Washington notifies an FMS sale of approximately $3.42 billion for F-16 Block 70s to Peru: 12 aircraft, APG-83 AESA radars, Viper Shield electronic warfare, AMRAAM/AIM-9X missiles.
Summary
Washington has notified a potential FMS to Peru for 12 F-16 Block 70s (10 F-16Cs and 2 F-16Ds) and an initial batch of air-to-air weapons. Indicative amount: $3.42 billion (≈ €3.15–3.25 billion depending on the exchange rate). The package includes APG-83 AESA, Viper Shield, IRST, and Litening targeting pods. The offer comes in response to aging fleets (MiG-29, Su-25, Mirage 2000, A-37) that are difficult to maintain, and the collapse of Russian exports. The F-16 would place the Fuerza Aérea del Perú within the NATO ecosystem (ammunition, support, training) while remaining more affordable and available than alternatives such as the Rafale F4, ** Gripen E/F**, or *KF-21*. The long-term target is *24 aircraft*: the acquisition could be made in two phases, with priorities: air policing, border control, anti-narcotics, then precision air-to-ground.
The FMS agreement notified: content, schedule, costs, and limitations
On September 15, 2025, the DSCA sent the “Peru – F-16 Aircraft” notification to Congress. The scope mentions 10 F-16Cs and 2 F-16Ds Block 70 for an estimated total of $3.42 billion. Converted at a rate of 0.92–0.95, this amounts to €3.15–3.25 billion. The initial weapons package includes 12 AIM-120C-8 AMRAAMs and 12 AIM-9X Block IIs: this is a starting allocation for qualification and air-to-air protection, with air-to-ground weapons announced as “to be added later” (potential JDAM/LGB/JSOW depending on arbitration). On the sensor side, the AN/APG-83 AESA provides superior range, multi-track tracking, SAR modes, and robust performance in cluttered environments. The IRST extends discreet radar-free detection, useful against low-signature targets. The AN/ALQ-254 Viper Shield (or equivalent) provides modern alerting, jamming, and DRFM techniques. AN/AAQ-28 Litening pods provide ground target identification and designation. The FMS contract normally includes training, parts, tools, initial logistics support, and technical assistance.
Two realities to keep in mind: (1) an FMS notification is neither a firm contract nor a final price; the content and value may change during negotiations (offsets, cadence, weapons options). (2) The Lockheed Martin Greenville line is loaded with Block 70/72 orders and F-16V retrofits; the first deliveries to Peru will depend on this order book and Peruvian funding milestones. A realistic schedule would be: signature → entry into force → industrial launch → training (pilots/techs) → initial deliveries: 36–48 months is typical for a first fleet, with acceleration if slots are freed up. To limit the cost per flight hour, the selection of an engine, a shared spare parts chain, and a conditional maintenance policy will be decisive.
The state of the Peruvian fleet: aging, availability, and needs
The Fuerza Aérea del Perú still operates MiG-29s (≈ 8), Su-25s (≈ 8), Mirage 2000s (≈ 11), and Cessna A-37 (≈ 20) aircraft, according to 2025 industry compilations. This fleet combines airframes delivered in the mid-1980s (Mirage 2000) and mid-1990s (MiG-29/Su-25). The MiG-29SM-Ps have received radar/avionics upgrades and a fixed refueling probe; the Su-25s have undergone a program to extend their potential. In reality, the availability rate of Russian-made equipment has fallen due to access to parts, avionics obsolescence, maintenance costs, and competition from Russian industrial priorities. The A-37s, numerous but very old, are limited in terms of payload, sensors, and survivability. The Peruvian Mirage 2000s, among the first to be produced, remain structurally sound but are insufficient without major modernization (radar, links, electronic warfare, weapons). Operational requirements fall into three categories: air policing (availability, datalink, reliable radar), interception/air-to-air (BVR AMRAAM missiles, short-range AIM-9X), and precision air-to-ground (pods, guided munitions). The aircraft will also have to be capable of high-altitude operations over the Andes and integrate into anti-narcotics missions (surveillance, medium-altitude interception, coordination with ground forces). Finally, logistics are a factor: a heterogeneous inventory is expensive; standardizing around a multi-role platform increases availability and lowers the annual bill, while simplifying initial and ongoing training. This is the core of the “block replacement” argument: gradually withdrawing the A-37/Su-25, reducing the MiG-29 fleet, and maintaining a responsible transition to the Mirage 2000 until the second batch of F-16s is delivered.
The geopolitical shift: phasing out Russian equipment, interoperability, and facts
The choice of the F-16 Block 70 reflects a strategic reorientation. Sanctions, the absorption of Russian production by its internal needs, and difficulties in accessing subcomponents have caused Moscow’s arms exports to plummet. SIPRI series indicate a halving (or more, depending on the five-year period) of Russian exports and a reduction in the number of active customers (from 31 in 2019 to 12 in 2023). At the same time, France has overtaken Russia as the world’s second-largest exporter. For Lima, maintaining dependence on Russian supply chains means accepting delays, hidden costs, and uncertainty about availability. Conversely, integrating the NATO ecosystem brings: interoperability (data links, procedures, ammunition), shared support and training, and industrial responsiveness. South America now includes Chile (for over twenty years) and Argentina (recently) as F-16 operators; Peru would become the fourth, opening up opportunities for regional cooperation (exercises, logistics, shared training and simulators). To put it bluntly, remaining captive to a supplier that struggles to produce and deliver exposes Peru’s defense to capacity failures. This is not a question of ideology, but of the measurable availability of aircraft, parts, and support teams. Recent international experience shows that “gold-American” fleets (modernized F-16s, F-15s, and F-18s) maintain higher mission rates, provided that there is rigorous MCO funding and just-in-time inventory management.
Capability comparison: F-16 Block 70 vs. Rafale F4, Gripen E/F, and KF-21
On the sensor side, the APG-83 AESA brings the F-16 closer to modern standards (SAR modes, multi-target air-to-air tracking, jamming resistance). Rafale F4 offers RBE2 AESA, SPECTRA, MICA NG/AMRAAM equivalents and highly advanced air-to-ground weapons (AASM, SCALP), but with a traditionally higher acquisition and ownership cost. * Gripen E/F* offers Selex ES AESA, Skyward-G IRST, an open architecture, and reputedly low hourly costs, with industrial support from Embraer in Brazil, which may be of interest to Peru for regional offsets. The KF-21 is promising (indigenous AESA, South Korean/NATO weapons), but still ramping up, so there are uncertainties about timelines and the supply chain . The F-16 Block 70 scores points for: industrial availability (Greenville), global supply chain, large user base (nearly 25 countries), and immediate compatibility with AMRAAM/AIM-9X already notified. In terms of air-to-ground capabilities, the maturity of JDAM/LGB kits and Litening pods reduces the time needed to achieve precision strike capability. Training is standardized (USAF/contractors syllabus), and simulators are widely available. In terms of overall cost, the decision will depend on offsets, maintenance location (intermediate or heavy), and inventory policy. One clear point: the F-16 is not “the best in every respect,” but it is the most sustainable for an air force seeking a rapid upgrade without taking excessive industrial risks.
Expected operational effects: missions, allocations, and ramp-up
In the short term, the arrival of an initial batch of 12 aircraft will secure air policing (QRA), with AMRAAM/AIM-9X pairs suitable for interception. The availability of the SAR mode of the APG-83 and Litening pods will quickly enable precision air-to-ground missions in support of ground forces: laser-guided or INS/GPS strikes from 4,000–8,000 m depending on the ground-to-air threat. For border control and anti-narcotics operations, IRST and data links facilitate cooperative interception of small, fast aircraft and trafficking on Amazonian routes. The announced final target of 24 fighters would give the FAP two operational squadrons: one focused on air-to-air/QRA, the other on multi-role air-to-ground. In training, allow 12–18 months to generate the first ten OTU-level pilots and patrol leaders, at a reasonable pace. On the MCO side, moving from a mix of MiG-29/Su-25/Mirage 2000/A-37 to a single F-16 standard reduces the number of references and facilitates the implementation of a rotating stock. At the same time, the gradual phase-out of the A-37s and the consolidation of support missions in favor of the F-16 require a strict ROE framework and investment in simulators (procedures, firing, rejoining, in-flight failure). Finally, the acquisition of air-to-ground weapons will have to follow: GBU-31/32 and GBU-12/16 JDAM kits, then stand-off (JSOW/JASSM if policy allows). From a budgetary perspective, the initial investment of €3.15–3.25 billion must be accompanied by a multi-year MCO budget > 6–7% of capital invested per year to maintain an availability rate above 70%.
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