Industry, technology, budget, and politics: how Germany is trying to impose its interests in the FCAS/SCAF program against France and Spain.
Summary
The FCAS / SCAF is presented as the future European air superiority system. It is set to replace the French Rafale and the German and Spanish Eurofighter by 2040, based on an ecosystem that combines a new-generation fighter (NGF), accompanying drones (Remote Carriers) and a combat data network (Combat Cloud). This program goes beyond the simple development of a new European fighter jet: it is a collaborative combat architecture involving billions of euros, critical skills, and the strategic sovereignty of the countries involved. Germany is seeking to defend its aerospace and electronics industry (Airbus Germany, MTU Aero Engines, Hensoldt, Diehl), its growing defense budget, and its political weight within the European Union. But Berlin is coming up against France’s desire, led by Dassault Aviation, to retain control over the fighter’s design, and a contentious industrial sharing arrangement. The current tensions are threatening the schedule, which is already slipping towards 2045, and raise a direct question: will Europe have one common European fighter jet or two competing programs?
The FCAS/SCAF program framework
The FCAS (Future Combat Air System), known as SCAF in French (Système de combat aérien du futur), is not just an aircraft. The three partner countries—France, Germany, Spain – are working on a “system of systems” that integrates a new-generation fighter, called NGF, swarms of drones called Remote Carriers, and a tactical Combat Cloud that connects all sensors and weapons in real time. The operational objective is clear: to achieve air superiority and strike deep into contested environments by 2040, combining distributed sensors, electronic warfare, secure interconnection, and collaborative strike capabilities.
This system is intended to succeed the French Rafale and the German and Spanish Eurofighter Typhoon, with initial capability targeted for around 2040. The prototype demonstrators (manned fighter, escort drones, combat cloud) are expected to fly before the end of the decade, with tests announced between 2027 and 2029. But political and industrial delays are already pushing this ambition back to 2045, according to several program stakeholders, including on the French side.
The strategic positioning of the FCAS is twofold. Military, because it must guarantee the three countries a very high level of air capability without depending on the United States. Political, because it embodies the idea of “European strategic autonomy” in the face of uncertainty over long-term American guarantees, particularly regarding deterrence and air defense of the continent.
Germany’s industrial contribution
Germany’s primary contribution is industrial. On the manned aircraft pillar (NGF), Dassault Aviation remains the prime contractor designated by France, but Airbus Germany—often referred to as Airbus Defence and Space on the German side—is the main partner for Berlin (and Madrid) and claims a co-development role, not simply subcontracting.
For the NGF engine, Germany has imposed MTU Aero Engines as the central player. The engine is being developed within a 50/50 joint venture between Safran Aircraft Engines (France) and MTU Aero Engines (Germany), grouped together in the EUMET JV. Spain, via ITP Aero, is involved as a major partner. This engine sharing is politically sensitive: propulsion is considered a sovereign technology and a lever for strategic autonomy.
Airbus Germany is the industrial leader in escort drones, known as Remote Carriers. German manufacturers are working on stealth escort drones capable of jamming, gathering intelligence, or attacking in swarms several hundred kilometers ahead of the manned aircraft. Groups such as Diehl Defense are involved in sensor architecture, targeting, and attack payloads. The idea is to project effects—reconnaissance, electronic warfare, precision strikes—without putting the pilot at risk.
On the Combat Cloud, Airbus Germany is once again the pilot. The Combat Cloud is set to become the system’s tactical and strategic data network, a resilient digital bubble connecting manned aircraft, drones, satellites, ground stations, and naval assets. The challenge is to distribute targeting information, command collaborative fire, and merge all sensors in real time in a jammed environment. For Germany, this network, cyber, and electronic warfare expertise is not incidental: it is an area where its manufacturers want to become indispensable in Europe.
The other pillar where Berlin carries significant weight is sensors. A German consortium, FCMS (Future Combat Mission System), which includes Hensoldt, Diehl, ESG, and Rohde & Schwarz, is developing the system’s distributed sensor network. These include active radars, optronic suites, electronic warfare capabilities, but also the ability to merge this data and push it into the Combat Cloud in an encrypted, stealthy and anti-jamming manner. Hensoldt, a German group specializing in military sensors, has been awarded contracts worth around €100 million to develop these critical components, proving that Berlin is not content to remain a mere customer of French solutions.
Finally, Germany is also claiming a role in the stealth capabilities of the future manned aircraft. Airbus Germany is involved in work on reducing radar and infrared signatures, in collaboration with French and Spanish teams. The aim is to ensure that the future fighter will remain difficult to detect by new-generation, long-range, multi-band enemy radars.
In other words, Berlin is not limiting itself to manufacturing fuselage parts. It is claiming control of three structural components of the future system: combat connectivity, electronic warfare, and collaborative sensor management. This is the digital backbone of the whole system.
Berlin’s budgetary weight and financial commitment
The FCAS budget is massive. Phase 1B, which covers detailed design and the development of flying demonstrators (manned aircraft, drones, cloud), represents approximately €3.2 billion spread between France, Germany, and Spain over approximately three and a half years. This budget will finance the initial technological leap and should result in flying prototypes before 2030.
But this effort is only a taste of what is to come. In the long term, the overall cost of FCAS is estimated at more than €100 billion. Berlin publicly acknowledges that this will be one of the largest European military programs in recent history. This explains why the Bundestag is closely monitoring the allocation of tasks and the protection of German manufacturers’ intellectual property. When approving budget tranches, the budget committee imposes clauses: there can be no question of technologies financed by German public money subsequently being locked in by a foreign partner.
This budgetary monitoring is part of a broader context of German rearmament. Since the war in Ukraine, Berlin has increased its defense efforts and is injecting billions into aviation, electronics, and ground-to-air defense. Groups such as Hensoldt are reporting record order books, fueled by increased domestic purchases and orders related to electronic warfare, air defense, and long-range radars. Germany therefore sees FCAS as an industrial multiplier that will fuel its technological fabric for decades to come, rather than simply a purchase of 5th or 6th generation jets.
The technological challenge for the Luftwaffe
For the Luftwaffe, the FCAS is set to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon from 2040 onwards, with an air superiority platform capable of operating in a space saturated with advanced ground-to-air defenses, multi-band sensors, and intensive jamming. The NGF will be at the heart of this capability. It will need to carry long-range air-to-air weapons, conduct deep precision strikes, and pilot Remote Carriers that will extend its range.
But German needs are not identical to French needs. Paris requires a nuclear carry capacity to ensure France’s airborne deterrence mission, as well as the ability to operate from an aircraft carrier. Berlin, on the other hand, does not require either a national nuclear capacity integrated into the future fighter or carrier landing capability. Germany, on the other hand, has purchased American F-35s for NATO’s nuclear sharing mission, which reduces the immediate pressure on the FCAS for this specific mission. This operational divergence is fueling industrial tensions: while the NGF airframe is optimized for French requirements, Airbus Germany fears being relegated to sub-assemblies when it wants to co-manage the overall design.
For Berlin, the challenge is also to avoid becoming dependent on high-end American equipment in the long term. Abandoning the FCAS means accepting that European high-tech aviation will remain dominated by the French Rafale and American fighter jets, with little room for German industry. German officials insist that the national defense industry must remain capable of producing critical systems, including combat aircraft.
Germany’s political influence
The program also illustrates how Germany uses its political weight. Berlin has set red lines on three issues: work sharing, technical governance, and exports.
First, work sharing. Germany rejects the idea of France’s almost exclusive leadership on the manned aircraft. Members of the Bundestag have threatened to leave the program if Paris imposes a distribution whereby France would take on up to 80% of the industrial tasks on the fighter jet. For Berlin, such a distribution would amount to transforming Airbus Germany into an executor of Dassault Aviation, which is politically impossible to sell to voters and employees at German sites.
Next, technical governance. Airbus Germany wants a say in the architecture of the NGF, not just the assembly. Paris responds that the design of a high-level combat aircraft cannot be directed by a committee and has historically been the responsibility of the prime contractor that has already designed a complete fighter jet—in this case, Dassault Aviation with the Rafale. This is the industrial crux of the conflict between Dassault and Airbus Defence and Space.
Finally, exports. Germany has historically blocked or slowed down certain arms exports for political reasons, which has made Paris nervous about other programs. Berlin now says it “will not stand in the way” of future FCAS exports, meaning that it does not want to become a political hostage to its own public opinion if a customer is deemed sensitive. This is a conciliatory signal sent to the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, which needs to export in order to offset the cost of the future system.
These positions show that the program has become as much a matter of sovereignty as a technical project. Each country wants to come out of it with industrial leverage for the next thirty years, not just with an aircraft.
Comparison with other European partners
Berlin is not alone in its opposition to Paris. Madrid, via Indra and Airbus Spain, supports a more balanced governance structure in which Airbus remains indispensable in several technological areas. Spain is wary of France taking almost exclusive control of the fighter jet, as this would marginalize Airbus Spain and call into question the original tripartite agreement.
This dynamic explains why some German officials are now floating alternative scenarios: joining or cooperating with GCAP, the competing program led by the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan, or strengthening the Eurofighter with new standards while waiting for something better. German politicians have even mentioned purchasing around 60 additional Eurofighters by 2029 if the FCAS schedule slips, in order to secure credible national capability. This also serves as pressure on Paris: if France pushes its industrial advantage too far, Berlin can threaten to leave.
It is also important to note a point that is often underestimated: if the FCAS falls apart, France will undoubtedly be able to continue on its own, even at a high cost, as Dassault Aviation already controls the entire combat aircraft chain (airframe, aerodynamics, sensor integration, weaponry, stealth). Germany, on the other hand, depends on Airbus for the platform and on a fragmented network of electronics and sensors spread across several companies. In short, Paris can consider a national plan B, while Berlin finds it much more difficult to do so. Germany**, meanwhile, depends on Airbus for the platform and on a fragmented network of electronics and sensors spread across several companies. In short, Paris can consider a national Plan B, while Berlin finds this much more difficult.
The possible trajectory of the program
Officially, Paris, Berlin, and Madrid still say they are aiming for a first operational NGF around 2040. The defense ministers have expressed their willingness to “clarify” the program by the end of the year and to launch the next phase, known as “phase 2,” which will finance the flight demonstrators. A political timetable has been set between German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron to decide on the future of the program by the end of 2025.
In reality, the project is already on life support. The trilateral meeting between Germany, France, and Spain scheduled to resolve the deadlock has been postponed, a sign that the differences are not only technical but also political. The manufacturers are talking to each other, but each is communicating publicly to put pressure on the other. Very clear messages are being sent: Airbus says it can continue with Germany and Spain even if France withdraws, and Dassault Aviation says it knows how to design a new-generation fighter on its own without Berlin.
The immediate risk is a domino effect. If the FCAS falls apart, European defense would send a signal to the world of a chronic inability to carry out a joint strategic air program. The three countries would each go their separate ways on national or bilateral paths, with costly duplication and interoperability difficulties in NATO air operations.
The strategic outlook for European defense
The question is therefore not simply, “Who will design the wings of the future fighter?” The real question is, “Who will control the tactical grammar of European air combat in the years 2040-2050?” Today, Germany holds the key building blocks: distributed command network, sensor fusion, electronic warfare. Paris, via Dassault Aviation, is the prime contractor for the manned fighter and wants to retain control over structural choices. Spain is securing its place in the sensor architecture and industrial support.
It’s brutal, but it’s the reality: no one wants to lose out. The FCAS budget is not just buying a European fighter jet. It is buying a seat at the table for the next 30 years, in a world where the United States, China, and other powers are already working on the 6th generation and on collaborative human-machine combat systems. Until Paris and Berlin resolve the issue of industrial leadership and exports, the risk is clear: Europe will arrive late in a field where there is no room for delay.
Sources
Reuters (July-October 2025).
Breaking Defense (October 2025).
Defense News (July 2025).
DGAP Memo No. 38 (August 2025).
Airbus/Dassault/Indra press release Phase 1B (December 2022).
Hensoldt/FCMS industry press releases (2023-2024).
Aviation Week (October 2025).
Bundestag Budget Committee briefings (2021).
Public analyses of the FCAS/SCAF 2040-2045 operational schedule.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.