Iran has used ballistic missiles with cluster munitions against Israel, complicating interception and revealing its tactical choices in a protracted conflict.
On June 19, 2025, Iran fired at least one ballistic missile with cluster munitions toward Israel. This type of weapon, whose payload fragments in flight, is designed to saturate a large area with multiple explosive charges. Dropped at an altitude of approximately 7,000 meters, the 20 submunitions identified each contained 2.5 kg of explosives, spreading over a radius of 16 km. This tactic increases the lethality of the strikes, complicates interception efforts, and reflects an evolution in Iranian doctrine, which seeks to maximize destructive effects despite limited accuracy. The arsenal used—Emad, Ghadr, Shahab-3, and possibly Khorramshahr-4 missiles—is largely based on North Korean or Soviet derivatives. Iranian ballistic systems, which are still far from Western standards of accuracy, rely on volume and dispersion. This attack also reveals a concern: Israel and its allies have effective anti-missile capabilities, but simultaneous saturation by different warheads could eventually reduce their effectiveness. Furthermore, Iran appears to be retaining more powerful long-range missiles for future use in a conflict that is taking the form of an asymmetrical long-range standoff.
A tactical choice based on area saturation
The use of ballistic missiles equipped with cluster munitions has a clear objective: to circumvent interception systems by generating vertical and horizontal dispersion of explosive charges. The missile fired on June 19 fragmented at an altitude of 7,000 meters, releasing 20 submunitions weighing 2.5 kg each. The impact area, approximately 200 km², makes interception virtually impossible if fragmentation occurs in the terminal phase. This strategy does not target a specific target, but increases the chances of hitting a military or symbolic target in a dense urban area.
By choosing this mode of engagement, Iran is circumventing the ballistic accuracy limitations of its current models. Shahab-3 and Emad missiles have a margin of error (CEP) of 1.2 km, according to data from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. On this basis, the probability of hitting a specific target is low, unless it covers a large area (logistics site, airport, military base).
Iran’s strategy is therefore based on volume and dispersion, combining multiple strikes and saturation of the airspace. In the short term, this choice increases lethality, but also poses a political problem: the use of submunitions is prohibited by the 2008 Convention, which neither Iran nor Israel has signed, but whose normative scope remains sensitive.
A shift in Iranian vectors towards precision warfare
The hypothesis of the use of the Khorramshahr-4 (Kheibar), a solid-fuel ballistic missile, raises questions about the evolution of Iranian capabilities. This model, with a range of 2,000 km and a payload of 1,500 kg, could theoretically carry several separate warheads, or even a programmable fragmentation warhead. Although the images of the launches circulating online date from 2023, the absence of an explicit claim is not sufficient to rule out its use in the June 19 salvo.
The Khorramshahr-4’s ability to carry multiple payloads—theoretically up to 1,500 kg distributed across 3 to 5 payloads—makes it a platform of choice for strikes designed to overwhelm Israeli defenses. Furthermore, the use of solid fuel gives Iran greater tactical responsiveness: the missile can be launched without prior liquid preparation, reducing the time it is exposed to satellite detection.
This development goes hand in hand with other vectors such as Fattah-1, a missile described as hypersonic but technically classified as an MRBM with MaRV (maneuverable reentry vehicle). Although its terminal maneuverability is debated, this class of missile reduces the probability of interception by the Iron Dome or Arrow 3, Israel’s ballistic missile defense systems.
The addition of submunitions to these missiles therefore transforms inaccurate delivery systems into tools for territorial saturation, which reconfigures the cost calculation for Israel. Each intercepted missile costs between $40,000 and $80,000, while a Shahab-3 ballistic missile costs around $500,000 to $1 million to produce. But a single unintercepted warhead can paralyze an air base or damage strategic infrastructure, overturning the tactical return equation.
The growing limits of Israeli defenses under saturation
One of the direct consequences of the use of cluster munitions is the drop in the interception rate observed on June 19. While the Arrow 3 and Iron Dome systems are effective at intercepting individual missiles, their effectiveness decreases as soon as the density of projectiles exceeds simultaneous processing thresholds. High-altitude fragmentation poses a technical challenge: each submunition becomes a separate threat, requiring tracking, assessment, and then neutralization.
In addition, the Emad and Ghadr missiles used by Iran have maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV). These warheads, which detach in the terminal phase, slightly change their trajectory, complicating the adjustment of anti-missile systems. This combined effect strategy (MaRV + fragmentation) makes each salvo more difficult to contain, especially if it is coordinated with electronic decoys or conventional single-warhead missiles.
According to data provided by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), more than 40 Iranian strategic targets were struck in retaliation by air-to-ground missiles launched by approximately 25 fighter jets. These strikes targeted ready-to-fire platforms, such as a ready-to-use Emad launcher. However, this success does not neutralize the risk of depleting interceptor stocks, whose production remains limited in the face of Iran’s potential firing rate.
The conflict is thus becoming a war of technological and economic attrition, where the objective is less destruction than logistical overload of the enemy’s forces. Israel, backed by US capabilities in the region, still appears to be in a position of strength, but this growing pressure highlights the vulnerability of defenses to saturation by multiple charges.
An evolving asymmetric strategy
Iran has not yet committed its entire arsenal. According to several analysts, longer-range missiles such as Sejjil or Haj Qassem could be reserved for an escalation phase involving a direct response from the US. Their potential lies in their higher payload and higher terminal velocities, which limit the adversary’s response time.
The missile war between Iran and Israel reveals a gradual doctrinal shift, where mass effect, saturation, and psychological warfare are taking precedence over precision. While this strategy entails civilian casualties, it reflects an assumed military logic: strike far, paralyze defenses, and force a response on terrain that is disadvantageous to the adversary.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.