
The Su-57 integrates the L402 Himalayas system within the Sh-121: L-band antennas, active and passive jamming, programmed decoys, real operational impacts.
Summary
The Su-57 Felon combines its Sh-121 avionics complex with the L402 Himalayas electronic warfare suite. The system combines the N036 Byelka X-band radar, L-band antennas integrated into the leading edges, warning receivers, jammers, and programmed decoys. The key idea is data fusion: early detection of enemy emissions, degradation of their radars through active jamming (directed power, DRFM techniques) and passive jamming (decoys, chaff/flares), while guiding the pilot with clear tactical aids. On paper, the suite claims to detect low-frequency radars, pick up the Byelka for fine tracking, and automate self-protection responses up to the sequenced firing of countermeasures. In practice, the recent use of the Su-57 favors firing from a safe distance; one aircraft was damaged on base in 2024, and the fleet remains limited. The Himalayas improves survivability, but its real value against modern multi-layered defenses remains dependent on integration, tactics, and the number of aircraft available.
The Sh-121 system and integrated architecture
At the heart of the system is the Sh-121, a multifunction radio-electronic complex that combines sensors, electronic warfare, and data links around a logic of integration and real-time fusion. The N036 Byelka radar is the main sensor: an X-band AESA antenna in the nose (approximately 1,500 T/R modules), two side antennas (approximately 400 modules each) to extend azimuth coverage, and interfaces with 101KS electro-optical sensors. The benefits for the pilot are twofold: a unified tactical image and decision support that prioritizes threats, reduces cognitive load, and automates tasks (echo filtering, track prioritization, self-protection triggering).
The L402 Himalayas chain is not an isolated “box”; it is integrated into the Sh-121 via its own antennas (including one on the dorsal surface) and by sharing certain transmitter/receiver surfaces with the Byelka. This sharing reduces protrusions, limits stealth penalties, and allows the directivity and frequency agility of AESA networks to be exploited for jamming or deception without interrupting surveillance.
Integrated L-band antennas and their uses
A special feature of the Su-57: L-band antennas (≈ 1–2 GHz) integrated into the leading edges. At these frequencies, the angular resolution is lower than in the X-band, but sensitivity to shapes optimized against the X-band can increase. The primary use is therefore as a “broad net”: low-frequency detection/alerting, detection of long-range surveillance radars, support for friend/foe identification, and electronic warfare functions.
In concrete terms, an L-band alert can “pick up” the Byelka: the aircraft pivots, the track is refined in X-band, then correlated with the IRST and ESM libraries. The L-band also serves as a transmission medium for certain jamming techniques (broadband, offset noise) against ground-to-air or airborne radars operating outside the X-band. An important limitation is that the L-band cannot “see” a discreet fighter at medium range in detail; it is mainly used for alerting and guidance, not for tracking and firing.
Active and passive jamming: principles and effects
The Himalayas combines active jamming and passive jamming.
– Active: directed RF power generation, DRFM (Digital Radio Frequency Memory) techniques to return modified echoes (Doppler shifts, delays, false distances), intelligent noise and spot/sweep against enemy antenna lobes. AESA directivity support to concentrate energy while maintaining a discreet lobe.
– Passive: use of dipole reflectors (chaff) and infrared decoys, signature management (angles, coatings), masking by geometry and terrain.
On a medium-altitude penetration profile, a well-adjusted DRFM can degrade an engagement radar and force a loss of tracking; on a low-altitude profile, terrain masking combined with broadband noise reduces the detection window. The downside is energy expenditure and electromagnetic “betrayal”: excessive emissions expose the aircraft to enemy passive receivers. Hence the importance of rapid frequency hopping and careful management of emission cycles.

Detection of enemy radars and pilot alerting
The Su-57’s RWR/ESM chain continuously searches for emissions: frequency, PRF, modulation, pulse shape. Threat libraries associate these signatures with radar families (surveillance, acquisition, firing). Once the algorithm is confident, the pilot interface annotates the situation: sector, type, estimated distance range, probability of pursuit.
This radar detection triggers a series of actions: change of axis, evasive maneuver, suggestion of optimal jamming angle, switch to a penetration profile (altitude, speed), or launch of an anti-radar missile if ROE allows. The important thing is responsiveness: a latency of a few seconds is enough to get out of an illumination lobe and “break” a semi-active fire calculation. Here again, the Sh-121/Himalayas integration avoids conflict between sensors (the radar does not blind the ESM receiver, the L-band remains usable).
Decoys and “programmed strikes”
The Su-57 has internal chaff/flare pods and a DIRCM 101KS-O system against short-range IR missiles. The self-protection interface offers programmed decoys: predefined sequences (e.g., 2-3 bursts of 2-4 flares at 0.3-0.5 s intervals) coupled with a break and engine masking. In the RF band, chaff “cuffs” can be released when the Himalayas injects a DRFM packet in order to superimpose spurious echoes and fictitious targets.
Countermeasures are counted; there are said to be around forty cartridges on board depending on the variants observed, which requires discipline in their use and programming adapted to the theater. The key is coordination: MAWS/UV detects the arrival of an IR missile, the DIRCM points and illuminates the seeker head, while a short burst of flares completes the evasion. On radars, the DRFM + chaff sequence, synchronized with an out-of-plane turn, can cause a monopulse tracking system to lose lock.
Flight capabilities and fighter pilot assistance
In the cockpit, the contribution can be seen in three areas:
- Predictive aids: “prohibited” zones displayed in real time based on the estimated firing antenna, altitude/speed recommendations to minimize illumination, calculation of the optimal angle for a jamming lobe.
- Automation: automatic switching of DRFM tables according to the identified threat, timing of programmed decoy sequences, energy management of transmitters to reduce the probability of interception.
- Multi-sensor operation: L-band/X-band/IRST correlation and data link to confirm the nature of a contact.
In an air-to-air engagement, these tools allow the fighter aircraft to remain in silent mode (passive radar, IRST priority) for longer, then briefly illuminate for firing, while maintaining reactive jamming windows against an enemy AESA radar.
Impacts on missions and operational reality
On penetration missions, the Himalayas aims to open a local “bubble” of sensor degradation to break through a portion of IADS, deploy a stand-off weapon, and then exit. In air-to-air combat, it helps break the kinematics of an enemy Fox-3 at the critical moment (mid-course or terminal). In escort missions, it protects a group by concentrating power on the threatened axis.
In recent reality, Russia has used the Su-57 mainly for stand-off firing from friendly airspace, which limits the exposure of the airframe and… the demonstration of the EW suite against modern multi-layer defenses. A Su-57 was damaged at its base in 2024, highlighting its vulnerability on the ground and the strategic value of each airframe. As long as delivery volumes remain modest, its use will remain cautious: the Himalayas is an efficiency multiplier, not an invulnerable shield.
Technical limitations and countermeasures
There are several limitations. First, physics: the L-band alerts but does not replace high-quality X-band tracking; at long range, angular accuracy remains poor. Second, electronic warfare is interactive: when faced with a modern AESA, the adversary can nullify the jamming, change waves, and diversify pulse shapes. A poorly tuned DRFM becomes detectable and countermeasures can be taken.
In ground-to-air defense, the trend is toward multi-band networks, passive sensors, and multi-platform correlations. This reduces the effect of isolated jamming and requires coordinated profiles (time, azimuths, altitudes). Finally, self-protection consumes a lot of resources: electrical energy, heat, decoy ammunition. Prolonged combat can deplete consumables and degrade the thermal signature. Crews must therefore manage the expenditure of countermeasures as a critical stock, just like fuel.
The path of evolution and the capability challenge
The likely areas of development focus on transmission power (GaN technologies), module density, frequency agility, and even more advanced data fusion with the Okhotnik-B. The goal is to extend ESM detection range, improve DRFM selectivity, and further automate the management of emission windows to reduce the aircraft’s “net” electromagnetic signature.
The capacity challenge remains: a sophisticated EW suite reveals its full potential in large numbers, with coordinated profiles and jamming relays. A few isolated cells will not saturate a coherent IADS. The value of the L402 Himalayas will therefore be measured less by technical specifications than by the combination of doctrine and volume: training, up-to-date threat libraries, EMCON discipline, and feedback accumulated in real operations.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.