Zelensky and Macron seal a historic agreement for the purchase of around 100 Rafale fighter jets. Amount, deadlines, financing, risks: a complete breakdown of a strategic gamble.
Summary
On November 17, 2025, ** Volodymyr Zelensky** and Emmanuel Macron signed a letter of intent in Villacoublay and then at the Élysée Palace for Ukraine to acquire “around 100 Rafale fighter jets,” along with their weaponry, new-generation SAMP-T air defense systems, radars, and drones. This is not yet a firm contract, but a political and industrial framework projected over a period of ten years. For Kiev, the challenge is clear: to eventually acquire a modern combat air force capable of competing with the Russian air force and complementing the future F-16s, Gripens, and Mirages already promised. For Paris, this is a strong signal of France’s role as a provider of security in Europe and a major success for the Rafale and the French defense industry. A series of serious questions remain: is such a purchase—likely to exceed €20 or even €25 billion with weapons and support—affordable for a country ravaged by war? Will industrial capacity be able to keep up? And beyond the announcement, what is the likelihood that the 100 aircraft will actually be delivered on time?
The actual content of the agreement signed between Paris and Kiev
The agreement of November 17, 2025 is not a conventional detailed export contract, but a declaration of intent. The Élysée Palace refers to cooperation on “Ukraine’s acquisition of French defense equipment,” including “around 100 Rafale aircraft, with their associated weaponry,” as well as new-generation SAMP-T systems, radars, and drones, over a period of approximately ten years.
This format is important:
- it sets a political framework and a target volume;
- it paves the way for a series of successive contracts (aircraft, missiles, training, maintenance);
- it leaves room for adjustment depending on the evolution of the war, Ukrainian finances, and European priorities.
According to several sources close to the matter, the order for 100 Rafales could combine:
- a smaller initial batch (around 20 aircraft) delivered as a priority,
- subsequent deliveries spread over a decade,
- options or conditional tranches linked to other European or bilateral financing.
The package does not only concern combat aviation. France is also offering:
- SAMP-T or SAMP-T NG systems, capable of intercepting aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles;
- long-range radars;
- anti-drone capabilities, an area in which Paris wants to establish industrial cooperation with Kiev.
For Zelensky, appearing in Villacoublay in front of a Rafale on display, then signing this agreement with Macron, sends a clear message: Ukraine is already looking beyond the war, towards an air force standardized on high-level Western platforms.
Choosing the Rafale over a less expensive European aircraft
The question immediately arises: why choose the Rafale, a high-end aircraft, rather than a less expensive European aircraft such as the Swedish Gripen or second-hand F-16s? Especially since Kiev has already recently signed a letter of intent for 100 to 150 Gripen aircraft, financed in part by frozen Russian assets.
Several factors explain this deliberate choice:
The quest for qualitative superiority
The Rafale F4 (and future developments) offers a combination of sensors, electronic warfare, and air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons that places the aircraft at the top of the global market: AESA radar, Spectra electronic warfare suite, Meteor air-to-air missile, Scalp/Storm Shadow cruise missile, etc.
Faced with a Russia that is deploying Su-30, Su-34, and Su-35 aircraft and developing the Su-57, Kiev knows that simply possessing F-16s or Gripens will not be enough to create a lasting advantage. The Rafale, an multi-role aircraft capable of performing air-to-air, precision strike, and reconnaissance missions in a single flight, offers an attractive capacity density for a country that cannot afford a huge fleet.
Political and strategic logic
The agreement is part of a Franco-Ukrainian relationship already structured by:
- French military aid (CAESAR, SAMP-T, missiles, Mirage 2000, ammunition);
- a bilateral security agreement signed in February 2024;
- Paris’s stated desire to establish itself as an autonomous European security provider.
By choosing the Rafale, Ukraine is sending a twofold signal:
- it is diversifying its suppliers, without relying solely on the United States (F-16) or Sweden (Gripen);
- it is aligning itself with the French vision of a European defense capable of supporting Kiev in the long term and deterring future Russian aggression.
Consistency with the future Ukrainian fleet
For several weeks, Zelensky has been talking about a target of around 250 Western fighter jets to rebuild his air force.
This fleet would be based on:
- F-16s delivered by several European countries and the United States;
- Gripen jets financed through frozen Russian assets;
- Mirage 2000 jets transferred by France;
- and, in the longer term, Rafale aircraft as the spearhead.
This architecture may seem complex, but it allows Kiev to combine quantity (F-16, Mirage) and cutting-edge quality (Rafale, Gripen), while securing political anchors in Washington, Stockholm, and Paris.
The amounts at stake: a potential purchase of more than $20 billion
The French government is currently refraining from announcing an official figure. However, previous Rafale export contracts give an idea of the scale involved.
- Greece paid more than €3 billion for 24 Rafales (new and used), including weapons and support.
- In April 2025, India signed a €6.5 billion contract for 26 Rafale Marine aircraft, including training, support, and technology transfer.
To simplify, a complete Rafale (aircraft, training, initial weapons, logistical support) often costs between €120 million and €200 million per unit, depending on the scope of the package and the associated industrial effort.
Applied to a volume of 100 aircraft, this gives a probable range of:
- €12 to €20 billion for the aircraft alone and their initial level of support;
- more than €20 to €25 billion when fully including armaments (Meteor, MICA, and Scalp missiles, guided bombs), simulators, and infrastructure.
Added to this are the SAMP-T systems, each battery of which already costs hundreds of millions of euros, as well as the associated radars and drones.
For French industry, if this agreement is finalized in full, it would represent one of the biggest export successes for the Rafale, adding to an already record order book of 186 Rafale exports and 53 for France still to be delivered by June 30, 2025.
Delivery times: a race against the industrial clock
Even if signed quickly, an order of this magnitude will come up against the reality of the production line. Dassault Aviation already has an order book of more than 300 aircraft, with a total backlog of €48.3 billion, including 186 Rafale exports.
The manufacturer anticipates:
- approximately 25 Rafale deliveries in 2025;
- a gradual increase to four aircraft per month by the end of the decade.
Inserting 100 aircraft for Ukraine into this flow means:
- either spreading deliveries over a full decade;
- or drawing, at least for the first few aircraft, on French stocks by withdrawing aircraft from the Air Force and Navy ahead of schedule, as was done for Greece and Croatia.
In the most plausible scenario:
- a first squadron of a dozen Rafales, possibly taken from French forces, could be transferred from the second half of the decade, once the training of Ukrainian pilots is sufficiently advanced;
- the rest of the deliveries would follow between the late 2020s and early 2030s, in parallel with deliveries to other export customers and to France itself.
This timeline reflects a reality that no one is really hiding: the Ukrainian Rafale is a long-term gamble, designed as much for post-war Ukraine as for the ongoing conflict. It will not solve Kiev’s immediate needs, which still rely on F-16s, short-term air defense systems, and drones.
Possible mechanisms for financing such a massive purchase
A country whose GDP has fallen by more than 20% since 2022 and whose defense budget is largely dependent on Western aid cannot finance an order of this magnitude on its own. The signed agreement therefore leaves open the question of financial arrangements, but several possibilities are emerging.
Bilateral loans and French guarantees
France can use state-guaranteed export credits, spread over 15 to 20 years, as it has already done for other Rafale customers. Arrangements involving Bpifrance Assurance Export or other export support instruments are possible.
This would allow Kiev to smooth out the annual cost and pay only a fraction of the amounts each year, but it would require a very long-term political gamble on Ukraine’s solvency and the stability of its institutions.
Mobilization of frozen Russian assets
The European Union is already discussing a mechanism to mobilize income from frozen Russian assets, or even a portion of the capital, to finance military aid and reconstruction in Ukraine. A budget of around €140 billion over several years is being discussed for all support to Kiev, including defense.
Part of these funds could be allocated to structural armament programs, including the Rafale, based on the model already envisaged for the Swedish Gripen.
Burden sharing among allies
Finally, there is nothing to prevent us from imagining a scenario in which:
- some Rafales would be financed directly by Ukraine;
- others would be offered or co-financed by European allies as part of a future security coalition;
- some of the associated weapons systems (missiles, bombs, spare parts) would be provided as military aid rather than through traditional exports.
Ultimately, Kiev will probably not pay for the 100 aircraft on its own, but the overall bill will still be considerable for European finances, in a context where national defense budgets are already under pressure.
The real likelihood of seeing 100 Ukrainian Rafales in service
The political announcement is spectacular, but the fundamental question remains: will this order for 100 Rafales actually go through?
Several factors point to partial or gradual implementation:
- The “declaration of intent” format allows the actual volume to be adjusted to Ukraine’s financial capabilities and the political situation in Europe. There is no obligation to strictly reach 100 aircraft.
- The duration of the agreement (around ten years) increases the uncertainties: political changes in Paris, Kiev, and other European capitals; developments in the war; possible peace agreements imposing limits on Ukrainian air capabilities.
- The coexistence of three major programs (F-16, Gripen, Rafale), plus the Mirage 2000, may eventually lead to prioritizing one or two platforms for reasons of maintenance and training costs.
The scenario considered most realistic by many analysts is that of phased implementation:
- initial formation of one or two Rafale squadrons, i.e., 12 to 24 aircraft, to give Ukraine a high-end and symbolic capability;
- gradual increase, depending on funding and the strategic situation, to a format possibly closer to 60 to 80 aircraft;
- possibility that the “100 Rafales” will remain primarily a political ceiling rather than a strict contractual objective.
For France, the main objective has already been achieved: the Rafale has established itself as a pillar of European air defense and as one of the symbols of France’s commitment to Kiev. For Ukraine, even half the number initially announced would represent a radical transformation of its combat aviation.
Strategic challenges for Europe and the post-war period
Beyond the figures and deadlines, this agreement says something more profound about the future of the war in Ukraine and the structure of European security.
By planning deliveries of Rafale fighter jets, SAMP-T systems, and drones over ten years, Paris and Kiev are acknowledging that it will be necessary to:
- rebuild a fully Western Ukrainian air force, integrated with NATO standards;
- establish, on the border with Russia, an air force combining F-16s, Gripens, Rafales, and multi-layered ground-to-air defense;
- take political responsibility, vis-à-vis Moscow, for the choice of a permanently armed Ukraine, even in the event of a ceasefire or a freeze on the front line.
This gamble is not without risks. It assumes that:
- European public opinion will accept the financing of heavy programs over the long term;
- defense industries—led by France—will keep up the promised pace;
- and that Ukraine will remain stable enough, economically and politically, to absorb these complex systems, train pilots and technicians, and integrate these aircraft into a coherent doctrine.
But it also marks a break with the past: after several years of hesitation, Europe now accepts that the security of the continent depends on a strong Ukraine, equipped with the latest generation of combat aircraft. In this context, the Ukrainian Rafale is not just a contract: it is a key element in a new military balance in Eastern Europe.
Sources:
– Statements from the Élysée Palace and live coverage by Le Monde on the signing of the declaration of intent for “around 100 Rafales” and SAMP-T systems, radars, and drones – November 17, 2025.
– Europe 1, TF1-LCI, HuffPost, Boursorama: announcements by Volodymyr Zelensky on the purchase of 100 Rafale aircraft and the “historic” nature of the agreement.
– Reuters, France 24, Arab News: analyses of the ten-year strategic aviation agreement, the prospects for a Ukrainian fleet of 250 aircraft, and the role of the Rafale.
– Industrial data: reports from Dassault Aviation 2025, Aerotime, Le Monde (contracts with India and Greece, Rafale backlog, ramp-up in production).
– Analysis of the Gripen, financing through frozen Russian assets, and Ukraine’s fleet strategy: The Guardian, Euromaidan Press, other European media.
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