The price of a fighter jet is paid at the time of purchase. Its dependency is paid for over 40 years. Costs, maintenance, updates: the real trap of air sovereignty.
In summary
Public debate on fighter jets almost always focuses on the purchase contract. That is the visible part. The decisive part lies elsewhere: in maintenance, parts, engines, software, infrastructure, stocks, and updates. That is where the total cost of ownership comes into play. For the most complex fleets, keeping them in service can end up costing several times the purchase price. The case of the F-35 is illuminating: the Pentagon estimates approximately $442 billion for acquisition, compared to $1.58 trillion for operation and support over the life of the program. There is a twofold trap. First, there is the financial trap: a country may purchase a technological showcase that it cannot afford to operate properly. Second, there is the strategic trap: an underfunded fleet flies less, wears out faster, and ages poorly if updates are delayed. Drones and missiles offer a more “consumable” alternative, but their promise of sovereignty remains partial.
The false price of a fighter jet
Buying a fighter jet is a visible political act. The head of state announces the contract. The manufacturer communicates. The unit price makes the headlines. But this price is only a starting point. The real issue is not the initial check. It is the ability to maintain the aircraft for thirty or forty years without compromising its availability or tactical relevance.
The French Senate highlights a fundamental point: maintaining operational readiness, or MCO, represents on average between 45% and 60% of the total cost of ownership of equipment over its entire life cycle, from acquisition to decommissioning. This is an average. It varies depending on the fleet, the intensity of use, the age of the fleet, and the sophistication of the system. But the message is clear: maintenance is not a secondary cost. It is a central component of the economic model of air power.
In the most expensive programs, the disproportion becomes spectacular. The GAO, the US Congress’s audit body, estimates that the F-35 program will cost more than $2 trillion over its lifetime. Of this total, approximately $442 billion is for acquisition, while $1.58 trillion is for support and operation. In other words, in this specific case, maintenance and support account for approximately 3.6 times the acquisition cost. The idea that “buying is easy, maintaining is ruinous” is therefore not just a saying. For some systems, it is an accounting reality.
The purchase budget and what it doesn’t say
The purchase budget primarily covers development, industrialization, manufacturing, delivery, sometimes initial armament, an initial supply of parts, and some training. It is the cost of the contract and commissioning. It gives the illusion of control because it is limited, negotiated, voted on, and politically presentable.
But it does not tell the whole story. It does not say how much years of fuel, major repairs, replacement of sub-assemblies, test benches, engine refurbishment, additional stocks in the event of a crisis, electronic obsolescence, or software upgrades imposed by the evolution of the threat will cost. Nor does it say how much dependence on the manufacturer will cost if the latter retains control over technical data, supply chains, or major depots.
This is the whole political problem with modern combat aviation: the purchase contract is easy to announce because it is signed once. Dependence, on the other hand, is paid for every year. And it becomes more visible when finances are tight, when parts are missing, or when a geopolitical crisis degrades access to the supplier. It is not just a budgetary issue. It is a question of logistical sovereignty.
The maintenance budget and what it really finances
The maintenance budget is broader than many people imagine. The GAO report on tactical aircraft points out that operating and support appropriations cover fuel, spare parts, and depot-level maintenance, among other things. For modern aircraft, this also includes engine work, inventory management, component repair, support equipment, specialized tools, and part of the technical infrastructure that simply keeps the aircraft flying.
The GAO also points out that, for the F-35, support includes operations and maintenance personnel, repair of the aircraft and its parts, and system modifications. In other words, maintenance is not just about “fixing what breaks.” It also includes what keeps the aircraft useful, safe, up-to-date, and operational.
This is where governments often go wrong. They think as if they were buying a conventional durable good. But a fighter jet is not a passive asset. It is a living, complex system that requires a permanent support chain. The French Senate notes that the average cost of aeronautical MCO increased by 24.2% between 2014 and 2023. This is not an anomaly. It is the logical consequence of increasing sophistication, the use of highly qualified personnel, more advanced maintenance equipment, and the rapid obsolescence of certain technological components.
Even when an aircraft is performing well, the cost of operation remains high. The same Senate report cites an estimated cost of €25,000 per flight hour for the Rafale, compared to €17,000 for the Mirage 2000. This does not mean that the Rafale is “too expensive.” It means that a more modern, more versatile, and more technologically advanced aircraft requires more expensive support. More capabilities also mean higher costs.
The operational trap of underinvestment
The danger is not just paying a lot. The real danger is paying a lot and getting less than expected. This is the crux of the operational trap. A fleet can be acquired at a high price, then lose actual availability if support is poor.
The case of the F-35 is very instructive here. The GAO notes that the entire fleet has seen its overall availability decline over the past five years, and that no variant is meeting its availability targets. It adds that mission-capable rates have not met their targets between 2019 and 2023, despite the increase in projected costs. The message is stark: spending more does not automatically guarantee a higher level of operational readiness.
Why? Because a modern fleet can be slowed down by repair delays, parts shortages, delayed depot maintenance, or a contractual architecture that is overly dependent on the manufacturer. The GAO explicitly mentions slow repair times, a growing backlog of components to be repaired, a lack of parts, insufficient technical documentation, and heavy dependence on contractors. This has a simple effect: the aircraft exists, but it spends too much time on the ground.
Under-investing in maintenance then creates a spiral. The available aircraft fly more. They wear out faster. Major repairs pile up. Training flight hours may be reduced to keep costs down. Pilots lose their rhythm. The military then has a fleet on paper, but a smaller actual capacity. The initial ROI deteriorates because the number of aircraft purchased no longer reflects the actual projectable power.
The cost of upgrades and obsolescence
A modern fighter jet is not static. It ages faster through its software and sensors than through its airframe alone. That is why upgrades are not a luxury. They are a condition for tactical survival.
The GAO points out that, in the case of the F-35, the 2023 estimate already included the Block 4 modernization effort, estimated at $16.5 billion, as well as engine modernization. This program aims to update hardware and software to respond to threats that have emerged since the initial requirements were defined. Simply put, without modernization, the aircraft can no longer keep pace with the threat.
The delay in updating has immediate effects. According to the GAO, the TR-3 brick, which is supposed to activate part of the Block 4 capabilities, will not begin delivery until 2026, approximately three years behind schedule. The report also explains that aircraft have been provisionally accepted in a non-combat-capable configuration to prevent them from remaining in storage at the manufacturer’s premises. In other words, aircraft are being delivered, but are not yet fully combat-ready. This is a perfect example of a purchase that does not immediately achieve its actual military return.
If a country does not invest enough in these upgrades, it does not simply “keep” an older standard. It accepts a loss of tactical range: less relevant sensors, delayed weapons integration, less efficient data processing, insufficient thermal management, and sometimes progressive incompatibility with the rest of the combat architecture. A fighter jet can still fly. It is no longer necessarily up to the level of combat that will be required of it tomorrow.
The temptation of drones and missiles
This is where the argument for drones and missiles gains ground. Their promise is simple: disposable sovereignty. They are less expensive per unit, more quickly replaceable, and they avoid the enormous support apparatus of conventional fighter aviation: heavy bases, long pilot training cycles, industrial depots, complex retrofits on the scale of an entire fleet.
Ukraine is a good example of this. In 2025, Kyiv announced plans to purchase approximately 4.5 million FPV drones, three times more than the previous year, with more than $2.6 billion allocated, specifying that 96% of the FPV drones acquired in 2024 came from Ukrainian manufacturers. This type of model does not eliminate industrial dependencies, but it does reduce dependence on heavy combat aviation and its long support chains. Above all, it allows money to be converted into operational mass more quickly.
But we must remain clear-headed. Drones and missiles are not magically sovereign. They too depend on components, electronics, ammunition, data links, sensors, and sometimes critical imports. Missiles require storage, control, recertification, and lifecycle management. Drones require continuous production, software adaptation, and protection against jamming. They do not eliminate logistics. They shift logistics to shorter, more numerous, more consumable chains.
Their advantage lies elsewhere: they avoid the trap of the very long support debt of a high-end piloted fleet. They are not expected to remain at the top for forty years. They are expected to be produced quickly, used quickly, and replaced quickly. It is a volume-based approach. Fighter jets, on the other hand, remain a capital-based approach.
The true interpretation of return on investment
The real return on investment of a fighter jet is therefore not measured on the day the contract is signed. It is measured by three things: how many aircraft remain available over time, how many useful flight hours they generate, and how much it costs to modernize them so that they remain credible.
If a country buys a very high-end aircraft but has neither the support budget, nor the stock of parts, nor access to technical data, nor the margin for upgrades, it is not buying a sustainable capability. It is buying dependence. Conversely, a country that chooses a more modest, more sustainable fleet, or that combines a core of fighters with drones and missiles, may obtain a less impressive capability on the surface, but one that is more robust over time.
The hidden trap of fighter jets is therefore not just their price. It is the confusion between possession and power. Owning a fleet is not the same as mastering it. True sovereignty does not begin when the aircraft is delivered. It begins when a country can fly, repair, upgrade, and regenerate it without depending on external decisions at every stage. This is where the line between a credible air force and an air force on life support is drawn.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.