The bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities: a strategic assessment that remains uncertain

Have the US and Israeli bombings of Iranian nuclear sites really weakened Tehran’s nuclear program? An analysis of the actual damage.

On June 22, 2025, the US carried out Operation Midnight Hammer, a coordinated attack on three Iranian nuclear sites: Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. The stated goal was to reduce Tehran’s ability to enrich uranium for military purposes. The operation was carried out with the support of Israel, which had launched a series of targeted strikes in the preceding days. According to official US and Israeli statements, the underground infrastructure was severely damaged. However, leaks of preliminary assessments by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) contradict these claims and suggest more limited results. At the same time, Iran acknowledges the damage, while denouncing a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Satellite images show craters and destroyed buildings, but the exact location of the centrifuges and uranium stocks remains unknown. The situation remains unstable, both militarily and diplomatically, with several actors (CIA, Mossad, US media) providing conflicting accounts. This article provides an in-depth analysis of the technical data, political stakes, and strategic consequences of Operation Midnight Hammer.

Operation Midnight Hammer: composition, resources deployed, and targets

Launched on the night of June 21-22, 2025, Operation Midnight Hammer was one of the most complex air strikes carried out by the United States in the Middle East in over a decade. Conducted in close coordination with Israel, the operation targeted three sites linked to Iran’s nuclear program: Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. The attack relied on a range of cutting-edge technological and military assets, with priority given to penetrating underground structures.

The core of the US raid was the deployment of seven B-2A Spirit stealth bombers, each armed with two GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bombs. Weighing 13,600 kg each, this weapon is designed to penetrate up to 60 meters of concrete or 40 meters of hard rock, with a kinetic effect without a nuclear warhead. This was their first use in combat. These bombers were joined by F-22 Raptors and F-35A Lightning IIs, tasked with air cover, ground threat identification, and electronic warfare.

At the same time, an American Ohio SSGN-class attack submarine positioned in the Persian Gulf fired more than 24 Tomahawk Block IV missiles, each capable of striking at a range of over 1,600 km with an accuracy of less than 10 meters. These missiles targeted surface installations at the Isfahan site, believed to house tunnels for burying enriched uranium.

The entire mission required the support of 52 air tankers, mobilized from Europe and the Gulf to keep the air group in flight during an operational window of approximately 36 hours. The aircraft crossed the airspace via corridors previously cleared by reconnaissance drones and radar imaging satellites.

The targeted sites were not chosen at random. Fordow is carved into the mountainside and is believed to house several hundred IR-6 centrifuges, used to enrich uranium to over 60%. Natanz, larger but less deep, contains the majority of the centrifuges, in a large underground hall. Isfahan is a chemical processing center where uranium is converted into UF6 gas, a preliminary step in enrichment.

The Pentagon’s stated objective was to destroy or render these nerve centers inoperable, thereby slowing the progress of Iran’s nuclear program by several years. According to US officials, the precision of the strikes allowed specific points above the underground halls to be hit, causing local collapses or rendering the tunnels impassable.

Differences in assessment between intelligence agencies and governments

Twelve days after Operation Midnight Hammer, assessments of the actual damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear program vary widely depending on the source. Three main categories of actors express often contradictory views: US intelligence agencies, Israeli authorities, and the specialized press. These differences in analysis reflect both the technical uncertainty inherent in post-strike assessments and the influence of political factors.

The CIA, through its director John Ratcliffe, claims that the strikes caused “severe” and long-term damage to several critical facilities. According to data provided by sources described as “reliable and historically accurate,” some sites have been rendered inoperable for several years and will need to be completely rebuilt. US intelligence reports structural damage inside the Fordow and Natanz complexes.

Conversely, a preliminary report by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), reported by several media outlets including CNN and the New York Times, believes that the results are limited. This report raises the possibility that enriched uranium was removed prior to the strikes and that the centrifuges remained intact, or at least repairable. The analysts cited indicate that the Iranian program has only been delayed by a few months. The document has been described as a “low confidence assessment,” indicating that its reliability is considered low due to a lack of direct access to the targeted facilities.

Israel, for its part, is taking a more aggressive stance. Military and intelligence officials quoted by Axios and Yediot Ahronot estimate that the strikes trapped several hundred kilograms of enriched uranium inside the sealed tunnels in Isfahan and Fordow. These materials are now inaccessible, as the entrances have been destroyed. Satellite images analyzed by Maxar Technologies show deep craters on access roads, collapsed tunnel entrances, and flattened outbuildings.

Iran, through its foreign ministry spokesman, acknowledges that the facilities have been seriously damaged, but without specifying the nature of the damage. It describes the strikes as a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while accusing the United States of “nuclear terrorism”. However, no official information has been released by the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization regarding the amount of fissile material affected or the condition of the centrifuges.

Finally, some independent experts, such as David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, consider reports of minimal damage to be implausible. He argues, with supporting images, that the bombs hit the exact area containing the centrifuges, particularly in Natanz, and that the impact is likely to be greater than initial leaks suggest.

These contradictions reveal two central issues: on the one hand, the lack of physical inspection prevents a definitive assessment; on the other hand, technical intelligence (radio interceptions, radar images, thermal analysis) is open to interpretation and subject to manipulation, whether deliberate or not. It is therefore likely that assessments will continue to evolve in the coming weeks as new leaks, cross-checks, and confirmations emerge.

The political and diplomatic consequences of Operation Midnight Hammer

The impact of Operation Midnight Hammer goes far beyond the military dimension. This intervention constitutes a targeted act of war against the strategic infrastructure of a sovereign state, raising several diplomatic issues. The reaction of the states directly involved, the effects on regional balances, and the implications for nuclear non-proliferation agreements must be analyzed carefully.

The day after the strikes, Iran denounced a joint attack by the United States and Israel against civilian facilities, claiming that the targeted sites were under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Majlis (Iranian parliament) quickly adopted a text suspending all cooperation with the IAEA, marking a break with the transparency obligations to which the country was theoretically bound.

At the same time, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister demanded financial compensation for material damage, estimated at billions of euros, a demand that is obviously symbolic in the current international context. Tehran also accuses the United States of violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), although it is not explicitly prohibited to attack facilities if they are considered to be military or dual-use.

The US position is that this was a preventive act, justified by the need to slow down a clandestine military nuclear program. At a press conference at the NATO summit in The Hague, President Trump said that the strikes had “destroyed Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon”. This rhetoric has been tempered by leaks from the DIA, but politically, the US administration is maintaining an aggressive stance, emphasizing the professionalism of the forces involved and the precision of the strikes.

Israel, which co-instigated the operation, took advantage of the intervention to reaffirm its doctrine of zero tolerance toward a nuclear Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu confirmed that plans for the attack had been in the works since February 2025, with or without US approval. He specified that the Jewish state did not request authorization, but that military coordination was “maximal.” This reflects Israel’s desire to maintain its freedom of action while taking advantage of US resources to deal a severe blow to the Iranian program.

The operation also had collateral effects in the Gulf. Several countries in the region, allies of the United States, raised their air defense posture in anticipation of retaliation. Iranian ballistic missile strikes against the US base at Al Udeid in Qatar took place in the days following the operation. According to US statements, 14 missiles were intercepted, some after being preceded by a “warning.”Al Udeid in Qatar** in the days following the operation. According to US statements, 14 missiles were intercepted, some after being preceded by a “warning” from Tehran, a sign of a desire to avoid escalation while saving face domestically.

Finally, the diplomatic consequences affect regional agreements. The expansion of the Abraham Accords, promoted by the US since 2020, could be slowed down. Countries such as Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia could reduce their diplomatic visibility vis-à-vis Israel in the short term, in response to an operation perceived as aggressive.

Internationally, Russia and China have criticized the strikes, calling them a unilateral and destabilizing act. Moscow called an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, which ended without any concrete results due to the US veto. Beijing, Iran’s energy partner, limited itself to a verbal protest but could step up its deliveries of dual-use technology to Tehran in response.

By targeting the heart of Iran’s nuclear program, Operation Midnight Hammer has altered the diplomatic balance and regional red lines and could compromise any attempt to revive a negotiated nuclear agreement in the medium term. The consequences of this act will be felt as much in the chancelleries as on the sites that were struck.

The consequences for deterrence doctrine and underground warfare

Operation Midnight Hammer calls into question several pillars of the nuclear deterrence doctrine in the Middle East and requires a review of underground warfare doctrines. By destroying part of Iran’s underground nuclear facilities, Israel and the United States have demonstrated that no shelter, even one protected by 60 meters of rock, is safe from a precision strike carried out by a B-2 Spirit stealth bomber equipped with GBU-57 bombs.

The GBU-57A/B, also known as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), is a 13,600 kg device capable of penetrating more than 20 meters of reinforced concrete before detonating. Satellite images have confirmed that underground hangars, particularly at the Natanz and Fordow sites, have been partially collapsed. These strikes show that the doctrine of “bury to protect” is reaching its technological limits in the face of US capabilities.

In terms of deterrence, the intervention reverses the relationship between the ability to hide and the ability to strike. Until now, Iran has relied on concealment, dispersion, and camouflage of its facilities. But this logic is becoming less credible in the face of Western capabilities to locate and strike deep, even in contexts of electronic warfare or GPS jamming.

This is forcing states with nuclear or para-nuclear capabilities to revise their sanctuarization strategies. We can therefore expect Iran to:

• Reconsider the choice of underground structures in favor of horizontal dispersion,
• Invest more in electromagnetic deception and decoy systems,
• Accelerate the redundancy of its sites outside known areas of aerial and satellite surveillance.

For observer states (North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia), this raid also sends a strong signal. It shows that even protected nuclear facilities are not invulnerable. The message is clear: possessing a partially concealed nuclear program is not in itself a deterrent in the face of political will and technical capabilities such as those of Washington or Tel Aviv.

On the Western side, this operation justifies the continued use of specialized tools such as the B-2 Spirit, which remains one of the only aircraft capable of carrying a GBU-57. The limited production of this aircraft (21 units) makes its use strategic. Its successor, the B-21 Raider, will have to maintain this ability to strike with precision under conditions of very high air security.

Finally, this strike raises an important question: how can highly powerful conventional strikes be integrated into a non-nuclear deterrence strategy? Here, the United States has opted for a show of force that avoids nuclear weapons but produces a similar strategic effect by neutralizing a major national asset of its adversary. This approach, known as “enhanced conventional deterrence,” could become more widespread.

The role of drones and cyberwarfare in preparing the attack

Operation Midnight Hammer also has an essential IT and digital dimension. Precision strikes against deep underground facilities rely on advanced intelligence work, combining drones, satellite imagery, and cyber attacks to weaken Iranian defenses, disrupt their chain of command, and ensure maximum tactical effect at the moment of strike.

Precise mapping by drones and satellites

The United States and Israel used MALE (Medium Altitude, Long Endurance) drones, such as the MQ-9 Reaper, equipped with electro-optical and infrared sensors to map the Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan areas in high resolution. Extended flights made it possible to identify key facilities, locate tunnel entrances previously blocked by Iran, and validate the areas above the centrifuges. In addition, 3D reconstructions from Sentinel-1-type synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite images or commercial images such as Maxar provided topographic models with centimeter accuracy. This data guided the targeting of MOP bombs at the center of underground structures, with a 40% improvement in accuracy compared to conventional missions.

Cyber attacks to disable defenses

Prior to the strikes, targeted cyberattacks reportedly targeted Iranian air defense systems, including SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) radars and C2 command centers. According to security sources, the cyber operations made it possible to temporarily neutralize medium-range radars, inject false information, and paralyze alert protocols. The aim was to create a window of opportunity when the B-2 Spirit aircraft arrived. At the same time, infections on Iranian maintenance and logistics servers reportedly caused delays in repairs and supplies.

Drone-cyber synergy for the mission

The combination of drones and cyberattacks made it possible to collect electronic signals (SIGINT) and BIOS data (such as radar network traffic), ensuring perfect synchronization with the flights of the B-2s, F-22s, and F-35s. Here are some verified figures:

• Drone flights: more than 200 cumulative hours over the sites over a 10-day period.
• Cyber packets launched: estimated at several thousand targeted attacks on SAM systems.
• Radar paralysis time: between 30 and 90 critical minutes, allowing the bombers to pass undetected.

Tactical impact and outlook

This digital integration made it possible to neutralize Iran’s defenses without a single surface-to-air missile being fired during the attack. This aspect reinforces the strategic approach of maximizing destructive effect while minimizing risk, and is part of an evolution in modern warfare. In the future, this means that countries seeking to protect critical infrastructure will need to invest heavily in advanced cyber defenses, network resilience, and redundancy in C2 systems. For air powers, the gamification of cyberwarfare is becoming a central element in any strike preparation.

Regional and international reactions to the June 22 attack

Operation Midnight Hammer immediately triggered political and military reactions throughout the Gulf region and within the international community. Although the strikes targeted facilities deemed to be military and not civilian, several states and non-governmental organizations expressed their concerns. The attack, while technically successful, raises questions of international law, strategic balance, and potential humanitarian consequences.

Iran’s official position

The Iranian government acknowledged that several facilities had been hit but downplayed the damage, claiming that the main sites, including Fordow, were already inactive. Tehran has referred the matter to the UN Security Council, citing a serious violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accusing the US and Israel of illegitimate provocation. Iran also announced its partial withdrawal from the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, limiting international inspectors’ access to certain sensitive facilities. This response could reignite a phase of regional nuclear escalation, particularly if the country accelerates uranium enrichment to more than 60% again.

Reactions from Gulf countries and Israel

The Gulf monarchies, notably Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, have adopted a cautiously favorable stance, welcoming action “against a strategic danger.” However, these countries are concerned about the risk of asymmetric retaliation by groups affiliated with Iran, such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, or Iraqi Shiite militias. Israel, for its part, has hailed an “operational success without casualties,” but remains on high alert, particularly around the northern areas and the Lebanese border.

Position of the major powers

• Russia: The Kremlin has described the operation as a “serious violation of international law” and called for an emergency session at the UN. Moscow maintains that Iran was attacked without legal basis and compares the action to the US strikes in Iraq in 2003.
• China: Beijing has expressed “deep concern” and called for a “return to multilateral dialogue,” while refusing to explicitly condemn the US.
• European Union: The 27 member states are divided. France, while criticizing unilateralism, admits that Iranian proliferation was a major threat. Germany and Italy have asked for evidence of the proportionality of the strikes.

International organizations and NGOs

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not yet been able to access the sites to verify the damage. It fears a major setback in cooperation with Iran. Several NGOs, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have expressed doubts about respect for the principle of distinction between military and civilian targets. They are calling for an independent audit of potential collateral damage.

Risk of retaliation

Western intelligence services believe that an asymmetrical Iranian response is plausible in the coming weeks: attacks on ships, cyber operations, rocket fire from Lebanon or Syria. The Mossad and the CIA have activated their protection measures in several allied capitals. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) has reinforced its positions in Qatar and Bahrain. Washington warns that any indirect attack will result in a direct response.

Technical assessment of the strikes on Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan

Fordow: precision of the strikes and underground structure

The Fordow site, built on a hillside and made of reinforced concrete, housed several hundred IR-6 centrifuges. The seven B-2 Spirit aircraft dropped 14 GBU-57 MOP bombs, two per aircraft, targeting the areas above the tunnels. These 13.6-ton devices were designed to pierce the access points before detonating.

The radar and optical images provided by Maxar Technologies show craters 10 to 15 meters in diameter, as well as access roads literally cut through by the bombs. Tunnel entrances have collapsed or been filled with rubble. However, Iranian authorities claim that Fordow was deactivated before the strikes, which reduces the actual impact on enrichment capabilities. It remains unclear whether centrifuges were present at the time of the attack, which means there is no confirmation that any useful units were destroyed.

Assuming that the density of centrifuges was close to maximum (around 1,000 units), their loss would have resulted in a reduction in enrichment capacity of more than 60%, according to estimates by non-proliferation experts. This would represent a delay of 12 to 18 months for Iran, including the time needed to install new machines and re-establish the uranium powder chain.

Natanz: underground area and MOP performance

At Natanz, a site covering more than 0.3 km², the strike focused on the main hall containing around 1,500 IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges. The MOP bombs hit directly above this hall, causing a partial collapse of the ceiling.

Satellite images taken before the strike show the classic layout of the tunnels. The most recent images now reveal a depression in the ground, indicating a local collapse. According to David Albright, Iran’s filling of the site with earth before the strikes did not mask or mitigate the impact of the MOP, as the pressure was transmitted directly to the underground structure, weakening the hall.

Unlike Fordow, enrichment was underway at Natanz before the operation. The destruction of centrifuges at this site could therefore represent an 18- to 24-month halt in activity, including the time needed to replace the machines, rehabilitate the hall, and recalibrate the site.

Isfahan: surface chemical center

The Isfahan site, located on the plain, was hit by a wave of 24 Tomahawk Block IV missiles fired from an Ohio-class submarine. This precision weaponry (accurate to within 10 meters) targeted the chemical conversion section, which is essential for producing UF6, a precursor to enrichment.

The damage was concentrated on the refining buildings and nearby storage facilities. Maxar shows partially collapsed buildings, burned areas of more than 5,000 m², and damaged ancillary infrastructure. These strikes are slowing down UF6 production, requiring the use of secondary facilities or imports of chemical equipment. The delay in activities could be as long as 6 to 9 months, partially offset by stocks already built up before the strike.

Technical assessment in figures

Site	Estimated impact	Estimated delay to the program
Fordow	Entrances collapsed, access blocked	12–18 months
Natanz	Centrifuge room partially collapsed	18–24 months
Isfahan	UF6 plants damaged	6–9 months

These timeframes apply if Iran has sufficient technical and financial resources to undertake reconstruction. If international sanctions and geopolitical events are taken into account, this delay could be longer.

On a technical level, Operation Midnight Hammer demonstrated deep strike capabilities, with tangible and localized damage. However, the extent of the real impact on Iran’s nuclear program will depend on the resilience resources available to Tehran and its ability to diversify or relocate its facilities. The next step is to observe developments on the ground and the diplomatic and strategic responses that follow.

Scenarios for an Iranian response: nuclear, asymmetric, cyber

Operation Midnight Hammer now leaves Iran with several options for retaliation. These range from symbolic nuclear measures to targeted asymmetric actions and sophisticated cyber operations. The following analysis presents Tehran’s possible responses, based on strategic and historical data and the Iranian state’s recognized capabilities.

A symbolic nuclear response or a return to intensive enrichment

Even if the strikes do not directly end Iran’s nuclear program, they undermine its credibility. Iran may respond by:

1. Returning to enrichment above 60%, the critical threshold for manufacturing a nuclear weapon, in order to restore its coercive capacity.
2. Conducting a low-yield underground nuclear test in the coming months as a sign of resistance. Such action could trigger tougher US and European sanctions, further isolating Tehran;
3. Continuing to conceal centrifuges, with the creation of clandestine underground or satellite networks, inspired by the North Korean model, to resume production without going through existing sites.

These options require significant material, financial, and human investment, at a time when Iran is facing economic constraints linked to international sanctions (GDP contracting by 6% in 2024).

An asymmetric response in the Gulf region

The most plausible responses remain asymmetric, exploiting Iran’s geographical and military position.

• Attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s oil passes, using maritime drones or anti-ship missiles.
• Strikes by Shiite paramilitary groups: Iraqi militias, Hezbollah in Lebanon, or the Houthis in Yemen could be used to strike Western interests in the region.
• launching ballistic missiles against US bases in Iraq, Syria, or Kuwait, aimed at provoking limited retaliation and influencing US debates.

These asymmetric responses, which are less costly and more difficult to attribute, allow Iran to retaliate without triggering an open war.

Sophisticated cyber retaliation

Iran already has operational capabilities for cyberattacks against Western infrastructure (Saudi refineries, Israeli facilities). These capabilities could be activated to:

• infect power plants or refineries, severely disrupting economies;
• carry out targeted disinformation operations to influence public opinion in Western countries;
• launch attacks against allied supply chains, slowing down military aid or trade.

In a global context where cyberspace intertwines military and civilian issues, Iran’s response could be discreet but long-lasting and difficult to attribute.

Geopolitical implications

Iran’s response, whether symbolic nuclear, asymmetric, or cyber, will have major strategic implications:

• It will trigger a spiral of military tension in the Gulf, with the risk of indirect conflict between powers.
• Justify increased militarization of the region (tactical bases, naval fleets, anti-radar systems) for Washington and its allies;
• Strengthen Iran’s negotiating position in a possible return to the nuclear agreement by capitalizing on its ability to stand up to the Americans;
• Create a mimetic effect: other states could attempt asymmetric retaliation in response to heavy Western strikes.

These scenarios raise questions about the effectiveness of Operation Midnight Hammer. If the goal is to send a strong signal to Iran and its backers, the main risk is a step-by-step escalation. The strategic interest for the West is to contain, anticipate, and neutralize these responses before they lead to a wider regional conflict.

Implications for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and international regulation

Operation Midnight Hammer, by targeting an Iranian nuclear site without first triggering UN procedures or an IAEA investigation, raises major issues for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This treaty, in force since 1970, is based on three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Israeli-American action can be seen as challenging this balance.

A weakening of the IAEA and multilateral governance

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), based in Vienna, plays a central role in verifying civilian nuclear facilities. However, a unilateral strike on a declared nuclear site amounts to challenging the IAEA’s authority. This risks setting a precedent:

• other powers could legitimize preventive strikes outside the UN framework;
• the cooperation of inspected states with the IAEA could deteriorate, hindering inspections;
• the UN’s mediating role would be marginalized, in a context where the Security Council is paralyzed by cross-vetoes.

This circumvention of the multilateral framework makes it more difficult to manage future nuclear crises, particularly in Asia (North Korea) or in response to emerging programs (Saudi Arabia, Turkey).

Risk of renewed proliferation dynamics

By striking an Iranian site without international consensus, the United States and Israel could trigger a domino effect in sensitive regions:

• Iran could withdraw permanently from the NPT, as North Korea did in 2003, and launch a clandestine program.
• Other countries such as Saudi Arabia could conclude that only autonomous nuclear deterrence can guarantee their security.
• Horizontal proliferation (new nuclear-armed countries) and vertical proliferation (improvements to existing arsenals) could intensify, undermining regional balances.

At the same time, treaties such as the TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons), already weakened by the refusal of nuclear powers to sign them, appear disconnected from the current strategic reality.

Western credibility put to the test

Western nuclear policy is based on two contradictory discourses: promoting non-proliferation while reaffirming the legitimacy of the arsenals held by the historical powers. This dual stance becomes difficult to defend when strikes are carried out without a clear legal framework. This weakens:

• future diplomatic negotiations with powers such as China and Russia, which already denounce the “double standard”;
• the cohesion of non-nuclear allies within NATO, with some states considering it risky to remain associated with pre-emptive strike strategies;
• the scope of negotiated security commitments, such as the security guarantees offered to Ukraine and South Korea.

Towards a reconfiguration of norms?

By breaking away from the traditional framework of the NPT, the US and Israel are triggering a reconfiguration of nuclear security norms:

• The legitimization of preventive strikes on civilian facilities, even if suspected, is reshuffling the deck of deterrence doctrines;
• The right to expanded self-defense, invoked by Israel, could be mobilized elsewhere by other regional powers (Turkey, India);
• Pressure to reform the UN system, deemed ineffective in preventing proliferation, could increase.

Ultimately, Operation Midnight Hammer is not limited to a targeted air raid. It reconfigures the global nuclear order by introducing a strategic gray area between treaty compliance and unilateral action based on national security imperatives. This dynamic has serious implications for medium-term stability.

Military lessons from the operation for air forces

Operation Midnight Hammer, conducted jointly by Israel and the United States, offers several technical and tactical lessons for modern air forces. Beyond its political significance, it reveals operational trends, confirmed capabilities, and persistent limitations in conducting an attack against a heavily protected target in semi-hostile territory.

A real test for stealth aircraft and collaborative combat

The strike reportedly involved Israeli F-35I Adir and US B-2A Spirit aircraft, supported by refuelers, ISR drones, and electronic warfare aircraft. The objective was to penetrate Iranian air defense systems (notably the Bavar-373, the local equivalent of the S-300) to reach an underground nuclear complex.

Key points:

• Passive stealth (shape and absorbent materials) remains essential for penetrating a defended airspace. With a radar signature of less than 0.1 m², the B-2 is currently one of the only aircraft capable of striking a strategic target without being detected.
• Collaborative combat, with real-time data sharing between F-35s, drones, and AWACS aircraft, made it possible to bypass radars and identify windows of vulnerability.
• Automated terrain following, combined with detailed digital planning, allowed the aircraft to fly at very low altitudes, reducing their exposure to radars.

Delicate deployment of the GBU-57A/B

The bomb used, the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator, is a 13-ton munition designed to strike deeply buried installations. It requires a platform such as the B-2A, modified to carry this payload.

The technical constraints are significant:

• The bomb penetrates up to 60 meters of reinforced concrete before detonating.
• It is guided by GPS/INS with semi-active terminal guidance for metric accuracy.
• The impact generates an internal blast effect, which is more effective against underground tunnels than against surface structures.

The lessons learned are doubly strategic: on the one hand, conventional deterrence now also relies on precision strike capabilities against nerve centers, and on the other hand, mastery of highly specialized weapons systems is becoming a determining factor in technological superiority.

The heavy logistics of long-range operations

The operation required significant resources:

• Several in-flight refuelings, involving US KC-135, KC-10, and KC-46 aircraft, enabled the B-2s to make the round trip from Missouri (Whiteman AFB) or Diego Garcia.
• The Israeli F-35Is reportedly took off with reduced internal fuel and minimal payloads to limit their signature and maximize their range.
• Escort drones (Heron TP, MQ-9) provided surveillance data, sometimes up to a few minutes before the strike.

This shows that preemptive strategic strikes require an extreme degree of joint preparation, coordination across multiple time zones, and precise weather windows. The apparent success of Midnight Hammer relies as much on planning as it does on technology.

Electronic warfare still essential

Despite stealth, electronic warfare played a decisive role. EA-18G Growler aircraft and Israeli pods likely jammed Iranian radars or generated false leads. This illustrates that air superiority does not depend solely on the firing platform, but on the electromagnetic environment controlled around the operation.

This reality has concrete implications: an army without modern electronic warfare cannot today envisage strategic penetration, even with so-called stealth aircraft.

War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.