The battle between reconnaissance and strike provides a tactical framework suited to multi-domain warfare and the proliferation of drones and guided munitions.
The concept of battle between reconnaissance and strike is now central to understanding the evolution of modern combat. Faced with the proliferation of drones, the digitization of the battlefield, and the democratization of precision strikes, the traditional model of mechanized maneuver is showing its limitations. This new framework is based on the immediate integration of detection, target designation, and strike at all levels, from the platoon to the army corps.
Originally inspired by Soviet doctrines of the 1980s, the model took shape during the Gulf War (1991) and was refined during US counterinsurgency campaigns (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria). But it was in the wars in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and Ukraine since 2022 that the concept demonstrated its tactical relevance. Drones provide reconnaissance, target designation, and often strike, with devastating effects on enemy armor, artillery, and logistics.
This model requires a doctrinal transformation: battle reconnaissance-strike must replace traditional maneuver as the tactical reference framework for the US Army. It allows priorities to be structured: identify the equivalent enemy complex, disorganize it, destroy it, or overwhelm it before maneuvering.
A doctrinal evolution born of a technological breakthrough
The concept of battlefield reconnaissance-strike is the result of a slow doctrinal maturation that began in the 1980s but only fully gained operational legitimacy in recent conflicts. Originally, the Soviet Union distinguished between two complementary systems: the reconnaissance-strike complex, using missiles and tactical aviation, and the reconnaissance-fire complex, centered on artillery. Both architectures relied on direct links between sensors and effectors via automated command systems. The digitization of data exchanges and the miniaturization of components have made this approach viable on a large scale.
The American experience during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 gave substance to this approach. The success of this campaign was based in particular on an unprecedented integration between detection, target designation, and precision strikes at long range. The Pentagon, through the Office of Net Assessment, noted a breakthrough known as the “military-technical revolution”: satellite sensors, ISR aircraft, guided weapons, distributed command systems, and drones were beginning to form a coherent whole.
This technological change was analyzed as structural. The predictions at the time were as follows:
- Widespread interconnection of systems: sensors, weapons, and command centers integrated in real time;
- The emergence of simultaneous operations in all environments (land, sea, air, space, cyber);
- The rise of surveillance drones, followed by armed drones, with extended command range;
- The development of indirect fire out of sight, supported by drones.
Today, these assumptions have become reality. War has changed in scale and nature: it relies on the ability to strike with precision, quickly, and in the right place, without direct contact, thanks to sensor-to-shooter networks.
But technological evolution alone is not enough: without a structuring doctrine, the means deployed will not produce a strategic effect. This is precisely what reconnaissance-strike warfare offers: organizing existing capabilities around a clear objective, namely the neutralization of enemy reconnaissance-strike systems, in order to then free up maneuver.
Contemporary conflicts as tactical validation of the model
The latest high-intensity wars have validated the relevance of the reconnaissance-strike battle concept, particularly at the tactical level. Two recent conflicts—the second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020 and the war in Ukraine since 2022—have illustrated how the combination of advanced sensors, drones, guided munitions, and tactical networks can neutralize enemy forces even before direct contact.
In 2020, Azerbaijan surprised military observers by implementing a strategy centered on armed drones (Bayraktar TB2), Israeli loitering munitions (Harop, Orbiter), and modified Antonov AN-2 aircraft to draw fire from Armenian air defenses. By first disrupting the defense system, Azerbaijani forces were then able to precisely target enemy artillery, armored vehicles, and logistics centers, saving resources and delivering a decisive psychological blow.
But it is above all the conflict in Ukraine that today constitutes the most successful tactical laboratory for the reconnaissance-strike model. According to a 2024 report by the Institute for the Study of War, both sides are now using integrated tactical complexes on a large scale, including:
- Short-range (5 to 20 km) ISR FPV drones;
- Bomber drones dropping grenades and thermobaric charges (up to 50 km);
- Switchblade or Lancet-type loitering munitions (up to 100 km);
- Interceptor drones dedicated to hunting enemy drones;
- GPS- or laser-guided artillery, corrected by real-time drone observation.
The result is an extension of the tactical battlefield far beyond traditional front lines. The traditional area of operation for a battalion (5 to 10 km) is now covered by the drones of a single company. Mechanized approaches are systematically neutralized from a distance: Russian armored columns are frequently stopped 3 to 5 km from their target by precision strikes triggered by drone alerts. The war in Ukraine also shows that 70 to 90% of combat losses are caused by drones, according to official estimates by the Ukrainian Parliament.
The tactical consequences are serious. Infantry is once again becoming central, but this time supported by a digital detection and strike network, whose coordination has become the factor of operational superiority. Front-line supply chains are constantly at risk due to continuous aerial surveillance. The success of an offensive no longer depends solely on the number of troops engaged, but on the ability to degrade or destroy the enemy’s reconnaissance-strike complex.
The empirical evidence is clear: any army that loses control of the reconnaissance-strike duel is doomed to attrition and tactical paralysis.
Why the reconnaissance-strike battle doctrine is technically suited to the modern battlefield
The technical relevance of the reconnaissance-strike battle concept lies in its ability to articulate the profound changes in the modern battlefield. At a time when combat takes place under continuous aerial surveillance, when long-range precision strike is available to tactical units, and when connectivity determines lethality, previous doctrinal paradigms are no longer sufficient. The reconnaissance-strike battle provides a pragmatic framework for exploiting all of these transformations.
The model is based on three key functions, now accessible at lower levels: find, fix, strike. The miniaturization of sensors and the abundance of drones enable a company or platoon to carry out autonomous ISR missions that were previously reserved for brigade headquarters. A €500 FPV drone can now designate a position, attack it directly, or guide artillery with meter-level precision.
This autonomy requires a decentralized but robust technical architecture: mesh radio networks, local data processing, tactical satellite links, or 4G in some cases. Interconnection is becoming vital for high-frequency operations: it is no longer a question of aggregating massive firepower, but of conducting coordinated surgical strikes at high speed, in synchronization with the electromagnetic environment, countermeasures, and the unit’s stealth capabilities.
The reconnaissance-strike battle is not just a strike method: it is a model of dynamic intelligence and lethal effect management, with a clear primary objective: to destroy the enemy’s reconnaissance-strike complex. As long as it remains intact, no maneuver can be carried out successfully. This principle transforms tactical priorities: the primary objective is no longer the enemy’s line of defense, but its sensory and decision-making system.
This reversal requires a review of the training, equipment, and organization of units. The tactics used in Ukraine in 2023 showed that groups of three to five drone operators, supported by an infantry squad, can neutralize a Russian mechanized platoon in 20 minutes, provided they have secure networks and active sensors.
This doctrine also responds to the democratization of resources: FPV drones are now available for less than €1,000 and can carry 400 g of explosives. More complex systems (Switchblade 600, Lancet 3) cost between €30,000 and €50,000, which is much less than a conventional anti-tank missile. These prices, relative to their lethality, make precision strikes accessible at all levels.
Finally, this logic is scalable: it works at both the group and division levels. It allows us to think of war not in terms of space to be conquered, but in terms of decision-making structures to be neutralized.
Why the current multi-domain doctrine remains incomplete without a clear tactical model
The doctrine of multidomain operations (MDO), officially adopted by the US Army in Field Manual 3-0 in 2022, represents an ambitious attempt to respond to today’s complex operational environments. It relies on the coordination of all domains—land, air, sea, space, and cyber—to achieve a window of tactical opportunity by saturating or paralyzing the adversary. This vision is coherent at the strategic level, but it reveals serious shortcomings when translated into concrete actions at the tactical level.
The first limitation of the MDO doctrine is its primarily strategic and joint focus. It provides useful frameworks for theater staffs or joint commands, but does not provide a structuring operational model at the company, platoon, or squad level. Yet it is precisely at these levels that combat takes place in Ukraine and in high-intensity conflicts. The lack of precise guidance on prioritization, the types of equipment to be integrated, or the interactions between tactical assets renders the doctrine inapplicable in the field.
The second weakness lies in the gap between doctrine and the resources actually available. Although relevant on paper, Multidomain Task Forces (MDTFs) are deployed in very limited numbers (three units) and remain dependent on heavy assets that are ill-suited to the decentralized environment of drone warfare. They are neither organized nor equipped to deal with tactical hotspots saturated with FPV drones, loitering munitions, and electromagnetic jammers, as is the case in Ukraine.
Finally, the MDO doctrine does not provide a clear training framework for tactical commanders. Many units continue to train according to the classic paradigm of mechanized maneuver and direct shock, based on the concentration of firepower and linear breakthrough. But this approach has shown its limitations. In 2023, the Ukrainian counteroffensive failed, in part because it relied on a traditional doctrine of mechanized assault, which the Russians neutralized from a distance with a dense layer of reconnaissance and indirect fire. The lessons learned published by two US officers emphasize that the tactics used were “exactly those prescribed by US doctrine,” but that the battlefield had changed.
The battle reconnaissance-strike doctrine corrects these shortcomings. It gets down to the tactical level, defines clear priorities (neutralize enemy ISR capabilities before any maneuver), and provides a scalable framework for thinking about engagement in a space saturated with drones and precision strikes. This model offers what MDO does not: a structured method for surviving, detecting, striking, and disrupting the adversary in a decentralized, fluid, and highly lethal environment.
The four fundamental principles of reconnaissance-strike warfare
The reconnaissance-strike battle doctrine is based on four fundamental principles that provide tactical commanders with a clear method for structuring their actions in an environment saturated with sensors and indirect strike threats. These principles are not theoretical: they are derived directly from experience gained in recent theaters of operation, particularly in Ukraine, and reflect a logic of survival, disruption, and prioritized lethality.
1. Be a difficult target
In an environment where everything that can be seen can be hit, the top priority is not to be seen or to thwart the enemy’s sensor-to-shooter chain. This requires a series of technical and tactical measures:
- Dispersion of units, with decentralized formations;
- Multispectral camouflage, including thermal and electromagnetic;
- Use of decoys and jammers;
- Permanent mobility, to avoid static geolocation;
- Fortification of fixed positions, when defense is necessary.
This principle runs counter to the traditional logic of concentrating forces. Now, regrouping hastens destruction, especially within range of drones or corrected artillery.
2. The enemy’s reconnaissance-strike complex is the primary target
Any offensive or defensive action must begin with neutralizing the enemy’s reconnaissance-strike complex. This means:
- Destroy enemy ISR drones;
- Target operators and their ground stations;
- Eliminate enemy tactical communication relays;
- Actively jam enemy transmissions.
As long as this system remains operational, no conventional maneuver is viable, as concentrations of troops or armored vehicles will be immediately detected and destroyed.
3. Win the sensor-shooter duel
The battle between reconnaissance and strike complexes is the real decisive battle. Whoever can detect, fix, target, strike, and assess faster and on a larger scale wins. This principle requires constant efforts in:
- Improving OODA loops (Observe–Orient–Decide–Act);
- Partial automation of the decision-making chain;
- Interoperability between drones, artillery, aviation, and infantry;
- Increased training for ISR and strike operators.
4. Concentrate capabilities before maneuvering
Before maneuvering, enemy sensors and fire must be severely degraded. Otherwise, any movement will result in immediate loss. “Mechanical slaughter” precedes movement. The classic doctrine of maneuvering to create a breach must be reversed: sight and fire must be broken, then maneuvered on the debris.
The concentration of fire, electromagnetic effects, and combat drones must precede any conventional kinetic action. Without this, the maneuver becomes tactical suicide.
Why adopting reconnaissance-strike warfare is a strategic emergency for the US Army
The formal adoption of the reconnaissance-strike battle doctrine by the US Army is not just one doctrinal choice among many: it is a strategic necessity dictated by the technical, human, and operational conditions of the modern battlefield. Failure to do so is tantamount to engaging an equal or near-equal adversary in a state of fatal unpreparedness, resulting in massive losses and a breakdown of the chain of command in the first hours of engagement.
The first reason is the growing technical and operational gap between doctrine and practice. US Army units continue, for the most part, to prepare for combat based on classic mechanized maneuver: the use of armored vehicles, sequenced indirect support, and linear breakthroughs. However, there are many examples of the failure of this approach, including in training at Fort Irwin and during the Ukrainian mechanized offensives in 2023, which were systematically halted by Russian ISR strikes from a distance.
The second reason is the time factor. Training, equipment, and doctrinal assimilation take years. Units cannot master reconnaissance and strike capabilities on an ad hoc basis during a conflict. Yet tomorrow’s potential adversaries – China, Russia, Iran – already have distributed, interoperable sensor-to-shooter capabilities that are sometimes superior in number and availability to those of US brigades. Failing to structure a reconnaissance-strike doctrine today means losing tomorrow within the first three days.
Third priority: logistical and industrial adaptability. The reconnaissance-strike model makes it possible to capitalize on simple, inexpensive but effective equipment such as FPV drones, low-cost loitering munitions, and mesh radio communication systems. In contrast, heavy equipment (tanks, assault helicopters, unguided artillery) becomes a target rather than a lever. The return on investment is clear: with €10 million, a unit can acquire 2,000 lethal FPV drones capable of neutralizing dozens of enemy tanks or artillery pieces. At equivalent cost, a single Abrams tank can be destroyed by a coordinated salvo of drones costing €400 each.
Finally, adopting this doctrine would anchor future warfare in a tactical grammar consistent with today’s information, electromagnetic, and satellite environment. This does not mean abandoning maneuver, but reconfiguring it around an essential prerequisite: winning the reconnaissance-strike duel, and only then engaging in physical contact.
Refusal to adopt such a doctrine would have irreversible consequences: unsustainable human losses, disintegration of operational tempo, saturation of medical evacuations, loss of control of logistics routes, and rapid moral collapse of units. Conversely, an army structured around the principle of reconnaissance-strike could strike first, see faster, understand before the enemy, and impose an unsustainable pace on its opponents.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.