MiG-31 over the Gulf of Finland: violation or simple overflight?

MiG-31 over the Gulf of Finland: violation or simple overflight?

Tallinn claims that three MiG-31s entered Estonian airspace for 12 minutes. Verified account, military implications, precedents, and NATO reactions.

Summary

Estonian authorities claim that three Russian MiG-31s entered national airspace over the Gulf of Finland for approximately 12 minutes on September 19, 2025, near the island of Vaindloo. According to Tallinn, the aircraft were flying without a flight plan, with their transponders turned off and no radio contact, and reportedly advanced to within approximately 9 km (5 nautical miles) of Estonian territory. Italian F-35s deployed to Ämari as part of NATO air policing were scrambled and forced the formation to turn back, while Sweden released images of a MiG-31 taken over the Baltic. Moscow denies any violation and maintains that the aircraft remained in international airspace. Estonia summoned the Russian chargé d’affaires, referred the matter to NATO under Article 4, and prompted condemnation from the EU. The episode is one of a series of aerial incidents in the Baltic; it is considered longer and more “brazen” than most of the previous ones, which generally lasted less than a minute.

MiG-31 over the Gulf of Finland: violation or simple overflight?

What Tallinn reported and what can be established

The Estonian Ministry of Defense reports that, starting in the late morning (local time), three MiG-31 interceptors crossed the 22.2 km (12 nautical mile) limit that demarcates national airspace from maritime baselines. The published trajectory shows a penetration of up to 9 km (5 nautical miles), near Vaindloo, a frequent point of Russian “corner cuttings.” The aircraft were uncooperative: no flight plan, transponders turned off, radio silence with controllers. Italian F-35As on alert were scrambled from Ämari and intercepted the aircraft in accordance with QRA procedures. The Flygvapnet released an image of a MiG-31 over the Baltic Sea after the aircraft left Estonian airspace, a visual element that fits with the timeline provided. Moscow disputes this and maintains that the transit took place “over international waters.”

The legal framework for airspace and the extent of the violation

Air sovereignty extends to a limit of 22.2 km (12 NM) beyond the coastline (or islands); beyond that, the airspace is international. The Vaindloo area is sensitive because the boundaries of civil air traffic control zones do not always exactly match the border, which creates exploitable ambiguities. In this case, Tallinn claims to have radar recordings and visual correlations. If the penetration of approximately 9 km (5 NM) is confirmed, this constitutes a full-fledged violation, not a simple “fly-by.” The duration of 12 minutes is noteworthy: at high speed, it allows for orbit profiles, turns parallel to the border, or QRA reaction tests, far beyond an accidental “compass turn.”

The maneuver and profile of a MiG-31 in the Baltic

The MiG-31 is a heavy interceptor, optimized for speed and endurance at high altitude. It can exceed Mach 2.8 (≈3,000 km/h), operate at 20 km (65,600 ft) and carry a large antenna radar for long-range interceptions. In the Baltic, it is used for rapid transit and to demonstrate presence. A formation of three aircraft allows for simple tactical options (line, echelon, trail) to test NATO interoperability, saturate an alert, or measure interception times. The choice of a “non-cooperative” profile (without transponder or contact) increases the initial uncertainty on the air traffic control side and accelerates the QRA trigger. Conversely, the absence of apparent weaponry and the fact that the aircraft remain in the maritime zone reduce the risk of immediate escalation.

NATO response and in-flight communication

The air policing system in the Baltic has been in place since 2004. Italian F-35s stationed at Ämari provide alerting, taking into account non-cooperative primary targets. Standard procedures include a call on 121.5 MHz, an attempt at radar/visual identification, and interception signals (wing waggling, positioning in leader). Tallinn reports that the MiG-31s did not respond to the signals. Once identification has been made, escorting the aircraft out of national airspace is the preferred option. Sweden and Finland, for their part, activated their fighters for presence and coordination, which resulted in a Swedish “handout” photo being released by the agencies. Politically, Estonia invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, resulting in the convening of the North Atlantic Council.

Precedents, their frequency, and what distinguishes this incident

Since 2014, Estonia has recorded more than 40 violations of its airspace by Russian aircraft, often brief (less than a minute) and concentrated near Vaindloo. There were none in 2023 or 2024, but 2025 saw tensions rise again with several incidents; Tallinn reports four violations prior to this one. The major difference on September 19 was the duration (12 minutes) and the reported depth (9 km / 5 NM), which were much greater than the usual “touch and go” violations. In practice, each case results in a verbal note, a summons of the Russian representative, and a temporary reinforcement of the allied air posture (QRA flight hours, availability of refuelers and AWACS).

Probable objectives on the Russian side: test, signal, ambiguity

Several hypotheses coexist. First, the reaction test: measuring the time taken to take off, the composition (type of aircraft), the interception routes and the NATO interdiction doctrine. Second, a political signal: demonstrating the ability to challenge a NATO border in the immediate vicinity of Saint Petersburg and the approaches to the Gulf of Finland. Finally, legal ambiguity: taking advantage of the specific local characteristics of air navigation and the small differences between borders and controlled airspace to challenge the narrative. The presence of a MiG-31, a long-range interceptor, reinforces the demonstration effect: speed, altitude, sensors, and—depending on the version—the ability to carry very long-range missiles.

Operational effects and political consequences

Operationally, the incident prompts NATO to adjust its operational readiness in the Baltic: tighter QRA windows, additional patrols, temporary reinforcements at Ämari or Šiauliai, and enhanced coordination with Sweden and Finland. Politically, Article 4 allows the Allies to align their strategic interpretation and calibrate a response ranging from reinforced alert to additional deployments (short-range air defense, remote radars, naval sup AA assets). The EU and several capitals emphasize the “dangerous provocation” nature of the incident. Moscow adopts a line of denial and portrays the transit as “lawful.” The main risk lies in friction: a navigation incident, a radio misunderstanding, or an aggressive maneuver during interception could escalate.

MiG-31 over the Gulf of Finland: violation or simple overflight?

Communication, evidence, and the battle of narratives

Tallinn claims to have a primary trail and a reconstruction of the trajectory corroborated by NATO and supported by Swedish visuals taken “after departure” of the aircraft. Moscow counters with a counter-narrative: route in international waters, compliance with rules, “verifiable by independent controls.” In this type of incident, the publication of maps and images is less about convincing Moscow than about solidifying the allied consensus, informing public opinion, and preempting disinformation. The controlled release of information (flight path map, “handout” photo) is part of a strategy of deterrence through transparency: showing that surveillance is continuous and attribution is rapid.

What to watch for next

In the short term, the signals focus on the holding of the NATO meeting, the density of allied patrols in the Baltic, and possible additional measures (sensors, additional aircraft, naval posture). In the medium term, attention is focused on the recurrence of “uncooperative” flights and the presence of high-performance aircraft such as the MiG-31 in restricted areas. Any repetition of incursions greater than 5 NM (9 km) and lasting several minutes would increase pressure for more visible responses: a tougher air-to-air posture, specific NOTAMs, and multinational exercises focused on preventing “corner cutting.” The key remains the balance between operational firmness and control of communication escalation.

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