Lack of flight hours, accelerated training, rising accident rates: how the deprofessionalization of pilots is weakening Russian aviation.
Summary
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the Russian Aerospace Forces have been facing a crisis that is less visible than material losses: that of pilot standards. The most experienced aviators were overrepresented in the early stages of the conflict, particularly during high-intensity missions conducted at low altitude. This qualitative attrition has forced Russia to accelerate the training of new pilots. In 2026, several corroborating sources indicate that some young pilots are being hired with less than 80 hours of flight time per year, far below NATO standards, which are between 180 and 200 hours. This deterioration has led to a significant increase in accidents, particularly during landing, navigation, and night flight phases. More profoundly, it affects Russia’s ability to conduct complex and coordinated air operations. Russian aviation is still flying, but it is flying less well.
The initial shock suffered by Russian aviation
Attrition concentrated on experienced pilots
In the early years of the conflict, Russia deployed its most seasoned pilots for complex offensive missions. Deep strikes, close air support, penetration of defended areas: these profiles required highly trained aviators. It was precisely these pilots who were most exposed.
Unlike material losses, which can be replaced in the medium term, the loss of an elite pilot represents years of training and experience that cannot be recovered in the short term. The VKS has thus seen part of its most valuable human capital disappear.
A rapid scissor effect
This qualitative attrition was combined with an intensification of the operational pace. Surviving pilots were called upon beyond the usual standards, accelerating fatigue, psychological wear and tear, and human error. The system began to strain as early as 2023.
Training Russian pilots before the conflict
A model already under strain in peacetime
Before 2022, Russian pilot training followed a traditional pattern: rigorous selection, specialized schools, then gradual progression to training and combat aircraft. However, even before the war, the number of flight hours was below Western standards.
A Russian fighter pilot accumulated an average of 100 to 120 hours per year, compared to 180 to 200 hours for their NATO counterparts. This difference was partially offset by a more rigid doctrine and less varied mission profiles.
Dependence on local infrastructure
Russian training relies heavily on specific bases, often remote, with limited resources. The slightest logistical, weather, or budgetary disruption directly affects flight hours.
Forced acceleration of training since 2023
Shortened cycles at the expense of mastery
Faced with losses, Russia has accelerated the flow of new pilots. Training cycles have been compressed, with certain consolidation phases being reduced. In practice, this means fewer solo flights, fewer complex exercises, and fewer repetitions.
In 2026, several pilots were sent to operational units with less than 80 hours of annual flight time, sometimes barely more than 60 hours. At this level, automatic responses are not yet stabilized.
Premature exposure to combat
These young pilots find themselves confronted with hostile environments without having fully assimilated the basics of tactical flying. Stress management, emergency response, and navigation become problematic as soon as the scenario deviates from the norm.
The increase in accidents as a visible symptom
A sharp increase in landing accidents
Open data shows a marked increase in accidents during the approach and landing phases. These maneuvers require fine coordination, constant anticipation, and excellent reading of the environment. They are particularly sensitive to lack of experience.
Runway excursions, hard landings, and collisions with terrain have been reported more frequently since 2024, even far from the front line.
Navigation and fuel errors
Another worrying indicator is navigation errors. Aircraft have strayed off course, violated unplanned airspace, or had to make emergency landings due to fuel shortages. These incidents reflect insufficient mastery of instrument flying and mission planning.
The direct impact on military effectiveness
A more cautious and less daring air force
Faced with this skills gap, the VKS is adapting its behavior. Mission profiles are being simplified. Deep penetrations are becoming rarer. The Russian air force is operating more from its own airspace, launching munitions from a distance.
This choice reduces human risk, but decreases accuracy and overall military effectiveness.
Degraded air-ground coordination
The lack of experience also affects cooperation with ground forces. Close air support requires a detailed understanding of the situation on the ground and fluid communication. However, these skills take time and practice to develop.
Unfavorable comparison with NATO standards
The central role of flight hours
In Western air forces, the number of flight hours is considered a key indicator of competence. Between 180 and 200 hours per year, a pilot maintains their reflexes, tactical sense, and ability to handle the unexpected.
At 80 hours, pilots fly enough to stay sharp, but not enough to improve. The margin for error becomes small.
A qualitative difference that is difficult to bridge
This disparity translates into a real performance gap, regardless of the technical characteristics of the aircraft. A modern aircraft cannot compensate for an insufficiently trained pilot.
The structural consequences for Russian aviation
A negative spiral that is difficult to reverse
Fewer flight hours lead to more accidents. More accidents further reduce the number of experienced pilots. This spiral is costly, both in human and material terms.
Training a fighter pilot costs several million euros and years of effort. Each loss has a lasting impact on the institution.
A long-term decline in credibility
In the medium term, Russia will retain a large air force, but one that is less professional. Air deterrence relies as much on the perception of competence as on raw numbers.
What this deprofessionalization reveals
The current situation highlights an often underestimated reality: air warfare is above all a human affair. Aircraft can be modernized and missiles replaced, but pilot experience cannot be decreed.
Russia can continue to field squadrons and produce aircraft. However, without massive reinvestment in training, time, and flight hours, the qualitative gap with Western forces is likely to widen permanently.
In the years to come, the skies will remain a battlefield. But for the VKS, the real challenge may not be entering it, but operating there with the level of mastery that modern warfare demands.
Sources
NATO assessment reports on pilot training
IISS and RUSI analyses of the VKS
Open-source data on Russian air accidents
Comparative studies on military flight hours
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.