Can we order a strike on an “Orb” with unknown technology? Framework, risks, technical assumptions, and decision-making processes for a reasoned response.
Summary
Authorizing a shot at an Orb with unknown technology presents the military with a dilemma: protect its forces immediately or delay action to reduce uncertainty. Technically, a Hellfire missile (≈ 49 kg, warhead ≈ 9 kg, range ≈ 8–11 km) is optimized against land and sea targets, not against very small airborne targets or objects with potentially high embedded energy. Legally, self-defense requires threat and proportionality. Tactically, the “detect-identify-decide-strike” chain must incorporate cost-effectiveness, the choice of terminal effect, and control of collateral damage. If the Orb contains a significant energy charge (chemical, electrical, or other), shooting it down could trigger unexpected effects (shock wave, debris, localized EMP). The most robust decision follows a “low regret” logic: cross-observations, firing window in a safe zone, limited-effect ammunition, then gradual escalation only if the threat is confirmed.
The operational fact and the central question
In at least one recent case, the U.S. Air Force authorized a missile strike from an MQ-9 Reaper against an Orb observed off the coast of Yemen. The available evidence suggests an engagement with a laser-guided Hellfire, as the interception did not produce the expected neutralization. The core of the debate is simple: how can a strike be validated when the target’s technology is unknown and potentially unconventional? The answer requires distinguishing between three levels. First, the legal level: imminent threat or hostile intent, international airspace, proportionality, and necessity. Next, the technical-operational level: multi-sensor detection, probabilistic identification, choice of ammunition and firing geometry (direction, altitude, impact zone). Finally, the political and strategic level: attribution, public communication, and risk of escalation. A “reasoned” decision requires balancing these levels within a limited time frame, with tangible safety margins.
The authorization framework: self-defense under uncertainty
U.S. doctrine authorizes the use of force in self-defense against a hostile act or credible hostile intent. In an area where actors such as the Houthis use drones and missiles, the presumption of threat increases when an uncooperative object moves toward a maritime traffic route. However, technological uncertainty requires additional safeguards: a window of engagement far from shipping lanes, an altitude that ensures a fall into the sea, and ammunition chosen to limit unwanted terminal effects. The proportionality analysis is not limited to caliber: it compares the desired effect (deterrence, damage, destruction) with physical risks (shock wave, fragmentation) and non-physical risks (diplomatic attribution). In other words, it is not “a shot” per se that is authorized, but “a precise shot in a controlled geometry with an expected and measured effect,” even if this means abandoning the mission if the conditions are not met.
Technical hypotheses: from mundane object to energized object
In the absence of identification, hypotheses must be explored and classified by risk.
- Low-energy “sensor/balloon” hypothesis
The Orb is a lightweight sensor (weighing a few kilograms), possibly enclosed in a spherical shell. In the event of impact, the expected effect is perforation, loss of attitude, and fall. The major risk is the dispersion of debris, limited to a safety radius of several hundred meters. In this case, a low-impact munition (70 mm laser-guided APKWS rocket) is rational: lower unit cost and sufficient lethality against a thin structure. - Low-mass but robust “rigid drone” scenario
The object is a small rigid aircraft with electronics and batteries. A Hellfire missile may miss its target due to the lack of a proximity fuse and the small effective surface area for the weapon. A guided fragmentation rocket or a missile with a proximity fuse (such as the AIM-9X) increases the probability of effect, at the cost of lower cost-effectiveness. - “Energized object” hypothesis (chemical or electrical source)
The Orb carries a significant amount of energy. For a simple reference, 1 kg of TNT is equivalent to ≈ 4.184 MJ. A Hellfire carries ≈ 9 kg of explosives (≈ 38 MJ). An object containing the equivalent of tens to hundreds of kilograms of TNT could, if destabilized, produce a shock wave and fragments dangerous to platforms within a radius of tens to hundreds of meters. If the source is electrical (high-density batteries, supercapacitors), the risk includes fire and possible localized EMP during a sudden discharge at very close range. - “Unknown technology” hypothesis (non-ballistic maneuvers, atypical signatures)
The maneuvers and signatures do not fit our models (abnormal accelerations, inconsistent albedo and laser backscatter). In this space, anticipating the effects becomes speculative. The prudent decision favors a graduated ban: illumination, persistent tracking, low-impact test firing, debris collection if possible. Escalation is only considered if the threat increases (heading toward a unit, decrease in altitude, increased speed).
Choice of ammunition: terminal effect, proximity, and cost
Three families dominate the current options from an MQ-9:
- APKWS (70 mm laser-guided rocket): low weight, fragmentation cone effective against slow drones, cost in the tens of thousands of dollars, low lethal radius. Good “first step” option.
- AGM-114 Hellfire (≈ 49 kg, warhead ≈ 9 kg): decent kinematics, versatile payload. Limitations: no proximity fuse on several variants and potentially excessive effect against very small targets, while sometimes remaining insufficient if the impact is tangential.
- AIM-9X (IR missile, proximity fuse, cost close to $1 million depending on batch): higher probability of hitting the target and better “no-escape zone,” but oversized against a stationary or very slow Orb and less economically sustainable for repeated engagements.
The “right” munition is the one that produces the necessary effect with the least associated risk. Against an unknown target, the logical firing order is “APKWS → Hellfire → AIM-9X,” subject to stock, range, and geometry.
Decision metrics: from detection to firing
To “authorize” with full knowledge of the facts, the chain must quantify:
- Kinematics: speed (m/s), altitude (m), acceleration. A slow object at low altitude requires a stricter window and ground/sea clearance.
- Signature: optical/IR, radar, radio frequencies. A low thermal signature discourages IR, while poor laser backscatter penalizes SAL guidance.
- Environment: distance from shipping lanes, air traffic, weather (turbulence, visibility), presence of friendly platforms.
- Terminal effect: expected lethal radius (m), nature of fragments, probability of ignition.
- Cost-effectiveness: marginal cost of interception vs. risk left if no action is taken.
A formalized decision can use a multi-criteria firing threshold: threat score ≥ X, knowledge score ≤ Y, safety distance ≥ Z, tier 1 ammunition available → authorize. Otherwise, defer.
Explosion scenarios and safety distances
If the Orb is “full of energy,” there are several possible scenarios:
- Deflagration equivalent to 20 kg of TNT (≈ 84 MJ) at sea: significant damage to a light hull within 100–150 m; dangerous shrapnel beyond that distance depending on the orientation.
- Equivalent to 100 kg of TNT (≈ 418 MJ): overpressure capable of breaking windows and damaging antennas and sensors at 200–300 m; possible injury from shrapnel further away.
- High-energy electrical discharge (supercapacitors): risk of local EMP affecting radars, data links, and optronics at short range (tens of meters), especially in a highly coupled environment (nearby aerial platform).
In practice, these orders of magnitude argue for firing with the impact axis towards an open area, at a sufficient altitude so that the energy is dissipated far from ships.
Risk governance: low regret and post-firing exploitation
In the face of uncertainty, the most robust method consists of three stages:
- Enhanced surveillance and attribution: heterogeneous sensors, triangulation, radio frequency correlation. If the object transmits, there is a trail of origin.
- Graduated interdiction: warnings, evasive maneuvers, low-impact firing in a safe area. The decision moves to the next level only if the threat increases or persists.
- Information loop: debris recovery (if possible), fallout measurements, recording of firing and sensor parameters. This reduces uncertainty for subsequent engagements and allows for adjustments to the rules of engagement.
The verdict: authorize, yes, but only with safeguards
It is possible to authorize firing on an Orb whose technology is unknown, provided that three conditions are met simultaneously: credible and immediate threat, engagement geometry that minimizes collateral damage, and choice of ammunition appropriate for a “first level” of risk. Firing “hard” from the outset can create an unnecessary gamble if the object is energized. Firing “too weakly” repeatedly can allow a real threat to slip away. Precise control of the tiers, firing discipline, and post-strike collection become the true operational superiority: when faced with the unknown, it is not the most powerful weapon that provides the best protection, but the method that tolerates the fewest errors without closing the door to action.
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