian and North Korean units to coordinate. Two serious incidents were recorded, in which North Korean troops fired on Russian units, believing them to be the enemy. The linguistic and sartorial similarities between Russians and Ukrainians accentuated this problem.
Russia had integrated Russian-Korean bilingual officers into the brigade headquarters, but their number remained insufficient to ensure operational transmission to the combat units. The gap between orders and execution reduced the effectiveness of these brigades, despite more rigorous tactical discipline on the North Korean side.
Comparison of military standards: North Korean professionalism versus Russian improvisation
One major difference observed by the Russian commanders concerns the discipline of the North Korean troops. Unlike the Russian soldiers, who are often poorly trained and receive little supervision, the North Koreans apply more structured combat tactics, with particular care taken in the evacuation of the dead and wounded. This rigor contrasts sharply with the frequent negligence observed in Russian battalions, where bodies are sometimes left on the battlefield due to a lack of relief or organization.
On the health front, North Korea offered to take Russian wounded soldiers into its military hospitals, an offer that Moscow partially accepted. Testimonies from Russian soldiers evacuated to Pyongyang indicate that the care provided is superior to that offered in Russian military hospitals, which face a chronic shortage of equipment, medicines and personnel.
This observation raises questions about the structural deterioration of the Russian military medical system, which is nevertheless supposed to support an active front more than 1,000 kilometers long. The Russian military health budget, estimated at around 4 billion euros in 2024, remains insufficient to absorb the human cost of the war. By way of comparison, the North Korean military system, although technologically under-equipped, relies on strict logistical discipline and a vertical hierarchy, which allows for better management of the wounded, despite more rudimentary material conditions.
Strategic consequences: economic militarization and future tensions
The use of North Korean troops has multiple strategic consequences. Firstly, it strengthens the interdependence between Moscow and Pyongyang, which could result in economic and technological trade-offs, such as the export of civilian nuclear material or assistance in long-range ballistic missiles. This militarization of trade is worrying neighboring countries, particularly Japan and South Korea, which are already facing a 15% increase in their defense budget by 2025.
Secondly, the mobilization of foreign troops under contract marks a shift towards an externalized war, where states equip themselves with inexpensive auxiliary forces, but at the cost of their strategic autonomy. If Russia continues down this path, other countries under embargo or in need of foreign currency, such as Venezuela, Myanmar or Eritrea, could be solicited in the coming months.
Finally, this situation highlights Pyongyang’s political use of war. By sending its soldiers, Kim Jong-un’s regime enhances the status of its troops among its own population, while obtaining foreign currency income estimated at several hundred million euros per year. This system is reminiscent of the North Korean practice of deploying workers in Eastern Europe in the 1990s.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.