Baku is investing more than $6 billion in the JF-17 Thunder to modernize its fleet, reduce its ties with Moscow, and move closer to Beijing.
Summary
Azerbaijan has officially begun integrating the JF-17 Thunder into its air force, with five aircraft making their first appearance at a parade in Baku in early November. These fighter jets are part of the Chinese-Pakistani FC-1/JF-17 program and are Block III standard, the most modern version. Two successive contracts have been signed: the first for $1.6 billion, or around €1.5 billion, for 16 aircraft, followed by an agreement worth around $4.6 billion, or nearly €4.2 billion, for 40 additional aircraft. This is the largest military export contract in Pakistan’s history. For Baku, this choice allows it to rapidly modernize a limited fleet of MiG-29s and Su-25s while diversifying its suppliers, to the detriment of Russia. But this modernization comes at a political price: technological dependence is shifting to China, which controls a large part of the system’s critical components, from avionics to radar and long-range air-to-air missiles.
A massive aviation contract that repositions Baku
The first thing to look at is the size of the contracts signed by Baku. In February 2024, Azerbaijan signed an initial agreement worth $1.6 billion, or around €1.5 billion, for a batch of JF-17 Block III aircraft, including the aircraft themselves, crew training, and weapons. A few months later, a second contract for 40 additional aircraft was announced, worth $4.6 billion, or nearly €4.2 billion. The total commitment is said to be more than $6.2 billion, which, for a country with less than 11 million inhabitants, is a very clear signal: Baku no longer wants to settle for a second-rate air force.
For Islamabad, this package represents the biggest success of the Pakistani defense industry. The JF-17 is no longer just a substitute program designed to circumvent American or European constraints; it is becoming a credible export product, capable of appealing to a country that has already fought and won on the battlefield, notably during the 2020 war against Armenia. This choice may be questionable in terms of absolute technological level, but Azerbaijan’s calculation is not foolish: the full unit cost (aircraft + training + weapons + support) remains significantly lower than that of a Rafale, an F-16V or a Gripen, while introducing modern capabilities.
For Azerbaijan, these costs remain manageable thanks to energy revenues. State gas and oil exports generate several billion euros each year, which directly feed into the defense budget. Baku has never hidden its priority: to secure militarily the advantage gained in Karabakh and to have credible means at its disposal against Armenia, but also against possible Russian or Iranian influence. The figures speak for themselves: very few countries of this size can currently afford such an aggressive air force modernization plan.
The JF-17 Thunder fighter jet aims for the “good compromise” segment
The JF-17 fighter jet is neither an F-35 nor a Su-57. It is a light fighter of the so-called “4.5” generation, designed to offer an acceptable cost/capacity ratio to air forces that have neither the means nor the political access to the most advanced Western platforms. From a technical standpoint, the Block III version that interests Baku still incorporates modern components that many wealthier armies do not yet have in all their fleets.
The KLJ-7A AESA radar is at the heart of this leap in capability. It is an active antenna radar capable of simultaneously tracking multiple air targets at distances exceeding 150 km, while offering better resistance to jamming than mechanical antennas. Combined with an electro-optical sensor and a modernized electronic warfare system, it gives the pilot a relatively complete view of the air environment over several hundred square kilometers.
In terms of performance, the JF-17 reaches approximately Mach 1.6, or nearly 1,970 km/h at altitude, with an operational ceiling of approximately 17,000 m. The announced offensive payload for Block III exceeds 3,600 kg on seven hardpoints, although in practice, configurations often remain more modest in order to preserve the range, which is around 900 km without refueling and up to more than 1,700 km with external tanks.
Air-to-air weaponry is a sensitive issue. The integration of the PL-15E long-range missile, with a range of around 145 km, changes the equation for regional adversaries equipped with older R-27 or R-73 missiles. The PL-10E short-range missile complements this system for close combat. On paper, this radar/missile combination gives the JF-17 Block III a first shot beyond the range of many platforms inherited from the Soviet era.
One can scoff at the “low-cost” positioning of the JF-17. But for a country like Azerbaijan, which is seeking a rapid increase in power, an aircraft that is less sophisticated than a Rafale but better armed than tired MiG-29s remains a rational choice.
Azerbaijan’s military aviation is changing scale
Until now, Azerbaijan’s military aviation has relied on a core of about 11 MiG-29s, some 30 Su-25 ground support aircraft, and a fleet of Turkish and Israeli drones that were heavily promoted during the 2020 war. The total represents around 180 aircraft and helicopters of all types, but the number of truly modern fighters was low. The MiG-29s, of various origins (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus), suffer from high maintenance costs and outdated avionics architecture.
The arrival of a first batch of JF-17s, visible during the Baku parade with at least four single-seaters and one two-seater trainer, marks a generational change. Ultimately, with 16 aircraft from the first contract and then 40 from the following agreement, the multi-role fighter fleet could exceed 50 JF-17s, a significant volume for a country of this size. Proportionally, this is the equivalent, for France, of several dozen additional Rafales.
Operationally, the JF-17s are expected to be based at Nasosnaya, a former large Soviet base that already houses MiG-29s. The logic is clear: to concentrate air superiority assets at a single site in order to optimize infrastructure, logistics, and training. The Su-25s, modernized with Turkey’s help and equipped with Turkish guided munitions, will remain the main ground support tools.
This configuration creates a clearer division of roles: JF-17s for interception and medium-range precision strikes, Su-25s for close support, and Bayraktar and Harop drones for harassment, air defense neutralization, and high-precision strikes. For Armenia, which is already struggling financially, this is a real problem: the gap in air and drone capabilities is widening.
It must also be said bluntly: with this fleet, Azerbaijan is not only aiming for deterrence. It is preparing credible offensive options, should the political and diplomatic balance of power in the Caucasus once again appear favorable to it.
A strategic dependence shifting towards Beijing
Officially, Azerbaijani commentators explain that this acquisition brings Baku closer to Pakistan and reduces its dependence on Moscow. This is true, but it is incomplete. Pakistan-Azerbaijan military cooperation remains essentially the visible part of a triangle in which China holds the industrial and technological levers. In the JF-17 program, approximately 42% of production is carried out in China and 58% in Pakistan, but the critical technologies—radar, missiles, and a significant part of the avionics—come from Beijing.
The strategic dependency is therefore clearly shifting. Admittedly, Azerbaijan no longer depends on Russian chains for the maintenance of its MiG-29s. It is also reducing its exposure to Western sanctions, since it is not buying F-16s, Gripens or Rafales. But in exchange, it is accepting a lasting link to a technological ecosystem dominated by China, against a backdrop of growing tensions between Beijing and Western countries.
The RD-93 engine, produced by Klimov in Russia, is a stark reminder of this hybrid reality. As long as Moscow supplies this engine or agrees to upgrades to the RD-93MA version, the system will continue to function. In the event of a serious political breakdown—for example, an open Russian-Azerbaijani crisis—the issue of supplying spare parts and replacement engines would immediately become sensitive. Beijing could offer an alternative solution, but this would not happen quickly or for free.
Finally, the choice of the JF-17 effectively closes the door to deep integration with certain NATO systems, particularly with regard to secure data links and Western command networks. Baku is trying to play all sides – cooperating with Israel, Turkey, Russia, and now China and Pakistan – but technical consistency comes at a price. It is not clear that policymakers always appreciate the long-term constraints of such a mosaic of suppliers.
A more unstable regional balance in the Caucasus
The arrival of the JF-17 Thunder in the skies over the Caucasus is not just a minor detail in terms of fleet size. It comes after a war won by Baku, a strategic retreat by Armenia, and Russian involvement weakened by the war in Ukraine. For Yerevan, which is already struggling to stabilize its own military apparatus, seeing its neighbor invest more than $6 billion in modern fighter jets is anything but reassuring.
The consequences are fairly straightforward. Azerbaijan’s potential air superiority is increasing, especially if the PL-15Es are supplied in large numbers and fully integrated. Armenia’s options for modernization are limited: it has little financial leeway and remains dependent on Russia for most of its systems. Cooperation with India or Iran is conceivable, but would remain partial. This imbalance makes any future crisis more dangerous, as one of the parties knows it has more cards to play in the air.
Beyond the Baku-Yerevan duo, this rise in power is of direct interest to Tehran and Moscow. Seeing the Caucasus fill up with Chinese aircraft and Turkish drones supported by Israeli weapons is not a neutral development for capitals obsessed with securing their own borders. Beijing, for its part, gains an additional showcase for its exportable military equipment, just a few hundred kilometers from Russian and Turkish bases.
We must take things for what they are: Azerbaijan is using its energy revenues to transform its military apparatus, with the support of partners who each have a strategic interest in doing so. The Azerbaijani population will not be consulted on the risk of shifting to a more offensive posture, nor will neighboring countries have a say in the matter. The gamble is clear: to establish itself as the dominant military power in the Caucasus for the long term, even if it means creating a more tense environment. Those who think that these fighter jets will remain a mere prestige force are deluding themselves.
Sources:
– Article “CAC/PAC JF-17 Thunder,” technical data and global production.
– Article “Azerbaijani Air Forces,” inventory of MiG-29s, Su-25s, and JF-17s.
– FlightGlobal, “Azerbaijan becomes fourth JF-17 operator with five appearing in Baku military parade,” November 2025.
– News.am, “Azerbaijan receives Chinese fighter jets,” November 2025.
– Army Recognition, “Azerbaijan confirms the delivery of five JF-17 Block III fighter jets from Pakistan,” November 2025.
– Defence Security Asia, “Azerbaijan inducts JF-17 Block III Thunder Fighters,” October 2025.
– Summary articles on the capabilities of the JF-17 Block III and PL-15E (Defense Security Asia, IRIA, specialized sources).
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.