An overview of sanctions against Russia in 2025: who is imposing sanctions, which sectors are affected, how much money has been frozen, the impact on Moscow, and the repercussions for Europe and the world.
Sanctions against Russia have changed in scale since 2022 and have been further consolidated in 2024-2025. They target finance, energy, trade, and technology. They involve the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, the G7, and partners in Asia-Pacific. They are based on asset freezes, import bans, export controls, price caps, and measures against the “ghost fleet” of oil tankers. They are causing major adjustments in Russia and among the sanctioning countries. This article provides a detailed overview of the situation in 2025: who is imposing sanctions, on what issues, for what amounts, with what economic effects and geopolitical consequences. The keywords searched—sanctions against Russia, economic sanctions against Russia, European sanctions against Russia, US sanctions against Russia, international sanctions against Russia, energy sanctions against Russia, financial sanctions against Russia, trade sanctions against Russia, sanctions against Russia in 2025—inform this analysis without weighing down the reading.
The global scope of sanctions in 2025
The core of the coalition includes the EU, the US, the UK, Canada, Japan, and Australia. Switzerland and Norway largely align with the European packages. South Korea, New Zealand, and Singapore are participating through financial restrictions and export controls. The measures affect banking, insurance, shipping, energy, metals, luxury goods, microelectronics, and software. Asset freezes are massive: approximately $300 billion in Russian sovereign assets are frozen in the G7, including nearly €210 billion in the EU. Switzerland has announced that 7.4 billion Swiss francs have been frozen within its borders. These figures structure the long-term financial pressure and fuel the effort to support Ukraine through the profits generated by the frozen assets.
The European arsenal: successive packages and the energy target
The EU has stacked up “packages since 2022. The 14th package (June 2024) marked an energy turning point: ban on transshipments of Russian LNG in European ports, ban on new investments in LNG projects in Russia, listing of ships involved in deceptive practices or in circumventing measures. In 2025, the EU strengthened the architecture by lowering the price cap on Russian crude oil and working on a mechanism for phasing out Russian gas contracts (pipeline and LNG) with transition periods. European sanctions against Russia also target diamonds (G7 trace), influential media, software, and intellectual property. On the energy front, the EU is maintaining its embargo on crude oil by sea and participating in the price cap coalition. The strategic objective remains to reduce Moscow’s energy revenues while minimizing supply shocks for European consumers.
US sanctions: from financial to secondary
Washington combines OFAC lists, BIS controls, and secondary sanctions. Since Executive Order 14114 (December 2023), foreign banks that facilitate transactions with the Russian military-industrial complex are subject to US measures. The Treasury has issued compliance notices and broadened the scope of targeted entities. US sanctions against Russia have also reinforced the implementation of price caps on oil and limited the provision of IT and software services to Russia. The result: increased caution among banks in Turkey, the UAE, and Central Asia, longer payment channels, and higher circumvention costs for sensitive Russian imports.
British, Canadian, Japanese, and Australian measures
London is maintaining the Maritime Services Ban and guidance on the price cap, and has published a list of major oil companies and ships linked to the evasion fleet. Ottawa expanded its regime in 2025: new import/export bans, additions of individuals and entities, targeting of vessels participating in the shadow fleet. Tokyo is extending its lists of products subject to authorization (semiconductors, precision equipment) and strengthening G7 coordination. Canberra added individual designations, strengthened sectoral bans, and joined forces with London and Washington. These blocs are moving forward together on international sanctions against Russia, with national nuances but a common goal.
Financial sanctions: frozen assets, SWIFT, and backed loans
The financial aspect remains central. Several Russian banks are excluded from SWIFT. Frozen sovereign assets generate financial profits captured by European depositories; they serve as the basis for a financing mechanism for Ukraine (approximately $50 billion in revenue-backed loans). The EU and the G7 are discussing legal options to perpetuate the use of these revenues, or even regulate the future liquidation of assets. The monitoring of transactions and maritime insurance is intensifying: more cumbersome documentation, reinforced certificates of origin, controls on transshipments and turned-off AIS. Compliance is becoming a cost in its own right for operators, insurers, and traders.
Trade and technology sanctions
Trade sanctions against Russia are linked to export controls. The United States, the EU, the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea are blocking Moscow’s access to critical technologies: high-precision CNC, machine tools, optics, radio frequency components, advanced semiconductors, and industrial software. Entity lists are growing, including in transit countries, and “no-Russia” clauses are becoming the contractual norm in supply chains. The authorities are also targeting marketplaces and “re-exportation” via intermediaries. The sanctions aim to slow down the ramp-up of Russian production of missiles, drones, and optical firing systems by cutting off access to dual-use goods.
Energy sanctions: oil, gas, LNG, and diamonds
The price cap on Russian crude oil is changing: initially set at $60 per barrel, it will be lowered in 2025 on the European side, with an adjustable model. Refined products remain subject to differentiated caps. The direct effect is mitigated by the rise of the ghost fleet and rerouting to India, China, and Turkey, but transportation, insurance, and discount costs are eating into profits. The share of Russian gas in European imports has collapsed: the EU has reduced its pipeline volumes and increased its LNG imports, mainly from the United States. Energy sanctions against Russia extend to LNG via a ban on transshipments in Europe and a freeze on new investments in Russia. On the diamond front, the G7 is implementing a traceability system; the EU and its partners are gradually banning diamonds of Russian origin (including those polished in third countries). Russia is partially compensating for this with discounts and the use of FSUs and non-G7 ports, but at the cost of a compressed margin.
The impact on Russia: growth under pressure and budgetary trade-offs
After a rebound driven by military spending, Russian growth slows in 2025. Energy revenues decline despite sustained volumes. The budget deficit widens over the course of the year, as the government prioritizes war efforts. The economy suffers from labor shortages, high logistics costs, and persistent inflation. Interest rates remain a constraint on civilian investment. Import substitution is progressing in simple segments, but is hampered by technological bottlenecks. The consequences of sanctions against Russia are also evident in credit quality, the fragility of certain regional banks, and fiscal adjustments. The government is favoring wages in the military-industrial complex and targeted aid, to the detriment of civilian investment. The model is shifting toward a two-speed war economy: the arms industry is running at full speed, while civilian sectors are constrained.
The effects on the sanctioning countries: energy costs and reorientation
For the EU, the halt in Russian flows meant a price shock and adjustment costs as early as 2022 . In 2024-2025, prices fell back but remained higher than pre-crisis levels. Europe invested in LNG terminals (increasing capacity by tens of billions of cubic meters) and diversified its sources; the United States dominates supply. A residual share of Russian LNG remains, hence the effort to gradually disengage. Energy-intensive industries are absorbing reduced competitiveness; national mechanisms are cushioning the shock. Norway has consolidated its role as a key supplier of gas. In terms of compliance, documentation requirements, due diligence, and audits are weighing on traders, insurers, shipowners, and banks. These implementation costs are the downside of Western sanctions against Russia; they are accepted in the name of security, economic, and moral objectives.
The geopolitics of sanctions: circumvention, coalition and limits
Russia has built alternative networks with Asia and the Middle East. Crude oil sales to China and India now account for the majority of outlets. The ghost fleet continues to grow, even if its expansion is slowing. Western authorities are adapting enforcement tools: cap reductions, ship listings, port access bans, secondary sanctions against recalcitrant foreign banks. Think tanks are proposing automatic mechanisms linking oil prices to Russian aggression, or tougher measures against complicit brokers and insurers. But marginal effectiveness declines over time: Moscow adapts, and the coalition must calibrate its measures to maximize pressure without disrupting global supply.
A realistic outlook for 2025
Sanctions against Russia and the global economy are shaping a new balance. For Moscow, the loss of the European gas market is structural; shale oil logistics from the ghost fleet prevent suffocation but eat into profits. Growth is slowing, the budget is tightening, and critical technologies remain difficult to access. For those imposing sanctions, Europe is paying an adjustment cost but gaining energy resilience; the Western financial system is holding the line thanks to stricter rules, at the cost of increased compliance burdens. Politically, sanctions alone are not enough: they reduce Russia’s resources, disrupt supply chains and limit access to technologies, but they require sustained enforcement, broader alliances and incentives for third countries. What happens next will depend on the cohesion of the G7, enforcement discipline, and the ability to tax evasion faster than Russia can invent new ways around it.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.