Following an Israeli strike on Qatar, the GCC announces enhanced cooperation on missile defense, revealing regional security vulnerabilities.
Summary
This month’s Israeli strike against Hamas targets in Qatar prompted a swift response from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The six member states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman—announced a joint plan to strengthen missile defense and security cooperation. Five commitments were made: increased intelligence sharing, acceleration of early warning systems, updating of defense plans, joint exercises, and improved interoperability. But these announcements face two realities: political differences between member states and a persistent dependence on the United States, whose reliability is now being questioned. The idea of an “Arab NATO” type alliance is still being discussed but remains unrealistic, given the divergent strategic interests. Current tensions highlight the urgency for Gulf monarchies to fill the gaps in their air and missile defense, in the face of an increasingly complex regional threat environment.
An emergency Defense Council meeting
The GCC met in Doha in a crisis context, just days after the Israeli strike. The event reignited an old concern: the vulnerability of critical Gulf infrastructure to missiles and drones. Defense ministers affirmed that any attack on a member state would be considered an attack on the entire Council. Five concrete commitments were announced: enhanced intelligence sharing, pooling of satellite imagery, acceleration of early warning programs, revision of defense plans, and increased joint exercises. These measures aim to give operational reality to the GCC’s collective security clause, which has too often remained theoretical since its creation in 1981. The objective is clear: to transform a political alliance into an effective military structure capable of responding to regional threats characterized by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and drones.
Persistent gaps in Gulf defenses
The crisis reveals critical flaws in the Gulf’s air and missile defense systems. Despite massive arms purchases—Patriot PAC-3 systems, American THAAD systems, and European batteries—coverage remains fragmented. Each country has favored domestic purchases, which are sometimes technically incompatible with each other. The lack of an integrated warning and command network reduces overall effectiveness, leaving blind spots in the protection of strategic infrastructure, particularly energy facilities. The drone and missile attack on Aramco in September 2019, claimed by the Houthis but attributed by Washington to Iran, had already demonstrated the difficulty of intercepting a coordinated salvo. This structural weakness can be explained by the lack of interoperability, but also by political mistrust between neighbors, with each capital fearing to delegate too much sovereignty to a common structure.
The idea of an Arab NATO and its limitations
The Doha meeting revived the idea of a more structured military alliance, sometimes compared to an Arab NATO. The principle would be to unify air defense capabilities, create a permanent military headquarters, and pool investments in strategic anti-missile systems. But the reality is different: political divisions between Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi are hindering any plans for deep integration. The embargo imposed on Qatar by some of its neighbors between 2017 and 2021 remains fresh in people’s minds and fuels mistrust. Furthermore, diplomatic orientations vary: Oman cultivates a cautious neutrality towards Iran, while Bahrain and the Emirates are aligned with a hard line. In this context, the idea of an integrated military alliance is hampered by strategic differences that make a NATO-like arrangement unlikely.
Contested dependence on the United States
Since the 1980s, the Gulf monarchies have relied on US protection. The US Central Command, based in Bahrain, coordinates operations in the region and maintains a constant naval and air presence. However, Israel’s strike against targets in Qatar, an ally of Washington, has sown doubt. Analysts and military officials in the region point to the uncertain reliability of the United States as a guarantor of security. Admittedly, the US military has the technical means at its disposal: satellites, AN/TPY-2 radars, THAAD interceptors, and an air and naval fleet. But the question facing Doha is whether the US has the political will to use these resources against Israel, Washington’s privileged strategic partner. Several Gulf officials say that US protection is now seen as conditional and subject to internal political calculations. This observation is prompting countries in the region to seek greater autonomy in missile defense.
The strategic consequences of the crisis
This sequence reveals two strategic realities. First, Gulf countries can no longer be content with modernizing their arsenals in isolation. Without integration, colossal investments—estimated at more than €100 billion over the last decade for air defense systems alone—produce limited results. Second, the balance between external dependence and regional autonomy is becoming crucial. While it is unrealistic to imagine complete independence from Iranian ballistic threats, regional coordination can reduce vulnerability. Ultimately, the creation of an integrated early warning network, combined with shared interception capabilities, would strengthen collective deterrence. But without shared political will, states risk remaining trapped in a fragmented security situation, dependent on US choices and exposed to Israeli initiatives.
An impasse or a turning point?
The GCC announcement can be interpreted in two ways. Either it remains a simple communiqué intended to display a facade of political unity. Or it marks the beginning of a transformation, where missile defense finally becomes a collective priority. Joint exercises and the pooling of intelligence, if conducted seriously, could be a first concrete step. But the Gulf states will have to decide: accept a reduction in sovereignty to strengthen common security, or maintain fragmented systems that weaken the whole. The equation is clear: the longer integration is delayed, the greater the vulnerability to missiles, drones, and external strikes will remain.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.