Satellite images point to a military construction site in Paulauka, possibly linked to Oreshnik missiles. Strategic, nuclear, and NATO issues explained.
Recent satellite images show a military construction site covering more than 2 km² near Paulauka, 60 km south of Minsk, on a former Soviet site linked to nuclear-capable missiles. The images reveal four areas connected by new roads, 13 protected depots, three hangars measuring approximately 100 m, a structure approximately 150 m long, and eight hangar frames. Since spring 2024, sappers have neutralized 2,800 munitions over 2.5 km², ahead of a ramp-up in work in the summer. Experts believe that the configuration could correspond to a strategic base capable of hosting the Oreshnik missile, a Russian IRBM announced to be nuclear-capable, currently being integrated into Belarus in the wake of the Zapad-2025 joint exercises. The location—in the heart of a buffer state bordering Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia—shifts the strategic center of gravity of the eastern flank and complicates NATO planning (air defense, anti-ballistic missiles, nuclear posture). The Belarusian authorities are maintaining official silence, which reinforces assumptions of a Russian-Belarusian project with strategic aims.
The site and physical evidence of a strategic base
Satellite images taken by Planet Labs at the end of August show four distinct areas connected by a new road network, covering an area of over 2 km², equivalent to approximately 280 football fields . In the western sector, there are at least 13 depots surrounded by embankments and three hangars measuring approximately 100 m each, as well as foundations for other buildings. In the north, eight hangar-type structures are being erected. In the east, a linear structure approximately 150 m long is being built, with earth mounds nearby. In the southeast, on a high point locally known as Signal Hill, the earthworks are creating new roads and platforms, compatible with radar stations, surface-to-air batteries, or command systems.
The choice of site is not insignificant. From 1959 to 1993, the site was home to the 306th Strategic Missile Regiment and a technical nuclear base (maintenance, storage). This continuity of use reduces implementation costs and shortens the time required to become operational (existing layout, military land, easements). Preparatory work began in spring 2024: according to local authorities, sappers had cleared 2,800 munitions over 2.5 km² by June 7, allowing earthworks and construction to be accelerated over four months.
The general architecture—scattered stores, internal road links, separate technical areas, high point in the southeast—corresponds to a strategic base: protected traffic, compartmentalization of risks, redundancy of axes, pyrotechnic security. The clues do not prove the exact nature of the vectors involved, but the density of the depots, the scale of the hangars, and the former nuclear use of the site point to a missile or nuclear-related capacity. In the regional context, it would be imprudent to ignore this signal.
The Oreshnik missile and the logic of deployment in Belarus
The Oreshnik missile is presented by Moscow as a hypersonic IRBM with strategic capabilities, nuclear-capable and conventional-capable, derived from the RS-26 line. Open sources describe it as having a speed of around Mach 10-11 (≈ 13,600 km/h), the possibility of multiple payloads, and a flight profile that complicates interception. Its first claimed use dates back to late 2024 against an industrial target in Ukraine. In early August 2025, ** Vladimir Putin** officially announced the entry into service and production of the system, with deployment announced in Belarus by the end of 2025.
Why Minsk? First, geography: in an advanced position relative to NATO targets, Belarus reduces flight time to logistics hubs or air bases; conversely, it exposes Belarusian territory more to allied sensors and interceptors. Second, politics: the Moscow-Minsk tandem now talks about a common “nuclear umbrella,” with aligned postures and thresholds for use. Finally, operations: the Zapad-2025 exercises (September 12-16) include nuclear scenarios and Oreshnik drills, suggesting the establishment of compatible infrastructure.
For Moscow, outsourcing part of the strategic chain to Belarus creates operational depth and dilemmas for NATO. For Minsk, it is a lever of security and negotiation vis-à-vis the West, at the cost of increased dependence and direct risk in the event of a crisis. This touches on the heart of IRBM logic: deterrence through speed, multiplicity of payloads, and reduction of adversary reaction times.
Regional implications for NATO’s eastern flank security
The positioning of an IRBM capability 60 km from Minsk, in contact with the Baltic States and Poland, would reshuffle the cards in terms of air defense and missile defense. On the NATO side, it would be necessary to increase the density of detection (long-range radars, passive sensors, optronic networks), strengthen resilience (shelters, redundancy of runways, dispersal), and adapt interceptors (kinetic, non-kinetic effects, jamming). . The major constraint is flight time: a missile launched from Belarus toward a Polish air hub would take minutes to reach its target, which shortens the detection-decision-interception loop.
For neighboring states, emergency plans must include temporary bans on airspace, rapid NOTAMs, diversions of civilian traffic, and protection protocols for logistics platforms (e.g., Rzeszów-Jasionka). NOTAMs**, *diversions* of civilian traffic, and protection protocols for logistics platforms (e.g., Rzeszów-Jasionka). Defense supply chains—ammunition, spare parts, sensors—must include buffer stocks and alternative routes. The signal sent to Western capitals is clear: the technical-strategic front line is no longer exclusive to Ukraine; it now affects NATO interfaces.
In Moscow, there is a psychological advantage—forcing NATO to maintain a high level of vigilance—but it has its downside: legitimizing allied investments in additional layers of defense, ** accelerating** interoperability and tightening political cohesion. If the Paulauka site switches to Oreshnik capability, Russia gains a lever, but loses operational latitude in the face of an alerted and rearmed Alliance.
Legal issues, transparency, and signals sent
The official silence of Minsk—no public announcement, no accessible cadastral documents, no structured communication—undermines strategic predictability in a sensitive area. The Belarusian regime has a security obligation to its population; building sensitive infrastructure without a credible public process means accepting a lack of transparency that undermines trust and increases the risk of regional miscalculation.
From an international legal perspective, hosting a potentially nuclear IRBM capability on Belarusian territory remains consistent with the sovereignty of the state, but poses two problems. First, consistency with the political commitments to ** non-proliferation** and the past communication from Minsk (which abandoned the arsenal inherited from the USSR in 1993). Second, regional stability: deploying a capability designed to strike quickly at targets in Europe ** encourages** neighbors to respond with more defenses and, potentially, postures of retaliation.
Let’s be frank: controlled communication serves the interests of the Kremlin and Minsk, but undermines collective security. A clear announcement of the status of the site—logistical, storage, operational—and safety measures (separation of flows, pyrotechnic safety, command rules) would reduce the risk of escalation and improve crisis management.
Industrial consequences and scenarios for the next 6–12 months
Industrially, an Oreshnik base in Belarus implies specific support chains: heavy transport, maintenance of TEL vehicles, control-command, nuclear safety, protected communications. The data from the site—multiple depots, long hangars, internal roads—suggests a capacity for sustained flows (fuel, pyrotechnic materials, parts). This requires long-term contracts, controlled logistics per kilometer, and trained operators.
At 6–12 months, three scenarios dominate.
1) Completion of the main structures and partial commissioning (depots, C2, ground-to-air defense), while Oreshnik elements are undergoing testing.
2) Mixed site: logistics (ammunition storage, support units) and infrastructure for future reception of systems, useful for strategic deception.
3) Limited operational capacity but maximum political announcement to produce a deterrent effect with controlled costs.
For NATO, the response involves high-speed sensors, secure data links, multi-layer interceptors, and a doctrine of rapid decision-making. For the EU, targeted sanctions on dual-use supply chains and export controls are becoming necessary. As for regional markets, they will incorporate a risk premium on aviation and logistics insurance. The harsh truth is simple: installing an IRBM capability in the heart of Belarus reduces everyone’s thinking time and forces everyone to pay in advance for their protection.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.