Chinese satellites have carried out orbital maneuvers of the space combat type, according to the US Space Force. Technical analysis.
In 2024, Chinese experimental satellites carried out synchronized maneuvers in low Earth orbit, interpreted by the US Space Force as a space combat simulation. Five satellites—three Shiyan-24Cs and two Shijian-605 As and Bs—carried out rendezvous and proximity operations, an expanding strategic capability. This operation demonstrates a high technical level in active orbital maneuvers, capable of threatening or inspecting other satellites. General Guetlein warns of the narrowing of the capability differential between the United States and its direct competitors. These developments call into question the doctrines of space superiority and the vulnerabilities of orbital infrastructures.
Chinese orbital maneuvering capabilities: a measurable technological evolution
The maneuvers observed in 2024 in low Earth orbit involving the Shiyan-24C and Shijian-605 A and B satellites reflect a growing mastery of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO). These operations require precise trajectory control, fine management of orbital propulsion and on-board optical or radar detection systems.
According to the orbital data analyzed by civilian operators and corroborated by the U.S. Space Force, the objects moved at relative speeds of less than 10 m/s, with approaches of less than 50 meters, a critical threshold for tactical interactions. The Shiyan-24C, technological test satellites, are designed to experiment with controlled approaches and behavior in constrained environments.
Shijian-605 A and B are suspected of integrating SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) sensors, capable of picking up electromagnetic transmissions, reinforcing the idea of a duality between physical maneuvering and passive surveillance. This joint capability is essential for intercepting space communications or disrupting adversary devices.
China has a three-pronged space program: the CNSA civilian program, the PLASSF (People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force) military program, and semi-state structures such as the CAST (China Academy of Space Technology). The 2024 maneuvers are part of this strategic triptych.
In parallel, China has already tested a controlled deorbiting operation of an out-of-service satellite in 2021 with the SJ-21 satellite, demonstrating a soft interception capability through physical contact.
Military and strategic consequences of orbital dogfighting maneuvers
Rendezvous and proximity operations are not just a technological exercise. They are maneuvers prior to kinetic or non-kinetic neutralization capabilities: jamming, capture, displacement, or even targeted destruction. In a tactical scenario, a maneuvering satellite can neutralize an opposing satellite without resorting to anti-satellite missiles (ASAT), thus avoiding the catastrophic debris generated by a kinetic attack.
This trend is part of a global dynamic of silent militarization of low orbit, where the United States, Russia and China are developing so-called “co-orbital” capabilities. The case of Kosmos 2543 in 2020, a Russian satellite that approached a US military satellite to within 100 km, is a precedent in this logic of “space harassment”.
The American doctrine of “space superiority”, reaffirmed in 2023 in the U.S. Space Force Vision Statement, is now based on a dual posture: defensive through early detection, offensive through active deterrence. The emergence of Chinese maneuvering vehicles complicates this doctrine, as the orbital environment becomes asymmetric, unstable and difficult to interpret in real time.
According to the CSIS Space Threat Assessment 2024 report, more than 100 active Chinese satellites are capable of changing their orbit quickly, an increase of 40% in three years.
Western commercial satellites, including those of Maxar, Slingshot Aerospace and ExoAnalytic Solutions, have become critical tools for behavioral surveillance, illustrating the rise of orbital behavioral mapping via civilian sensors.
Narrowing of the capability differential between major space powers
General Guetlein mentions a narrowing of the technological differential between the Space Force and its competitors. Historically, the United States has dominated the orbital surveillance and intervention segment. However, the acceleration of the Chinese space budget, from 5.8 billion euros in 2015 to nearly 12 billion euros in 2023, is changing the balance.
The number of Chinese orbital launches in 2023 reached 67 missions, more than the 63 American missions, with a success rate of over 97%. These volumes give Beijing the capacity to rapidly implement new orbital platforms, particularly in the LEO band (Low Earth Orbit, between 160 and 2,000 km), a favored tactical space for intelligence, communication and neutralization.
China also plans to put 13,000 satellites into orbit for its G60 Starlink-like constellation, a project competing with SpaceX’s American LEO satellites, making the management of space traffic denser, and therefore more vulnerable to jamming and interference.
This capacity crunch is forcing the United States to invest in new orbital resilience technologies: replicated satellites, distributed architecture, stealth satellites with low radar signatures, autonomous propulsion, and onboard AI for decentralized decisions.
Operational perspectives and redefinition of space doctrines
The Chinese maneuvers of 2024 require a rapid redefinition of operational space postures. The classic model of orbital deterrence by ASAT arsenal is becoming obsolete in the face of agile, mimetic devices with effects that are difficult to attribute immediately. The “orbital gray zone” is becoming the theater of reversible, discreet actions with low political cost.
NATO doctrines, currently focused on land and air defense, will have to integrate the doctrine of adaptive orbital maneuvering, with maneuvering satellites in a constellation and a rapid co-orbital intervention capability. Prospective work by the RAND Corporation recommends the deployment of discrete interceptor satellites capable of neutralizing a threat without generating debris.
The standardization of orbital maneuvers, through international standards, is currently non-existent. The absence of a treaty on non-kinetic military behavior in space leaves room for varying interpretations and strategic regulatory instability.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.