What processes enable the military engagement of fighter planes? Comparative analysis of doctrines, actors and decision-making chains.
The engagement of a fighter plane on a combat mission is neither automatic nor linear. It is based on a structured decision-making architecture, founded on employment doctrines, precise rules of engagement, a defined hierarchical chain and a politico-strategic environment. Each country applies specific processes, which reflect its military priorities, its intervention doctrine and its relationship to political risk. The triggering of an offensive mission implies operational, legal and diplomatic responsibilities. This complexity of decision-making reflects the nature of modern conflicts, where the use of air force remains a major strategic lever, but subject to multiple levels of validation. This analysis describes the mechanisms of military engagement of fighter pilots, comparing the French, American, Israeli and Russian approaches, while examining the operational constraints and the centrality of the chain of command.
The decision-making process in France: political and operational verticality
In France, the military engagement of a fighter plane follows a centralized decision-making architecture, characteristic of the politico-military model of the Fifth Republic. The President of the Republic, as head of the armed forces, retains ultimate control over the use of force.
Political-strategic level
The decision to intervene by armed force, including the use of air assets, is made by the Head of State, often after validation by the Defense Council. External operations (OPEX) are then planned by the Planning and Operations Command Center (CPCO), under the authority of the Chief of the Army Staff (CEMA).
Operational level
Orders are transmitted via the chain of command: CEMA (Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces) → Chief of Staff of the Air and Space Force (CEMAAE) → Air Defense and Air Operations Command (CDAOA). The latter manages tactical planning and the designation of units. The Air Operations Center (CAOC) then validates the missions.
Rules of Engagement
The fighter pilots are subject to very strict ROE (Rules of Engagement), defined according to political objectives and international law. A Rafale on a support mission can only open fire in accordance with these rules. In Operation Chammal in Iraq-Syria, each shot was validated by an ROE officer within the CAOC at Al Udeid.
Concrete example
On March 21, 2019, a Mirage 2000D was deployed to the Sahel for a neutralization strike against an armed terrorist group. The deployment order required dual validation from the CPCO and the Barkhane command, with satellite imagery, support from Reaper drones, and ROE confirmation before the GBU-12 was dropped.
The American model: tactical decentralization, strategic control
The United States has adopted a command structure that combines tactical delegation with enhanced political control.
Political-strategic command
Authority over the use of force remains federal: the President and the Secretary of Defense validate all offensive operations, but delegate broad operational autonomy to the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). CENTCOM or EUCOM plan air operations.
Operational command
The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), often located in Al Udeid (Qatar), plays a key role in the distribution of missions. F-16, F-35 and F-15 fighter squadrons receive their orders directly from the CAOC, with priorities by theater, by target and by timing (ATO – Air Tasking Order).
Variable rules of engagement
American ROEs vary depending on the mission. In Afghanistan, strikes required a triple legal verification, while in post-2014 Iraq, close air support (CAS) missions allowed for more reactive engagements with JTAC on the ground. The doctrine favors “dynamic targeting,” i.e., strikes on timely targets, validated in flight.
Figures
In 2017, CENTCOM authorized nearly 35,000 air sorties, including 11,500 actual strikes, illustrating the scale of the delegated process. The estimated operational cost was over 8.5 billion euros, with a constant involvement of 10 to 15 squadrons in rotation.
The Israeli model: maximum responsiveness and guided tactical decision-making
Israel applies a specific doctrine: extended tactical autonomy, speed of execution and centralized coordination.
Direct decision-making chain
The Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense are informed of strategic operations, but the IAF (Israeli Air Force) retains a high degree of latitude for pre-emptive strikes. The Chief of Staff and the IAF Commander quickly validate the targets.
Immediate strike capability
F-15I Ra’am or F-16I Sufa squadrons are capable of taking off in less than 10 minutes after being alerted. By 2023, more than 2,300 combat missions had been conducted without long planning, often via pre-programmed targeting (strike packages validated in advance).
Active deterrence doctrine
Israel favors tactical initiative. ROEs are designed to enable the rapid destruction of identified threats: anti-aircraft batteries, weapons depots, command structures. The challenge lies in anticipation, not diplomatic coordination.
Numerical examples
Between 2020 and 2022, the IAF carried out more than 1,200 targeted strikes in Syria, with an average planning time of less than 90 minutes, compared to several hours for a coalition strike.
The Russian model: rigid centralization and hierarchical cumbersomeness
The Russian air doctrine is based on a cumbersome, inflexible decision-making structure with a high degree of centralization.
Vertical command
The Kremlin retains control over engagement. President Vladimir Putin validates all major operations. The General Staff of the Armed Forces directs orders, which are relayed to the VKS (Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily). The doctrine favors massive strikes over tactical adaptation.
Joint forces integration
The regional joint command plans missions in coordination with artillery, land units and naval forces. Missions are often conducted in coordinated raids, with little leeway for fighter pilots.
ROE lacking transparency
The doctrine does not clearly communicate its rules of engagement. The operation in Syria since 2015 has seen massive strikes with no differentiation between strategic and tactical targets, causing significant collateral damage. In 2016, an OSINT study listed more than 3,500 bombing missions, mostly by Su-24 and Su-34.
War Wings Daily is an independant magazine.